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The title of this thesis, Contro l of the Value of Black Goldm iners ' Labour-  
Power in South Africa in the Early Indus tr ia l Period as a Consequence of the 
Disjuncture between the Rising Value of Gold and its 'Fixed Price', presents, in 
reverse, the sequence of arguments that make up this dissertation.
The revolution which took place in the value of gold, the measure of value, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, coincided with the need of 
international trade to hold fast the value-ratio at which the w orld 's various 
paper currencies represented a definite weight of gold. Movement in value did 
not translate into movement in price. Therefore, in order for this metal to be 
produced at all, even on the basis of simple reproduction, its value would 
have had to be lower than that value represented by its secular price.
The 'fixed price' of the product also acted as a value-barrier between gold 
m ining and industry in general. This m eant that gold m ining had to be 
responsible for its own surplus-value production, rather than, as does other 
industry, claim it from the general pool of surplus-value on the basis of the 
volume of capital invested. The size of its own variable capital, therefore, came 
to have an im m ediate bearing on its rate of su rp lus-value. For go ld - 
producing capital, the value of gold-producing labour-pow er becomes crucial 
to its function as capital. For gold production to be secured, appreciation in the 
value of gold-producing labour-pow er needed to be controlled. The early 
South African gold-m ining industry offers the clearest dem onstration of this. 
The object before us, therefore, is the value of labour-pow er in gold 
production.
This thesis offers three things: (i) a contribution towards a theory of gold; (ii) a 
reassessment of the great transformations that took place in the production 
and political economy of gold in the second half of the nineteenth century (a 
"re-appropriation of the material in detail"); (iii) an alternative explanation 
for the emergence of oppressive labour conditions on the South African gold 
m ines.
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When there is a general change of conditions, it is as if the entire creation 
had changed and the whole world been altered.





The title of this thesis, Control of the Value of Black G oldm iners’ 
Labo ur-P ow er in South Africa in the Early Industrial Period as a 
Consequence of the Disjucture between the Rising Value of Gold and  
its ‘Fixed Price’, presents, in reverse, the sequence of arguments that 
make up this dissertation.
The revolution which had taken place in the value of gold, the 
measure of value, in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
coincided with the need of international trade to hold fast the v a lu e -  
ratio at which the world’s various paper currencies represented a 
definite weight of gold. Movement in value did not translate into 
movement in price. Therefore, in order for this metal to be produced 
at all, even on the basis of simple reproduction, its value would have 
had to be lower than that value represented by its secular price.
The ‘fixed price’ of the product also acted as a value-barrier between 
gold-mining and industry in general. This meant that gold-mining had 
to be responsible for its own surplus-value production, rather than, 
as does other industry, claim it from the general pool of surplus-  
value on the basis of the volume of capital invested. The size of its 
own variab le  capital, therefore, came to have an immediate bearing 
on its rate of surplus-value. For gold-producing capital, the value of 
gold-producing labo ur-pow er becom es crucial to its function as 
capital. For gold production to be secured, appreciation in the value of 
gold-producing labour-power needed to be controlled. The early South 
African gold-m ining industry offers the clearest dem onstration of 
this. The object before us, therefore, is the value of labour-power in 
gold production.
In this thesis we shall offer three things: (i) a contribution towards a 
theory of gold; (ii) a reassessment of the great transformations that 
took place in the production and political economy of gold in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (a “re-appropriation of the 
m ateria l in d e ta i l”); (iii) an a lte rn a tive  exp lanation  for the  
emergence of oppressive labour conditions on the South African gold 
mines. Thus is this work divided into three corresponding sections.
Part II 
Statement of Method
Writings on the political economy of gold have been virtually 
monopolised by liberal economists since the time of the international 
gold standard system in the 1870s. This historiography has been 
erratic, consisting of floods of material at times of disquiet on the 
world economy, punctuated by periods of virtual silence. For example, 
writings in the 1880s and ’90s were directed at the gold standard and 
value-ratio between gold and silver. The next wave, from the end of 
the First World W ar to the 1930s , was concerned with the 
reinstatement of the collapsed gold standard and whether national 
currencies should be pegged to gold at the pre-w ar level. A trickle of 
literature links this period to the near-panic turnout of the 1960s  
and early 1970s. The relationship between the United States dollar 
and gold was here the principal issue. This was followed by another 
burst of m aterial in the early 1980s  when econom ists were  
dispairing over apparently uncontrollable inflation. From time to time 
there appeared re-eva luations  of earlier periods or themes. This 
voluminous body of literature is as much the work of academics as it 
is of finance ministry officials and practical banking men. There have 
also been a number of journalistic overviews.
All this literature starts from the received assumptions of neo­
classical economics. Alternative writing on gold, especially Marxist 
w riting , is con sp icu o u s  by its n e a r -a b s e n c e .  Th is  la tter
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historiography is introduced by Friederich Engels’ remarks in Volume 
II of Marx's C ap ita l .  There are some descriptions of South African 
gold production in John Hobson’s Im p e r ia l is m ,  while V.l. Lenin’s 
remarks on gold are known more for their graphic imagery than for 
their analytic content. Ernst M ande l’s Decline of the Dollar, which 
appeared in 1972, is a collection of essays he had written between 
1964 and 1972. In the same year Suzanne de Brunhoff published M a rx  
on Money, a work which makes no reference to Marx's G rundrisse.  In 
1981 the journal Capital and  Class  carried the article Capitalism and  
G o ld  by Duncan Innes. Anikin’s The Yellow Devil was translated from 
the Russian in 1983, the same year as Gool published his critique of 
South African go ld -m in ing  historiography, Mining Capitalism  and  
Black Labour in the Early Industrial Period in South Africa.
U n d e r s ta n d a b ly ,  S o u th  A fr ic a n  w r i te rs  h a v e  m a d e  a 
disproportionately high contribution to world scholarship in this 
area. This historiography has undergone its own evolution.1 An early 
radical interpretation of South African gold production is offered by 
Leo Katzen in his Gold and the South African Economy, published in 
1964. Much material exists as articles in journals (some of which are 
obscure), while many others are unpublished theses, such as Paul 
Trewhela’s thoughts on the gold question, committed to paper in 1981 
and 1986. In 1975 Michael Williams offered his theory of gold in an 
obscure London publication, Journal of the Conference of Socialist 
E c o n o m is ts .  A number of articles by Peter Richardson and J e a n -  
Jacque van Helten have appeared since 1977. Russell Ally’s thesis, 
The Bank of England and South Africa’s Gold, was lodged in 1990.
South African le ft-w ing  historiography on gold suffers from two 
particular weaknesses. Firstly, apart from Williams, Trew hela  and 
Innes, there have been few attempts to construct a political economy 
of gold. Theory, such as there is, consists either of quoting Marx (e.g., 
W illiam s), proposing arbitrary categories (e .g ., W olpe), or the 
academic project is dictated by an a priori objective to “place the 
African working-class more in the centre of the stage and attribute
1 See Gool. S. (1983).
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to its struggle a more central role”.2 If theoretical exploration  
cannot satisfactorily answer the question, “how does this inform the 
struggle?” then the exercise is scornfully dismissed as irrelevant.
Secondly, although there has been polemic, the writing does not 
constitute a debate.3 Every writer appears to have claimed a niche for 
himself in which he delves ever more deeply for original material. 
This, of course, has a very important role. But it is our view that 
while such work adds to information, it contributes less generously  
to understanding. Indeed, this division of labour and non-interference  
in one another’s ‘patch’ appears to rest on an unspoken quid pro quo. It 
has becom e an e lem en t of le ft -w in g  ac ad em ic  etiquette  to 
acknowledge a writer’s expertise if he has scoured an archive for 
original papers. When reference is made to work in another detailed 
area, conclusions are taken as proven and interpretations are taken to 
be the most representative of reality. To rework material already  
studied by others is seen as a waste of labour. Thus is the theoretical 
poverty both concealed and protected.
These two weaknesses result in a historiography which is not only 
em pir ic is t (a lb e it  le f t -e m p ir ic is t ) ,  but a lso p a ro c h ia l .  The  
explanation for the history of wages on the South African gold mines, 
e.g., comes down to the high cost of producing gold from low-grade  
ore (in the context of a fixed gold price) which the mines have  
managed to do because they have successfully split the working class 
along racial lines and incorporated the white workers into the control 
structure of the mines. This very formulation states that the 
“splitting” of the working class is a particular local solution to a 
world problem. But this world problem is never examined. The only 
possible relationship which can be allowed to exist between any 
particular country (especially a colony or ex-colony) and the world in 
general (but especially those countries possessed of la rg e -sca le
2 Gool, S. (1983), p16. Thus is any action on the part of labour which does not coincide with the 
interests of capital automatically put down to “resistance".
3 An exception to this is the debate triggered by Blainey’s The Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid 
in 1965.
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capital) is “imperialism”.4 “Monopoly capitalism” is a similar article 
of faith. Once this has been stated, theoretical obligations have been 
fulfilled and the scholar can get on with the task of examining new 
material in order that “the struggle” may be “better informed”. In 
other words, where a global context is acknowledged, this is either 
done uncritically or it is only invoked in the service of telling the 
story of South African  capitalism.
The category around which this dissertation is constructed is the 
value of labour-power. This means that the value of labour-power is 
used as a probing device in the service of thought. All manner of 
disparate facts settle into a coherent relationship if we keep our 
eyes focused on the value of labour-power. But why is this not as 
arbitrary  as, say, “focusing on” m onopoly cap ita lism ? W hat  
consistently emerges from analysis is a question of whether or not 
and, if so, then how, gold-producing labour reproduces itself. The 
material examined in detail is not only South African, and not only 
from the turn of the century. The factual base of this thesis covers 
antiquity, the classical world, the Middle Ages, pre-colonial Africa 
and South America, California, Virginia, Colorado, British Columbia, 
Alaska and the Klondike, Australia, New Zealand, India, Siberia, jo int-  
stock companies, the industrial revolutions, the abolition of slavery, 
the technical aspects of mining in general and go ld -m in ing  in 
particular, the evolution of money (both historically and as a 
category) in addition to the history of southern Africa from c.1870 to 
c.1910. This list is declared only by way of saying that the use of the 
category va lue  of la b o u r-p o w e r  is not a case  of “a priori  
positionalism ”, to borrow Eddie W e b s te r ’s lovely phrase. The  
material examined suggested its own category.
The value of labour-power is not a ‘Marxist’ category. It is used in 
many different places, although not always by the same nam e.5 Our 
project deals with the relationship between the value of labour-  
power and the production of the material gold. Our problem thus
4 Thus, e.g., are an investigation into the transfer of capital between “the imperialist countries" 
and South Africa; or the machinations of the British Colonial Office in the region legitimate areas 
of study.
5 See, e.g., the neo-classical economics essay Bonacich, E. (1972).
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transcends both that of the money-commodity and that of capital. We  
have conducted our investigation according to the method employed 
by Marx in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy  and the 
G ru n d r is s e ,  and explained in the latter. Our understanding of the 
nature of labour-power, commodity, money, capital, etc. derives from 
these two works plus Marx's Capital.  Having said that, we must state 
that we have deliberately shied away from simply quoting from Marx 
as ‘proof of our assertions. Instead of this we have attempted to 
d erive  our propositions for ourselves. W e have, after all, the benefit 
of a large body of material not available to Marx. Most of the time our 
results coincide with those of Marx, but sometimes they do not. 
Where they do not, we have tried to show why we think Marx in error. 
W e think it necessary to state this because there are scholars for 
whom critique of Marx borders on impertinence. Since we do not 
subscribe to critique by quotation, it is up to those who understand 
Marx better than we do to demonstrate our shortcomings and thereby 
improve our understanding.
In this thesis, a clear distinction is maintained between gold as u s e -  
value and gold as money; and between gold as money and gold as 
capital. At every stage of the investigation these are first considered 
in isolation from one another, and then in their inter-relation. This is 
method-ologically different from what appears to be the practice in 
the literature  w h ere  forms are  reduced to static e lem ents  
independent of one another. Labour, product, commodity, money and 
capital are not understood as forms. Form A which posits form B is 
itself, in turn, posited by form B as form Ai. Although labour posits 
commodity production, under commodity production labour itself 
takes a different form to labour which has not been posited by 
commodity production. Similarly the commodity before and after it 
has posited money, or money before and after it has posited capital. 
Labour may posit capital, but capital posits labour as wage-labour. 
So, too, is the commodity which arises out of capitalist production a 
different form of commodity to that which gives rise to capitalist 
production. This distinction between whether a form posits or is 
posited is very important to our thesis, especially since it is the self 
same material, gold, which is at the same time product, commodity, 
money and capital, without, in essence, having to change its p h ys ica l
form. To begin to understand the complex role of gold in the modern 
world, it is necessary to be clear on when this substance presents as 
commodity, when money and when capital.
Methodologically, therefore, one is required first to consider gold 
simply as a thing, to appreciate it as a concentrate of physical 
attributes and to know the m ateria l/technica l character of its 
production. Then it must be viewed as a commodity, subject to all the 
laws applicable to commodities. The subsequent question then 
becomes one of understanding how these laws express themselves in 
a commodity which has isolated itself from the general body of 
commodities and stands opposed to it. In other words, how do the 
laws of commodities translate into the laws of money, and similarly, 
the laws of money into the laws of capital? While the social form of 
this objectified labour takes all these different forms, the material 
form of that objectified labour, a lump of gold, remains the same. 
This means that the same material presents simultaneously in all 
these different social forms. But the commodity is, by definition, a 
contradiction, and money and capital are developed moments of that 
contradiction. Gold, in its social character, must demonstrate all of 
these. The labour which produces commodities is posited, socially, as 
com m odity-producing labour. Similarly, the labour which produces 
money is posited as money-producing labour, and that producing 
c a p ita l ,  c a p i ta l -p r o d u c in g  labo ur (w a g e - la b o u r ) .  G o ld  is, 
sim ultaneously  a concentra te  of this contradiction at all its 
moments. A concern of this thesis is to examine the character of that 
labour which objectifies itself in this socially polymorphous way.
The period covered in detail by this thesis begins with the opening of 
the California goldfields in 1849 and ends with the repatriation of 
Chinese indentured labourers from the W itw atersrand in 1907, 
although occasionally reference is made to situations falling outside 
of this period. During the latter half of the nineteenth century gold 
production changed from being based predominantly on placers to 
being based predominantly on lodes. The o n e -m a n  digger was  
replaced by the joint-stock company. Capital requirements changed  
from pick, shovel and pan to hundreds of thousands of pounds. Slavery 
was replaced by w age-labour. The industrial revolution (eventually)
cam e to mining and, in the overall mining production process, the 
balance between underground work and surface work altered very 
strongly in favour of the latter. In short, there was a revolution in 
gold production.
The earliest comprehensive account of these developments, as far as 
we have been able to ascertain, was Alfred Lock’s 1,229-page G o ld :  
Its Occurrence and. Extraction , which appeared in 1882, one year  
before M arx’s d eath .6 There have been major treatises on the gold 
question in the wake of the California and Australia discoveries, but 
these tended to speculate on the probability of the price of gold  
retaining its traditional stability. W hat concerned scholars at this 
time was the dramatic rise in gold o u tp u t  from the increasingly  
scientific working of the placers, rather than the eventual depletion 
of those placers and the re-organisation of gold production on a 
different value-basis. All the authorities whom Marx could consult, 
fell within this category.7 Marx's treatment of the gold question is 
inadequate. But this is not only on account of his sources— the 
political economy of gold was not his project. His project was to lay 
bare the laws governing production on the basis of capital.8 To this 
end, a detailed political economy of the production of this material 
would serve no purpose. His most important insight into gold is the 
nature of surplus-value extraction where gold has already become  
money. This is part of his exposition of the evolution of exchange  
value: to wit, its assumption of an independence from particular 
commodities. But on the basis of Marx's understanding of exchange  
value alone, one would not be able to explain, where production is 
based on free labour or free wage-labour, but “when the object is 
[still] to obtain exchange value in its specific independent money- 
form’’, why the “recognised form of over-work” is n o t  “working to 
death”— contrary to his conclusion in C ap ita l . W e will show that many
6 Marx also appears to have been unaware of the US Government’s Gold Panic Investigation 
R eport of 1870.
7 Marx’s sources included Jacob, W. (1968a) and (1968b), both originally published in 1831; 
Chevalier, M. (1859); Soetbeer, A. (1879), etc. Soetbeer’s reticence is surprising, given that 
by the 1870s, placer production was already revolutionised. Most of the information available to 
Lock in 1881, would also have been available to Soetbeer in 1878.
8 “ln this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of 
production and exchange corresponding to that mode”, Marx, K. (1983), p19 (Preface to the 
first German edition).
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of M arx's utterances on gold are not particularly  helpful in 
constructing a political economy of gold.
This dissertation will attempt to prove that the infamous labour 
practices on the South African gold mines are a direct expression of 
the developm ents discussed above, both in terms of the social 
evolution of money, and in terms of the technical revolution in go ld-  
production. W e suggest that the existence of a low-productivity, low- 
value labo ur-fo rce  in the region offered go ld-m in ing capital an 
opportunity to c ircum vent the ab sen ce  of lo w -v a lu e ,  h ig h -  
productivity production in gold-mining in general. Other gold-mining  
areas around the world at the time were not so ‘fortunate’.
Part III
Some General Points on the Occurrence and Production of Gold
The history of gold production and technical questions about its 
geological occurrence and its mining and processing, do not generally 
fall within the remit of the social scientist. Many of the discussions 
which will follow below require  som e fam iliarity  with such 
historical and technical questions. For the benefit of the reader not 
familiar with these aspects of gold production, we offer these  
general points by way of introduction.
Gold occurs on or near to the earth ’s surface in two principal 
conditions: (i) the first of these is p lac e r  deposits  (commonly and 
inaccurately known as ‘a lluvial’9 gold). These are deposits which
®Alluvial gold is a particular variety of placer gold. Placers may occur in a number of varieties, 
of which stream (alluvial) placers have historically been by far the most important, (e.g., 
Klondike). Eluvial placers are distinguished from alluvial placers in that they are not created by 
stream s, but by rainfall and wind, which carry aw ay the lighter m aterials, thereby  
concentrating the gold (e.g., early Australian deposits). Beach placers are formed by the 
different rates at which heavier and lighter materials are shifted by wave action and shore 
currents, thereby concentrating them (e.g., Nome gold, Alaska). In the case of eolian placers, the 
principle of concentration is the same as in all other varieties of placers, except that the wind 
acts as concentrating agent removing fine particles of the lighter dross (e.g., some Australian 
deposits).
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originated elsewhere and at a later stage ended up ‘placed’ in these 
locations, mainly by movement of water, but also by movement of 
wind and sand. Since they are relatively younger than their matrix, 
they are not geologically integrated with it and hence relatively easy 
to extract. Such gold is usually native gold, i.e., in metallic condition, 
thus restricting necessary processing to physical extraction.
Not all placer deposits occur on the surface. Deposits created during 
past geological era lie buried deep beneath many layers of more 
recently formed strata and hence are called deep placers. This is 
particularly so beneath modern gold-bearing river beds. While the 
working of placer deposits, therefore, mainly involve surface work, 
an elem ent of both open cast and underground mining is also 
associated with this kind of deposit. Extracting such underground  
deposits involves the additional difficulties and complications of 
underground mining, but the gold remains geologically distinct from 
its matrix. Placer deposits are characterised by high yields of gold 
per unit ore and relatively quick reward for effort. Almost all gold 
mined up to the third quarter of the nineteenth century occurred in 
nature as placers.
(ii) The second condition of naturally occurring gold is as /o d e s .10 
Lodes differ from placers principally in that lodes are sites of the 
original formation/concentration of the element at a very early time 
in the formation of the earth. Such gold occurs in a condition where it 
is integral with its matrix and thus not amenable to segregation (or, 
often, detection) by simple physical means. The lodes themselves  
occur either in fissures which occasionally puncture the surface as 
outcrops, or as massives, being simply ‘bubbles’ of gold-bearing  
material suspended in other rock. The matrix itself is often quartz 
and hence extremely hard compared to placer matrixes. The gold 
particles themselves tend to be minute, often not visible to the naked 
eye and their segregation from the matrix involves chemical 
treatment of the ore after the latter had been sufficiently pulverised 
to allow for adequate contact with all its particles.
1 0 Not to be confused with veins, of which lodes are but the metalliferous variety. Naturally, 
geologists would talk of veins, while miners would talk of lodes.
12.
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(iii) Conglomerates,  a hybrid of placers and lodes, is the third 
condition in which gold occurs natural ly on earth. These are placers 
of such ancient age that they pre-date the final violent geological 
upheavals in the formation of the earth’s c rust .11 The original placers 
were put through a process not unlike that of lode formation. Under 
condit ions of the most extreme heat and violent pressure, the gold 
and its matrix got fused into an integrated quartz body, so that, 
al though strictly speaking a placer, the condit ion of the gold within 
its matrix resembles that of a lode. Such gold is described as 
occurring in quartz lodes (also described as reefs). The gold deposits 
of the Witwatersrand fall into this category. For the purposes of this
11 O pinion is divided as to the setting-down of the conglom erate beds.
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study, therefore, conglomerates may be regarded in the same way as 
lode gold.12
The first feature of placer mining to strike the scholar investigating 
its history, is the remarkable constancy of its labour process. This 
process has been virtually unaltered for millennia and occurs in much 
the same form the world over. A vessel (pan, calabash, batea, etc.) is 
used for scooping up ore which is then ‘washed’ in water by the water 
and lighter particles being allowed to spill across the edge through a 
steady rotary motion of the arms, relying on centrifugal force to 
restrain the gold particles, which are more massive, within the 
vessel. In many cases this work is divided amongst a team, the latter 
often consisting of men, wom en and children. Th e  furthest 
development in placer mining by the mid-nineteenth century appears 
to be the channelling of water-borne ore through troughs or ditches 
equipped with transverse riffles to trap the slower moving heavier 
particles. Such a system was, however, also in use in ancient Egypt.13
The first, ‘surface work’ involves sifting and prising from placer 
deposits either on or within about five metres of, the surface. At its 
most sophisticated level in antiquity, this involved a series of holes 
in the ground, in other words, a lowering of the surface, rather than a 
puncturing of it in order to work beneath it. From about 1900, large- 
scale placer mining has been carried on by means of dredgers, 
especially in the USSR. Except where the ore occurs from surface to 
depth over a wide area, the hole sometimes simply get bigger and 
bigger, eventually turning into a pit or an open-cast mine. Surface  
work is the earliest and most simple mode since it can be carried out 
with the bare hands or absolutely minimal mechanical aids and is 
associated with the most primitive of peoples.14
12Gold is also recovered as a by-product of base-metal mining.
1 3 Lock, A. (1882), pp6-10.
1 4 Drawing on the letters from W est Africa of the German explorer Bosman, Lock says that, 
“gold is found in three sites. The first and best was ‘in or between particular hills’; the negroes 
sank pits there and seperated the soil adhering to it. The second ‘is in, at, and about some 
rivers’. The third is on the sea-shore, near the mouths of rivulets, and the favourite time for 
washing is after the violent rains”, ib id., pp26-7. In British Columbia, “the gold is in large 
particles, and is obtained by the Indians in crevices among and beneath the stones in the river", 
ibid., p51. Further, in the eastern Transvaal, one prospector reports that, “a body of Kafirs 
were at work breaking out quartz, in which the free gold was easily visible”, ibid., p20. “The 
spots containing the metal are known by the bare and barren surface. The natives dig in any
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The second mode, ‘deep digging’, or ‘mining’ (as understood until the 
1890s and not to be confused with the ‘deep-level mining’ of 
W itw atersrand fam e) also involves p lacer deposits. This time, 
however, they are located too deep underground or within mountain 
crevices, thereby making surface work impractical. All the goldmines 
from antiquity to the mid-nineteenth century were of this kind. Since 
the deposits, were placers, the matrixes in which they occurred were 
invariably relatively young and consisting of material which was 
relatively recently disturbed. There is no ‘organic’ bond between the 
gold and its surrounding material. It is therefore am enab le  to 
extraction with the aid of hammers and chisels or pick-axes. This 
mode is thus dependent on the art and science of metal-working and 
metallurgy already having been achieved. Since the technology of 
propping and— equally importantly in some cases, as in ancient Egypt—  
the material for propping were not available, the shaft with galleries 
or stopes developed much later than mining in mountains, where the 
rock supported itself, although the former, too, have been in use for 
c e n tu r ie s .15
Once retrieved as ore, the gold particles need to be separated from 
the non-gold particles. This usually involves some manner of washing 
in water. In the case of placer gold this process is in most cases 
identical with that of extraction, since the gold already occurs as 
either nuggets, grains, flakes, specs or dust, or, if embedded in rock, 
the latter occur as pebbles of various sizes requiring first to be 
pulverised by means of hammers. Because gold is one of the heavier
small crevice made by the rains of the preceding winter, and there find gold-dust. These potholes 
are rarely deeper than 2 or 3 ft.; at 5 or 6 ft. they strike the bed-rock. In the still portions of 
the rivers, when they are low, the natives dig for nuggets that have been washed down from the 
hills. Sometimes, joining together in hundreds, they deflect the stream, and find extensive 
deposits", {ibid., p15), and in Mexico, “Glennie found a number of Indians suspended by ropes 
from the [mountain] crests, picking out the earth containing the gold with wooded stakes", ibid.,
p 1 10.
^A cco rd in g  to Scherzer, “the date when the mines of Yuscaran [in Honduras] ...w ere first 
opened, ...is not on record: many of them appear to have been worked for centuries. Five are now 
(1857) systematically worked. The Malacate mine, the oldest in Yuscaran... was, about seven 
years ago, taken by a company, who expended great sums in clearing away the rubbish by which 
the galleries were choked, in order to get to the principal lode. But after 7 seven years of 
continued digging... the point has not yet been reached where the former miners left off 
working", Lock, A. (1882), p100. “La Mina del Oro [New Mexico]... is certainly very ancient... 
the work was done before ...1680. The principal shaft is over 200 ft. deep",ibid., p179.
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metals, it can, by the motion of water, be segregated from other, 
lighter material. At its simplest level, this involves panning, as 
described above. Whether amongst Ashanti women on the Gold Coast, 
Californian Forty-Niners, or Australian Fossickers, panning involves 
the identical process.
The most important points about placer mining relevant to the 
construction of a political economy of gold, though, are, (i) that gold 
occurs in nature in a ready-to-use metallic (native) form; (ii) the 
historical and geographical constancy of production technique; (iii) 
the, on average, fairly constant yield per unit labour expended; (iv) 
the fact that placer mining can be carried on by single individuals 
working as isolated units without any form of co-operation between  
them; and, (v) that this labour may be carried on using only the most 
primitive of technical aids. These five points are most important in 
securing for this material its money role eventually in all commodity 
economies, as we shall see below.
Though not abundant, the natural occurrence of gold on the surface of 
the earth is fairly widespread, so that the initial form of ‘extraction’ 
involved little more than sifting and prising for the gold to be 
claimed from nature.
The Technical Constraints on Underground and Lode Mining
It is, however, in the technical nature of mining, all mining, but
especially of ore-based metals, that the principal concrete labours 
particular to it involve hammering, digging and hauling (and washing). 
This has been a feature constant to it from the earliest mining up to 
the present century. The first purpose here is to discuss these
t e c h n i c a l  constraints and show how mining, by its nature, is
different from other industries. The limited object being to ensure 
that what is peculiar to mining in general is not assumed to be 
peculiar to gold mining in particular. W e are interested in these 
features in so far as they distinguish mining labour from other
labour, on the one hand, and gold-mining labour from other mining 
labour, on the other. These may be listed as:
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(i) It is almost always the case that the site of mining production is 
in an inaccessible place— such as deep underground. Extractive  
industries offer the producer no choice of site of production. The  
material has to be extracted from where it had been deposited by the 
chance forces of nature, even though a greater or lesser degree of 
final processing can take place at a site removed from the primary 
and more to the producer’s convenience.16
(ii) Initially, those sites in closest proximity to the centres of 
settlement (and production) will, naturally, have been the first to be 
exploited, i.e., earlier in the evolution of technique, rather than later. 
This, of course, is not to suggest that centres of settlement did not 
spring up at distant occurrences of minerals, hence gold rushes.17 
Broadly speaking, though, it can be said that these developments  
describe a coincidence. As technique developed, so, unrelatedly, did 
the d istance betw een the centres of its most concentra ted  
application and the mines themselves increase. Not only did this 
impede the conveyance to the site of mine production of whatever 
technology was available, but the servicing of that technology and the 
work-force on site, be it by man, beast, water, wind or fire, was 
made very difficult, if not impossible. E.g.:
“Difficulties encountered [in opening up the Tati goldfield, Matabeleland], were the 
want of pumping machinery, and the great cost of transport from the coast”18;
“Ramses ...turned his particular attention to the gold-districts which had been 
discovered, and especially to the Nubian gold mines... But water was wanting in the 
dreary sterile valleys of the mountainous country, and men and beasts died on the 
roads to the gold-districts”19.
(iii) Often the site itself did not admit anything larger than a 
stooping or crawling man (and often not even that) since labour spent 
removing superfluous material is labour lost from the rockface. In a
1 6 Liquid material, such as oil, offers less site restriction. This is especially the case with off­
shore production, where a single platform can serve a number of widely dispersed well-heads 
delivering to it by undersea pipeline. It must be remembered, though, that liquid extraction, 
except for water from wells, is a relatively modern industry.
1 S e v e n te e n th  century Cossacks hoped to encourage the Russian government, “to establish 
those needful posts and centres of supply and trade, the demands for which increased with the 
wealth which these brigands had obtained through plunder and placer mining", Del Mar, A. 
(1969), p377.
18 Lock, A. (1882), p15.
1 9 ibid ., p6.
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mine there is simply no room in which to manoeuvre anything much 
larger than a man, let alone whatever might be required to operate it. 
Coal mining in Victorian Britain offended even the gentlefolk with its 
images of wretched children crawling along galleries harnessed to 
loaded cocopans .20 Mining is therefore compelled to forsake a great 
many technical developments generally available to other industries, 
restricting itself to the bare minimum m eans w ithout which 
production could not take place— the labourers equipped with hand- 
tools.
And by way of proving that this is not a case of social form, one 
might select exam ples from a few places very different to the 
country  a t the fo re fro n t of n in e tee n th  c e n tu ry  c a p ita lis t  
development, e.g., Stalin’s Russia:
“The tunnels inside the mines were so narrow that two people could hardly walk 
side by side, and the height hardly permitted a medium-sized fellow to walk unless 
bent from the middle. In some places the gallery was so badly excavated that we had 
to advance on our knees and hands"2 1 ;
and Tacquah, in pre-colonial West Africa:
“The head- and foot- walls are composed of syenite, as hard as flint, through which 
the natives are unable to penetrate, so that, unless the reef itself is wide enough to 
allow a man to work in it with elbow room on each side, they can do nothing with 
it"2 2 .
(iv) The basic actions of hammering, digging and hauling, concrete 
labour which characterised mining through the ages, are actions of 
brute force. The application of concentrated force at a specific point, 
until relatively recently, required the congregation of a large number 
of discreet force units within the proximity of that point. The two 
hundred slaves required to haul one granite block themselves took up 
an area much larger than the block which they hauled. By the eve of 
the introduction of steam  ships, sailing ships, by then at their 
largest and carrying greater than ever cargoes so as to make oceanic 
voyages as economically viable as possible, could hardly be seen for 
their sails. Coaches and wagons could convey heavier loads only by
2 0 Prospective South African mine workers are put through stringent psychological tests to 
ascertain their susceptibility to claustrophobia.
21 Conquest, R. (1978), p122.
2 2 Lock, A. (1882), p32.
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the addition of more beasts23. Prior to the invention of bellows, the 
concentration of great heat in a small area so as to enable smelting 
was a serious problem. The solutions, though sometimes ingenious, 
always involved an area many times larger than that of the material 
worked on.24 The point here being that concentration of force could 
only be achieved where space permitted the congregation of a large 
aggregate of relatively small discreet force units. Mining, therefore, 
by its very nature, had to wait for the invention of electricity (or, at 
least, steam power), pneumatic tools and dynamite, before force 
greater than can be mustered by a man equipped with hand tools could 
be systematically introduced.
The crudeness of mining technology can be illustrated by many 
examples from around the globe and from all ages. “Until late in the 
1950s”, says Conquest, “prisoners were still working with picks and 
axes as their only tools"25. These words, describing the Siberian  
prison mines at Kolyma, could have been said about almost any mine, 
whether prison or not, Stalinist or not. And in the gold mines of the 
pharaohs: “the strongest men worked in the tunnels, breaking the rock 
with iron hammers, while the old men and children carried the ore to 
the crushers, where it was broken up by the men and then further 
ground by w om en”26. And, staying with ancient Egypt, “Thereupon  
[after opening of the new gold mines by Seti], everything was done to 
carry on gold-washing to success. The people who followed this 
laborious occupation were placed under the supervision of a hir-pit or 
‘overseer of the foreign peoples’”27.
Mining is, therefore, an industry which could only benefit from 
technological advancement once technique in general had developed
2 3 Hence “horse power” as a unit of motive force.
2 4 “The [North American] Indian method of smelting these metals was one of the most 
remarkable devices of savage ingenuity; ...Having first hollowed out a flat stone to form a basin, 
they filled it with charcoal, and upon this laid the nuggets of metal. A number of Indians then 
seated themselves in a circle around the basin, each one having in his hand a long reed, pierced 
through its entire length, and armed at one end with a clay tube or pipe. Everything being ready, 
fire was applied to the charcoal, and the whole mass instantly blown into a powerful heat through 
the reeds, the clay extremities of which were inserted in the basin”, (Lock, A. (1882), p122).
2 5 Conquest, R. (1978), p122.
2 6 0bserver, 02 .07 .89 .
2 7 Lock, A. (1882), p6.
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beyond a certain level, that level being for mining much further along 
the line of genera l technological deve lopm ent than for other 
in d u s tr ie s .28 Mining could, for all this time, only achieve increased 
production through the intensification of labour. More material could 
be broken from the rockface only by slinging more human bodies at it. 
Mine labour is or was, therefore, a lready on account of this 
circumstance alone, brutal and oppressive.29
(v) But it becomes even more so, when one looks at points (ii) and (iv) 
in their mutual interrelation. Given that over time gold became  
increasingly inaccessible, both through being mined at greater depth, 
and through new fields being developed at greater distance, labour 
requirements increased simply to retrieve the same amounts of gold. 
While this has the effect of increasing the value of gold, it also 
serves to push production to the technical threshold beyond which no 
increase in labour input could grant access to known reserves. This 
can be e ither because the gold is simply located too deep  
underground, or in too inhospitable a terrain, or is locked into a 
particular variety of ore for the nature or yield of which retrieval 
processes had yet to be developed.
Placer Mining (Gold-Washing) and Lode Gold Mining Compared
If placer mining had remained virtually unaltered for centuries, the 
same can be said for lode mining. Ore bodies, which may also be of 
the massive variety (see Fig. 1), were reduced by being set about by 
slaves or other forced labour equipped with hammers, chisels, picks 
and shovels. Once retrieved, the ore had to be crushed and pulverised. 
This, again, was a matter of sledge-hammers and brute force. The 
pulverised material was then treated with mercury in a process
2 8 A similar case can be made for construction, which, until the development of prefabrication, 
involved, for the greatest part, the laying of stone upon stone, or brick upon brick, thus keeping 
the nature of a large part of its concrete labour constant for millinia. Unlike mining, however, 
construction has neither the problem of a production site dictated by nature, nor the problem of 
confined space.
2 9 “Modern mining methods use state of the art technology for drilling and blasting to reach the 
gold-bearing ores, which are then taken away for processing. The ancient Egyptians used slave 
labour. Agatharchides, a Greek writer from 150 BC visited some of the Egyptian mines and 
described methods that had not changed for hundreds of years", Observer, 02.07.89.
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known as amalgamation. Further processing retrieved the gold, but 
much was lost.
In lode mining access to the site of production is usually admitted 
only at one point: the shaft head.30 Placers admit diffused access in 
that gold may be retrieved, e.g., all the way along a river, both from 
its bed and from both banks including a certain distance up the valley 
walls. Gold may also be sought in the estuary and a certain distance 
into the sea and along the beaches adjoining the estuary. Upstream  
gold may be found all the way to the lode from which the placer 
orig inates .
The phenomenon of a gold rush ,^  therefore, takes on a completely 
different meaning depending on whether the gold in question occurs 
as lode or placer. Placer gold rushes are characterised by a possessed 
mass of countless Godless individuals all feverishly outdoing one 
another to stake claims over a large area. Most of the time this 
involves no cost other than that of a fearsome w eapon.32 The loss 
involved in the loss of a c la im — w hether voluntarily  through  
abandonment or sale, or involuntarily (as was more likely to be the 
case) through economic or physical coercion— is little more than the 
labour-time expended on it.
When lode gold triggers a gold rush, the only feverish activity likely 
to occur is on the stock market as various associations for gain seek 
to establish themselves as joint stock companies. Indeed, gold rushes
3 0 Modern mining safety standards require at least two points of access to a mine.
31 By “gold rush” we mean a frantic and uncontrolled scramble to extract gold from a known or 
suspected source regardless of the general condition of trading activity. This is not the same as 
“gold quest", by which we understand the conscious searching for gold without any source 
necessarily suspected or identified, such search being driven by a sudden need for gold for 
restoration or continuation of commercial intercourse. Some writers, i.a., W achtel, H. (1990), 
loosely employ the former term to designate both conditions. This does not, of course, mean that 
these could not coincide, as they did, e.g., in the case of the Witwatersrand.
3 2 Apart from attempting to limit the size of claims, the dominion authorities in Canada in 1900 
imposed the following charges in British Columbia: “an individual miner’s certificate (permit to 
mine) is $5: for a stock company of $100,000 capital or less, $50; for other companies, $100; 
for a Crown grant, $5; for recording a certificate or claim, or an affidavit, or generally  
speaking, any paper, the fee is $2.50; and when of unusual length, 30 cents per folio additional”, 
Del Mar, A. (1969), p428. Del Mar does not say whether and how the miners managed to pay 
this. When licence charges were imposed in Australia in 1854, insurrection broke out. See 
Buranelli, V. (1981), pp82-6.
21
associated with this kind of deposit is a phenomenon presupposing 
the existence of a capital market. Gold occurring in this form is 
almost always inaccessible to the individual and prior to the 
existence of joint stock companies only exploitable by the state, 
whether directly on its own account (Russia, Rome, etc.) or indirectly 
through, e.g., chartered companies, sponsored expeditions (Latin 
America), etc. Only bodies such as these disposed o /£ r  the necessary 
coercive force to secure labour and keep it working under necessarily 
brutal conditions. The degree of technological development did not 
allow for the worker prising quartz to be a free agent.33
In the case of placer gold rushes, possession of the land invariably 
takes precedence over ownership. One of the symptoms of gold fever 
is that the sufferer is not overly concerned with the niceties of title 
deeds and the like, as the illustrious John Augustus Sutter learned at 
the cost of first his sanity, then his life.34 Because of the enormous  
amounts of capital involved and the time the owner will have to
spend on site before any gold is recovered, ownership of a lode source
becomes as important as possession. The mine owner is thus often
involved in a mass of fees, licences, permits, taxation, insurance,
leases, etc., not to mention purchasing of adjoining lands in case the 
ore body extends beneath the boundary.35 All this apart from the 
securing of long term supplies in what is often an inaccessible area, 
and the additional expenses of underground exploration. The extent, 
grade, location and nature of the ore body needs to be fairly exactly 
established not only to secure capital, but to keep much capital from 
drifting off to more profitable ventures.
While in the case of placers the gold occurs in native form, that in 
lodes constitutes an ingredient of a fused gold-bearing ore. There is,
3 3 This held right up till 1971, when the price of gold could once again proceed from its value.
3 4 Cendrars, B. (1982). Only the pen of a novelist can capture the richness/poverty of 
life/death which is a gold rush.
3 5 One of the major staumbling blocks to the development of a gold-mining industry in the USA 
was its gold law, which allowed for the auriferous ore to be pursued underground beyond the 
boundary of the property upon which the works have been erected. This caused endless litigation 
and interruption of production, further adding to speculative pressures to make money by buying 
and selling shares to “prospective" mines, rather than from the sale of production. See, e.g., 
Lindley, C. (1897). On the Witwatersrand, the mines endevoured to have all ambiguous property 
laws clarified very early on, but also improved their position by buying up as much contiguous 
property as possible.
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therefore, much less gold in a unit of lode ore than in the same unit 
of placer ore. In placer mining the gold can be available from the 
moment someone cares to pick it up. In lode mining there is a 
necessary time lag between labour first being applied, and usable 
gold emerging. Lode yields are, therefore, always much less than 
placer yields, whether considered by unit tonnage of ore, time input 
or labour input. Historically, much less mining took place by this 
method than by the placer method, so that the socially necessary 
labour-time for the production of gold was set by placers.36
Since the end product of both methods is the same homogeneous  
material, lode mining was therefore necessarily much more brutal 
than placer mining. The distinction between placer gold and lode gold 
thus lies not only in the technical difference, but in the different 
ways in which they are significant in a political economy of gold.
3 6 The value distinction between placer gold and lode gold is also borne out by technologically 
backward peoples tending to produce gold from the former, rather than the latter source, as Del 
Mar accounts:
“During the whole of the 17th century bands of predatory Cossacks roamed through these 
vast [Siberian] domains, prospecting, conquering, plundering the inhabitants, ransacking 
the Tschudi sepulchres, prospecting again, washing the river sands for gold, digging 
through the turf ...into the frozen placers below, or pointing out to the government where 
quartz mines might be located (for they themselves cares nothing for quartz), and where 
serfs or convicts might be led to delve for gold and silver", Del Mar, A. (1969), p377.
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ITowards a Theory of Gold
24.
Introduction
One of the most tenacious problems of economics, both Marxist and 
orthodox, is how to account for the behaviour of gold as an economic 
thing. Orthodox economists quickly exhaust their range of explanatory 
options when they either try to squeeze gold into their supply and 
demand curves, or just insist that things were better in the days of 
“hard money”. Marxist economists, on the other hand, can do no better 
than simply to quote Marx, or to dismiss the whole gold question with 
a few remarks.
No single commodity has displayed the kind of economic history that 
gold has. When something is for millennia synonymous with stability, 
invariability, constancy, etc., and suddenly, over a period of mere  
decades, comes to be associated with daily fluctuations, then there 
are some serious processes at work which require more than the kind 
of ‘sectional interest’ attention it seems to have received to date. 
T h e  volte -face  in the economic role of gold which occured in the late 
nineteenth century still awaits satisfactory explanation.
In detail, how can one explain South Africa without being able to 
explain the material singularly responsible for its existence as a 
modern state? But it would be a mistake to see the need for a theory 
of gold only in terms of explaining South Africa. The position should 
rather be the reverse, with South Africa illustrating the workings of 
such a theory. A theory of gold would have to distinguish between the 
material nature of gold, the technical nature of its production, and 
its social form, and yet grasp the relationship between these. It must 
be able to trace and account for the evolution of gold through its 
various social forms. A theory of gold would have to lay bare the laws 
by which this evolution of social forms takes place, and trace its 
implication not only in the relation between gold and other things 
(objectified labour), i.e., in circulation, but also between gold and 
living labour, i.e., in its own production. In other words, a theory of 
gold must embrace a political economy of gold. These are the terms 
of reference of the first section of this dissertation. It must be
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remembered throughout this dissertation that we are dealing with a 
period when gold did actually circulate as money. Its conclusions 
cannot be transfered wholesale to the late twentieth century, since 
the social forms of gold which begin to emerge during the period 
under investigation and only reach m aturity in the 1970s ,  





The exploration of gold specifically as money is necessary for three 
reasons: (i) the form on the one hand, has its own laws which are but 
tendencies in the commodity form and are also distinct from the laws 
of commodities, and on the other, demonstrates tendencies which 
become laws in the capital form; (ii) in the period under review, the 
dominant social form of gold was money, and not yet capital, although 
it was undergoing the transformation from the former to the latter 
during this period; and (iii) Marx's treatment of gold is incomplete in 
that his exploration of gold is ancillary to his exploration of capital.
We are looking at gold in a period when it made the transition from 
circulating as money, to: (i) its increasing confinement to hoards; and 
(ii) its progressive marginalisation from the functions of money. In 
this dissertation, these developments are not followed through to the 
subordination of money economy to credit economy. Although silver 
also, for the greater part of this period, circulated as money, it is 
specifically excluded from this discussion. This is done partly 
because by the m id -1 8 7 0 s , silver had been alm ost com pletely  
eclipsed by gold as international medium of circulation and means of 
p a y m e n t ,37 and partly because the relationship between gold and 
silver has no bearing on the exploration of the value of gold-producing 
labo ur-pow er.38
3 7 Large silver-based economies persisted, though, e.g., India, China, Spain.
3 8 We offer a brief mention of the silver:gold value-ratio question in Section II.
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Gold and the Functions of Money
Gold has, until the twentieth century, always been associated with 
two attributes, viz. constancy and uniformity. These two attributes 
have consistently drawn comment in the literature, one scholar even 
making them the subject and title of a book.39 Although this
constancy and uniformity are each given proper attention and they are 
often discussed together, it is seldom that an inherent relation 
between them is brought out. Seldom, too, is a c lear relation
established between the m a te r ia l  character of gold as a particular 
metal, and its socia l  character as the money-commodity. While many 
scholars do point out that in all exchange societies the role of money 
eventually comes to settle upon the precious metals— and gold in 
particular— we could find no attempt to theorise why gold in one 
society appeared to command more or less the same value as gold in 
another, quite different and often quite distant, society. In other 
words, while much has been said about the role of gold both between 
and within societies, this distinction still warrants some theoretical 
attention. The suitability of gold to the role of m oney-com m odity,
though, has received much scholarly attention. Discussion, however,
tends to be naturalistic. Gold is money because it offers certain 
natural qualities, rather than money is gold because it finds in gold 
certain natural qualities. The one exception to this being Karl Marx, 
who will be discussed in a moment.
The naturalist approach begins by listing the attributes of gold: great 
density, homogeneity of substance, ease of division and reunification, 
m alleab ility , longevity , virtual indestructib ility , u nad u Iterabi I ity , 
e tc . ,40 as well as its widespread occurrence around the world. It is 
therefore ‘logical’ that it be used as money. The problem is that while 
these are, indeed, attributes of the metallic substance gold, they are 
adequate only to a medium of circulation, and not to money. Money is 
more than merely a medium of circulation. It is also a measure of
3 9 Jastram , R. (1977).
4 0 “Neither rust nor worms can spoil this metal", according to Sappho.
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value and a repository or store of value. This is generally recognised, 
but in a merely rhetorical way. Often it is simply asserted that 
money has three functions: a, b and c, these being simply quoted from 
Marx's C apita l .41
The view most prevalent in the literature is that gold plays the role 
of the money-commodity because of the natural specification of gold. 
This view is not held in opposition to the view that gold is m oney-  
commodity because of the s o c ia l  specification of money, since the 
question of the social specification of money never occurs to most 
writers. It is not understood that, "Though gold and silver are not by 
Nature money, money is by Nature gold and silver".42 Marx, and some 
other scholars, understand a particular form of social economy to
posit money first, and then to seek out and settle upon that natural
substance most adequate to money. The link between the attributes of
the natural substance (gold) and the social substance (money) 
remains, in our view, only partially developed, even in Marx.
For Marx, exchange value posits its own independent bodily form out 
of exchange itself. This is so because exchange value stands as
mediator between two distinct use -va lues , each addressing two 
distinct needs. Exchange finds a commodity the utility of which it 
will be to convey exchange value from one commodity owner to 
another. Exchange value itself is devoid of any material attributes, it 
is simply human labour in the abstract which has taken the form of 
abstract labour. It is, therefore, neither this, nor that particular 
labour, but yet capable of being any one of them. Labour objectified 
into a commodity is labour already performed. But such labour has not 
necessarily yet reached its final, desired objectification. Exchange  
value allows for labour objectified in one material form to be 
transformed into another, quite different material form. Thus, while 
it is but one exchange value, it is, at the same time, potentially all 
m anner of use -va lues . It is potentially capable of satisfying all 
wants.
41 See, e.g., Innes, D. (1981) for a particularly mechanical study in which, money “in order to 
function as money... must of necessity adopt the commodity-form”, p6.
4 2 Gilliani, quoted in MEGA. Vol. II/9, pp77-78.
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As long as exchange value must reside in some or other use-value, its
identity coincides with the identity of that use-value. It is therefore
as much subject to the attrition of nature as is the use-value  which 
houses it and will decay along with it, unless transferred to another 
us e -va lu e  beforehand. In other words, the labour objectified in a
com m odity  runs the risk of not reaching its final, desired
objectification on account of the transitory com m odity decaying  
before it can be exchanged. Exchange value would therefore find itself 
best preserved in a commodity which is virtually indestructible. Gold 
is such a commodity.
Since the substance of exchange value is abstract labour, a
hom ogeneous, undifferentiated substance, it can to lerate  infinite 
division and re -un ification  without e v er  ceasing to be abstract
labour.  Exchange value, in order to be adequate to itself, eventually 
settles on a commodity which, no matter how divided or re-united,  
never ceases to be that commodity. It finds this attribute of itself 
most adequately reflected in the material gold. But this describes
only the emergence of a medium of circulation out of exchange value. 
Measure of value and store of value remains unaccounted for.
The value of gold, like that of everything else, is determined by the 
amount of labour-power expended upon its production. In order to be 
universally capable of measuring the value of other commodities, its 
own value must be universally uniform. Exchange, after all, develops 
historically on the fringes of societies, i.e., it is an external, rather 
than an internal relation. For a particular com m odity  to be
universally recognised as having a certain amount of value, it must be 
universally produced in more or less the same amount of labour-time. 
But societies offering gold to, and accepting gold from, one another 
have been extremely diverse, often standing at vastly different levels 
of social development. The average productivity of labour in those 
societies demonstrates as many different levels as their number. It 
would seem as though a measure could hold good only for one society, 
while every other needed its own measure. However, this was not the 
case.
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Exchange value, which is the form in which objectified labour is 
carried from commodity owner A to commodity owner B, must persist 
through time from A to B. Time is therefore built into the very 
definition of exchange value. For a measure of value to have practical 
meaning also requires for its unit to be constant over time. A 
fluctuating measure of value interferes with the consummation of 
sale by purchase.43 In other words, it undermines the raison d ’etre of 
exchange value. The tendency, therefore, is for exchange value to , 
settle upon a commodity the value of which tends to remain constant 
over time. From the earliest times up till the mid-nineteenth century, 
the labour-process in gold production has remained constant. Marx 
does not develop this.
The explanation for the eventual emergence of a uniform measure for 
all societies lies outside the domain of gold as a natural substance. It 
might appear as if the homogeneity of its material would have a 
bearing on its role as m e a s u r e ,  but it has not. Although, for all 
intents and purposes, one part of gold had as much value as any other, 
regardless of where each might have originated, the question is here 
not about the material of the ruler, but about its scale. Is the amount 
of value understood by society A to be embodied in one ounce of gold, 
the same as that amount so understood by society B?
Value expresses the fact that a commodity is a congellation of a 
certain q u a n t u m  of labour, being a definite portion of society’s 
general pool of labour. The exchange of commodities is, in effect, the 
exchange of labour. That such exchange is an exchange of equivalents 
presupposes that such labour is measured, which is the same as to 
say that it is reckoned in units. Each unit, if it is to measure all 
labour, must be of the simplest kind, so that all labour is only more 
complex than the unit by a certain degree, i.e., the unit must be 
recognisable in all labour. It must hence be capable of execution by 
the single individual unaided by mechanical devices or aided only by 
devices of such simplicity and crudity as to be the highest common 
denominator for all trading societies. This single unit of la b o u r  must, 
therefore, find expression in a single unit of a particular commodity.
4 3 With the transformation of gold from money into capital, this interference becom es an 
opportunity for accumulation. The detailed study of this falls outside the scope of this thesis.
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In other words, a single unit of a particular commodity must, in its 
p r o d u c t i o n ,  objectify this single unit of labour. Gold, in its 
production, is such a commodity.
W herever gold production has been indigenously developed in a 
society (whether as product, commodity or m oney), this initially 
entailed the exploitation of placer deposits including, occasionally, 
c o n g lo m e ra te  o u tc r o p s .44 Primitive placer gold production is 
differentiated from other gold production in that the gold was  
retrieved either by the unaided hand, or with the aid of the crudest 
and most minimal tools.45 As gold occurs in nature in already  
metallic (native) form, no further labour needs to be expended upon it 
in order for it to become useful. The most basic form of concrete 
labour— simple, unaided labour— has been the character of g o ld -  
producing labour from the days of m an’s first contact with it. The  
labour expended on gold production has thus immediately reflected 
the abstract unit of labour inherent in exchange value. In other words, 
a unit of abstract labour can, through gold, itself be given a material 
expression. The value of gold was, therefore, immediately identified 
with the labour-pow er that was expended on its production, rather 
than with the use-value of another commodity.
The widespread occurrence of placer gold throughout the world meant 
that in all societies, some sooner, others later, gold would not only 
come to serve as the measure of all value, but that the unit of that 
measure would be universally understood to mean the same thing: x 
amount of labour-tim e. The language of value was the first world 
language.
But this is thanks to an objective circumstance which has nothing to 
do with the natural qualities of gold and, rather, everything to do 
with natural occurrence. In as much as the very existence of gold is 
but an objective circumstance allowing the nature of exchange value 
to more adequately express itself, so is the nature of gold production 
an objective circumstance allowing for the emergence of a measure
4 4 0 n e  prospector reports that in the eastern Transvaal, “a body of Kafirs were at work 
breaking out quartz, in which the free gold was easily visible", Lock, A. (1882), p20.
4 5 Chapter I and Section II of this dissertation offer a fuller account of this.
32.
of value. While the placers lasted and gold lent itself to simple 
extraction, such simple extraction persisted, changing only rarely and 
in small measure. The form of gold production was therefore not only 
uniform across societies, but also constant over time. A measure of 
value persists only for as long as these two conditions are fulfilled. 
As v a lu e , gold is capable of preserving itself over time thanks to its 
indestructibility; as exchange value, its preservation depends on the 
constancy of the labour-process producing it. The importance of this 
distinction, which Marx does not make, em erges only when the 
process by which gold is produced begins to change.46
Gold and its method of production to g e th e r  offer to exchange value 
the means by which it might find a material em bodim ent most 
adequate to its inner character. It was therefore only a matter of 
time before exchange value would come to settle upon gold as the 
commodity which would liberate it from the stricture of use-values. 
“Exchange value obtains a separate existence".47 Gold now appears as 
potentially all commodities.
As exchange value retains its quality of representing all use-values  
only as long as it remains exchange value, its inner tendency is to 
avoid commodities destined for consumption. It therefore eventually 
finds and holds onto a commodity least susceptible to physical 
consumption. It has already been pointed out that gold is, to all 
intents and purposes, indestructible. This m eans that it c a n n o t ,  
strictly speaking, be consumed. It is, however, a soft material and, as 
such, vulnerable to abrasion. It can be worn out of existence as a 
particular physical shape. But the particles to which it is reduced  
remain as much the material gold as was the larger lump whence they 
came. The original shape can again be reconstituted. Thus does gold 
escape the one axe which hangs over the heads of all commodities: 
consumption. Once produced, it exists forever. Exchange value settled 
into gold can thus ween itself from the mother which gave it birth: 
exchange. As value-for-itself, it seeks out and finds a commodity in 
which it can congeal as permanent value. Gold obliges it. Exchange
4 6 This is taken up in Section II.
4 7 Marx, K. (1973), p145.
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value now exists for its own sake, and its role as an enabler of the 
socialisation of labour must now become secondary.
Wealth now becomes alienated from itself in that, far from willingly 
sacrificing itself on the alter of human pleasures, it must now, 
according to its concept, do everything to avoid such consumption. As 
v a lu e - fo r - i ts e lf  its accumulation is not only obvious, but also 
measurable. Money sets itself up as consumer of wealth in opposition 
to the human consumer, and in direct competition with him. Jacob
draw s a distinction betw een  “m etallic  w e a lth ” and “m ateria l  
w e a lth ”.48 The owner of wealth must now arbitrate between whether 
his person or his hoard will consume the gain. The hedonist and the
miser are the pure forms of these extremes.49
Prior to the em ergence of capital, or, more accurately put, where  
value is unable to assume the capital form, accumulation can take 
place only by the direct addition of one mass of values to another,
thereby creating a new, larger mass. Accumulation arises from 
exchange value, and not from capital, capital accumulation is but the 
perfection of this, requiring particular production and social 
conditions for its emergence. Many scholars, e.g., Hillel Ticktin, argue 
that by accumulation Marx means nothing more than accumulation of 
c ap ita l.50 For this reason we let Marx speak for himself:
“Money, i.e., exchange value which has assumed an independent existence, is by 
nature the embodiment of abstract wealth; but, on the other hand, any given sum of 
money is a quantitatively finite magnitude of value. The quantitative delimitation of 
exchange value conflicts with its qualitative universality, and the hoarder regards 
the limitation as a restriction, which in fact becomes also a qualitative restriction, 
i.e., the hoard is turned into a merely limited representation of material wealth. 
...The degree in which the realisation of exchange value approaches such an infinite 
series, in other words how far it corresponds to the concept of exchange value, 
depends on its magnitude. ...But in passing one set of quantitative limits of the hoard 
new restrictions are set up, which in turn must be abolished. What appears as a
4 8 Jacob, w. (1968b), p 115.
4 9 “Die GenuGsucht in ihrer allgemeinen Form und der Geiz sind die zwei besondern Formen der 
Geldgier. Abstrakte GenuGsucht unterstellt einen Gegenstand, der die Moglichkeit aller Genusse 
enthielte. Die abstrakte GenuGsucht verwirklicht das Geld in der Bestimmung, worin es der 
m aterielle Reprasentant des Reichtums ist; den Geiz [verwirklicht das Geld - FS], in sofern es 
nur die allgemeine Form des Reichtums gegenuber den Waaren als seinen besondren Substanzen 
ist. Urn es als solches zu halten, muG er alle Beziehung auf die Gegenstande der besondren 
Bedurfnisse opfern, entsagen, urn das Bedurfnis der als solcher zu befriedigen", MEGA, Vol. 
11/1.1, p 147.
5 0 Personal communication, January 1992.
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restriction is not a particular limit of the hoard, but any limitation of it. The 
formation of hoards, therefore, has no intrinsic limits, no bounds in itself, but as 
an unending process, each particular result of which provides an impulse for a new 
beginning. Although the hoard can only be increased by being preserved, on the 
other hand, it can only be preserved by being increased.
... The activity which amasses hoards is, on the one hand, the withdrawal of money 
from circulation by constantly repeated sales, and, on the other, simple piling up, 
accumulation. It is indeed only in the sphere of simple circulation and specifically 
in the form of hoards, that the accumulation of wealth as such takes place, whereas 
the other so-called forms of accumulation... are quite improperly, and by analogy
with simple accumulation of money, regarded as accumulation... Gold and silver
constitute money not as the result of any activity of the person who accumulates 
them, but as crystals of the process of circulation which takes place without his 
assistance. He need do nothing but put them aside, piling one lot upon another, a 
completely senseless activity, which, if applied to any other commodity would 
result in its devaluation”.51
“But the accumulation of money for the sake of money is in fact the barbaric form 
of production for the sake of production, i.e., the development of the productive 
powers of social labour beyond the boundaries of customary requirements”.52
Because money is a more adequate form of expressing exchange value 
than is the commodity, it is therefore a more adequate means of
exchange. It is better able to secure for its owner whatsoever u s e -  
value he may require, unlike exchange value locked into a particular 
use-value. Money therefore presents itself as a more adequate form in 
which to hold value, and a more adequate  form in which to
accumulate.
Here two most im portant transform ations take  p lace. Firstly, 
accumulation, which is the movement of “the contradiction between  
free time and labour time”53, and which hitherto becam e active only 
in the actual exerc ise  of la b o u r-p o w e r  itself, now assum es
corporeality. The contradiction between free time and labour-tim e  
comes to reside in a single commodity: money. Money is the physical, 
material, bodily, expression of this contradiction since it is at one
and the same time both exchange value in general and the particular 
exchange value which is its bodily form. As exchange value in general,
it is “free time” in that it is potentially a ll  use-va lues , both in their
variety and in their quantity; as particular exchange value (money is
always just so much money, a given amount) it is a given quantity of
51 Marx, K. (1977b), pp131-3. See also Marx, K. (1973), pp269-70.
5 2 Marx, K. (1977b), p134.
5 3 Marx, K. (1973), p711.
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use-values. It is capable of exhaustion and thus presents itself as a 
given quantity of social labour-time. The contradiction between free 
time and labour-time here takes the physical form of money, and as 
money, expresses itself as a contradiction between its physical or
q u an tita t ive  lim itation, and its essentia l l im it lessn ess . It is 
sim ultaneously exchangeable against all exchange values (in its 
social aspect) and exchangeable against only a fixed amount of 
exchange values (in its concrete aspect). It is therefore in h e re n t  in 
money to seek to overcome its own physical limitedness in order to
render it adequate to its own essential limitlessness. This it does by
constantly seeking to expand itself.
In this way, while the p r o d u c t  is an objectification of concrete  
labour, m o n e y  is an objectification of social labour. The movement
inherent in the exercise of labour-power to constantly seek to expand 
its free com ponent at the expense of its necessary component 
(thereby accumulating free time) now re -em erg e s  in money as a 
m o ve m e n t to transform  m oney into m ore m oney, thereby  
accumulating the objects of free time. Money is therefore the first 
objectification of labour in all its aspects. Indeed, money can, more 
adequately than any other form of product, be described as ‘a form of 
labour’, since in money, like in labour-power, is its accumulation  
driven by itself.
"We have already seen, in the case of money, how value, having become independent 
as such -  or the general form of wealth -  is capable of no other motion than a 
quantitative one; to increase itself. It is according to its concept the quintessence of 
all use-values; but since it is always only a definite amount of money (here, 
capital), its quantitative limit is in contradiction with its quality. It is therefore 
inherent in its nature constantly to drive beyond its own barrier. ...Already for that 
reason, value which insists on itself as value preserves itself through increase; and 
it preserves itself precisely only by constantly driving beyond its quantitative 
barrier, which contradicts its character as form, its inner generality. Thus 
growing wealthy is an end in itself. The goal determining activity of capital can only 
be that of growing wealthier, i.e., of magnification, of increasing itself. A specific 
sum of money (and money always exists for its owner in a specific quantity, always 
a specific sum of money) ...can entirely suffice for a specific consumption, in which 
it ceases to be money. But as a representative of general wealth, it cannot do so. As a 
quantitatively specific sum, a limited sum, it is only a limited representative of 
general wealth, which goes as far, and no further than, its exchange value, and is 
precisely measured in it. It thus does not by any means have the capacity of buying 
all pleasures, all commodities, the totality of the material substances of wealth; 
[First is the capacity of the commodity to function effectively as exchange value 
limited by its specific use-value, then, once posited as money, is its capacity to 
function effectively as this new use-value limited by its specific exchange value, 
FS] ...Fixed as wealth, as the general form of wealth, as value which counts as value,
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it is therefore the constant drive to go beyond its quantitative limit: an endless 
process. Its own animation consists exclusively in that; it preserves  itself precisely 
as a self-validated exchange value distinct from use value only by constantly  
multiplying  itself"5 4 .
Historically this takes the form, amongst all peoples in the early 
stages of their trading development, of money stumbling its way  
from commodity to commodity, more or less by trail and error, each 
commodity in turn taking up the role of money. “The particular use-  
value which, as a result of barter between different communities, 
become commodities, e.g., slaves, cattle, metals, usually serve only 
as the first money within these com m unities”.55 Since there are 
definite economic specifications which the money commodity has to 
meet, the different commodities selected at different points to play 
the role of money are variously suited to this function: (i) its labour
content must be appropriate  to the range of m agnitudes of
transactions, i.e., to the amount of labour changing hands;56 (ii) once 
acquired, it must preserve itself long enough to be able to exchange  
without loss for the desired use-value, when such comes along; (iii) 
it must be availab le  in sufficient discreet units in order that
circulation (its velocity notwithstanding) may not be interrupted for 
want thereof.57
With this kind of specification it would be only a matter of time 
before this role would devolve to the metals and among them, to the 
noble ones. Hence, eventually, silver and gold (particularly the latter) 
coming to be universally used as the m oney com m odity  by 
communities separated by both space and time. Of all known
materials, gold is by far the most suited to the role of money.58
5 4 /'b/d., p270, emph. orig.
5 5 Marx, K. (1977b), p50.
5 6 “Copper was adopted as the basis of money in Sweden in 1625. ...Worth only one-hundredth 
the value of silver it was unsatisfactory for ordinary payments because of their great weight. 
While burglars could not steal the money because the?r could not carry it, wagons were needed 
for ordinary payments", Kindleberger, C. (1987), p23.
5 7 Silver mining was disrupted by Black Death after 1348, resulting in accute shortage of money 
during the expansion of trade following in its wake. Barter expanded for want of an adequate 
money-commodity. Salt and pepper, especially, stepped in as equivalents, ibid., p24.
5 8 In the historical sequence of metals to play the role of the money commodity, the next in line 
after copper, silver and gold will have been platinum. Although some platinum is being hoarded in 
bullion form alongside gold as a 'store of value', its emergence to prominence as a monetary 
metal has been eclipsed by the development of the credit system to overall world dominance. The
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"Though gold and silver are not by Nature money, money is by Nature 
gold and silver".59
W hen exchange value has ‘taken over’ the physical body of another 
commodity as its own particular materiality, it has done two things: 
Firstly, it has elevated itself above the world of commodities; and in 
so doing it has, secondly, elevated the commodity thus taken over so 
that it, too, now appears to be e levated above the world of 
commodities. From this point on, gold becomes a mystery.
The commodity which is also the m oney-com m odity  comes to be 
produced for its own sake. Its production ceases to relate to its 
consumption, or, more precisely, its production as the m o n e y -  
commodity is unrelated to its consumption as a commodity. The  
money commodity is the first commodity produced for exchange,  
rather than for consumption. Unlike capitalist commodity production, 
where production is for exchange, but is nevertheless conditioned by 
consumption, no such condition restrains the production of the money 
commodity. Quite regardless of their concrete reality commodities  
are as products, produced in order that they may be consumed, even if 
after a lengthy delay. Indeed, they are exchange values for this very 
reason. As values, they cannot be va lu e -fo r - its e lf  since they are 
inextricably tied to u s e -v a lu e s , which, if not sooner or later 
consumed, will cease to be both use-values a n d  values. V a lu e - fo r -  
itself needs to be free from the threat of eventual consumption. Once 
money posits va lue -for-itse lf, however, then the money commodity 
ceases to be a commodity for consumption (according to the concept 
of com m odities).60 This commodity is now specifically produced for 
accumulation.
Hence intensified production of that commodity which is set aside to 
play the role of money— strictly speaking, this is, in fact, intensified
study of this development is not part of this thesis. In the meantime, it is unlikely that anyone 
will ever be praised for having a heart of platinum.
5 9 Loc. cit., p4.
6 0 In practice, though, this often devolves onto a commodity for consumption the longevity of 
which extends beyond those of commodities around it. In such cases the money commodity stands 
to be replaced by something more immortal, if and when such should come along. An example 
might be many peoples in Africa for whom cattle originally served as money, this later to be 
replaced by coins as their economies merged with those using money in this more ideal form.
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a p p ro p r ia t io n  in that it applies as much to plunder, free labour, etc. 
Forms of production externally akin to slavery. That this applies to 
the m o n e y -com m odity  is why it is also evidenced in the case of 
silver, hence, e.g., Potosi. Silver never occurs as placers. Placers
allowed intensified production to take different forms because  
diffused occurrence allows uncontrollable access to the m a te r ia l  of
production, i.e., it could not support s la v e -l ik e  production, the
exception to this being where a sufficiently large coercive force can 
be m ustered to control a work force scattered over a large, 
borderless area, or where a region is so hostile as to guarantee death 
after escape.61 Hence continued a p p e a ran c e  of placer gold production 
as if it were the production of a no/7-m oney-com m odity. Placer mining 
would only begin to assum e character  of m o n ey-co m m o d ity  
production once the placers begin to run out.
Gold and its ‘Constant’ Value
Value  preserves  itself in u s e -v a lu e , the only form in which 
equivalence can be expressed. Any deterioration in that use-value,
i.e., in its capacity to satisfy the need associated with it, implies a 
decline in its capacity to officiate as equivalent. In other words, a 
decay in its use-value results in a decline of its own relative value. 
But separately, commodities are also subject to a continual decline 
in their value as the level of productivity with which they are
61 Hence the success of the Russian state in working the great Siberian placers on the basis of 
serfs and convicts. For (Ascriptions of Russian gold-mining in the nineteenth century, see Del 
Mar, A. (1969), pp372-96 and Lock, A. (1882), pp369-455. Similar control provided by the 
impenetrable Amazon allowed for placer gold extraction on the basis of unfree labour:
“If the whole number of captives and slaves forced to work in the gold mines of Brazil be 
multiplied by the years they worked, and the quotient divided into the entire product of the 
mines, it will be found that they produced on the average less than $40 a year per man. Of 
this amount one fifth went to the Crown at the outset, leaving only $32 per man. By the 
time the mine proprietor turned this into coins it would be reduced to about $26, thus 
reducing the averg&e product to about half an American gold dollar per week per man, less 
than the solitary gleaner still wins in freedom from the neglected corners of the abandoned 
catas. The imagination can scarcely realize the cruelty and privation to which the mining 
slaves w ere form erly subjected in order to ‘m ake them pay’ the cost of their 
maintenance", Del Mar, A. (1969), p253.
Free mining was attempted in Siberia, especially where operations have been abandoned by the 
state. This generally failed unless either: it was adapted into a privately owned venture worked 
on the basis of unfree labour; or, as after the mid-1860s, technological improvements were 
introduced. Ibid., pp385-6. and Lock, A. op. cit., pp448-55.
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produced increases. Gold is no exception. When dealing with the 
products of extractive industry, such as gold, a crucial qualification 
to this statement has to be made. This is done when we return to this 
point, below. A distinction must at this point be made between a 
decline in value on account of a deterioration of use-value,  and a 
decline in value on account of an improvement in the productivity of 
labour.
In the case of gold this distinction is most crucial, for the metal 
presents  a doub le  deception : (i) on account of its virtual
indestructibility, the value of gold cannot decline as a result of a 
decay of its u se -v a lu e , since the latter preserves itself; (ii) on 
account of the actual production process of gold which for centuries 
has lent itself only with the greatest tardiness to improvements in 
p ro d u c t iv ity .62 Reminding ourselves of the discussion in Part III of 
the Introduction, in the case of placer production, productivity was 
not improved, because production was too easy; in the case of 
underground mining, because to do so was too difficult. The value of 
gold has, as a result, declined but slowly, remaining constant for very 
long periods of time. Fluctuations in the value of gold tended to come 
about by its gradual rise as a result of the gradual depletion of 
sources, and its sudden fall occasioned by plunder or the discovery of 
new sources. These objective  circumstances combine in their effects 
to give gold the appearance of being above the law (of value), so to 
speak. Many mystical accounts of the ‘power’ of gold have their bases 
in this. Even Jastram ’s statistical odyssey, The Golden Constant, is, 
ultimately, reducible to this.63
More than this, given that the value of gold, for these purely 
accidental reasons, remains relatively constant, or has historically 
diminished only very gradually, it allows an accumulation of value  
simply on the basis of an adjustment in the value ratios, which is 
almost always in favour of gold.64 For a long time, therefore, the 
owner of gold could accumulate value by doing nothing at all. The
62 See Jacob, W. (1968a), Chs. II, VII and X.
6 3 Jastram, R. (1977).
6 4 Given the general backwardness of economy prior to the advent of surplus-value production, 
value in general diminished only very gradually.
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amount of 'human pleasures' which a given quantity of gold could 
command would increase purely on account of a diminution of the 
values of these 'pleasures' standing opposite it. Here we speak of gold 
not as money-commodity, but simply as commodity, i.e., not as an 
enabler of exchange, but as one of the parties to it.65 Gold did not 
only preserve wealth, it appeared to expand wealth without itself 
actually expanding. The certainty of value pursuing its own self­
expansion appears here to be identical with gold as a physical thing. 
Any diminution in the value of gold would therefore deal a double 
blow to the sanctity of wealth held in that form, and would impel the 
development of the other forms of wealth preservation.
Decline in the value of a commodity announces itself to its owner 
first in the deterioration of its u s e -v a lu e  while  still in his 
possession and only in the second instance in a decline in its rate of 
exchange against other commodities, i.e., upon its alienation. It 
therefore seems, to the owner of commodities, as if the value of an 
item is suggested by the condition of the use-value and that this is
merely confirmed by its exchange value. From this vantage point,
socially necessary labour-tim e itself appears to be an irrelevancy 
which has nothing to do with value, and thus an illusion.66
If this is true for commodities in general, then it is even more true 
for gold in particular. Not only does the u s e -v a lu e  of gold not 
deteriorate, the preservation of its value which appears to its owner 
to flow from this, has for centuries seemed confirmed by the actual 
constancy of value (reflecting the unaltering productivity of its
production process). Wealth can, it would seem , without fear of
diminution, be amassed in this form. When use-value and value are 
conflated, the illusion that the value of gold remains constant is 
reinforced.
6 6 Jacob offers an idea of. “the high value of money, or the low cost of all the necessaries and 
luxuries" in 1189, by a lengthy examination of the coronation banquet expenses of Richard I. See 
Jacob, W. (1968a), pp329-37.
6 6 Many an economic head has come unstuck over this illusion. Alec Nove, prolific writer of 
many books and papers on ‘m arket-socialism’, for example, talks of Marx's, “artificial and 
unjustied separation between value and use-values", arguing that, “some things have more use- 
value than others", and must therefore command a higher price, Nove, A. (1983), p21.
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Gold therefore appears as the ideal incarnation of va lue-for-itse lf,  
most em in en tly  suited to the task of accu m u la tion . W hile  
accumulation is a process of accrual, time, as described above, 
imposes a deduction upon that accrual. With gold this deduction 
appears to have been suspended. Accumulating wealth in the form of a 
commodity other than gold is like accumulating w ater in a leaky 
bucket. When that commodity is gold, the bucket appears leak proof. 
This phenom enon must, at least in some way, contribute to the 
mystery surrounding this material.
But objective circumstances are precisely that, and circumstances  
change. A major change in circumstances came with the flooding of 
Europe with gold from the New World during the sixteenth century.67 
Almost overnight (compared to centuries of constancy or only very 
gradual rise) the value of gold declined very rapidly. All of the new 
gold entering the world economy from the New World did so by way of 
a method far more productive than mining: plunder.68 A new social 
average had to emerge, taking account of tonne per conquistador per 
annum. The result was that all existing hoards suffered loss 
(including those in the holds of the arriving ships, for their value was 
anticipated at the prevailing world average). The value of gold had to 
decline, no matter how well it had preserved its use-value. One unit 
of gold could henceforth buy less. In other words, there was a 
universal increase in prices.
This has nothing to do with the q u a n t i t y  of gold coming into 
circulation, as is so often suggested, especially by theorists of the 
sixteenth century price revolution, and la tte r -d a y  gold standard  
protagonists. The debates surrounding the quantity of specie in 
circulation in relation to the level and total of prices does not 
concern us here. W e will just briefly say that a change in the quantity 
of gold in circulation, all else remaining constant (i.ct., the values of
6 7 For the m uch-explored subject of the effects of New World gold on the economy of Europe, 
see, e.g.. Jacob, W. (1968b), Del Mar, A. (1969), Vilar, P. (1976), Supple, B. (1964), etc. 
Ramsey, P. (1972) suggests that these effects tend to be exaggerated in the literature. For a 
summary of the monetary theories that arose in the wake of these developments, see Vickers, D. 
(1968), and also Rubin, I. (1979).
6 8 Even if this gold were originally produced as exchange value, which it was not, its existence 
as exchange value would have abruptly ceased with its plunder, regardless of how efficiently or 
otherwise it may have been produced.
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gold and commodities, the sum of prices, the velocity of circulation), 
results only in increased hoarding or lending (or other forms of 
advancement). The same quantity still expresses the same sum of 
prices as the value stays the same.
Change in the value of gold, however, alters the ratio in which it 
expresses the prices of commodities. An increase in value means that 
the same quantity of gold now expresses more value than that 
contained in the sum of commodities. Commodities, provided that 
their values have not altered, now have their values expressed in 
smaller amounts of gold. In other words, there has been a universal 
drop in price. Likewise does a decline in the value of gold reflect in a 
universal rise in price. The gold (and silver) from the New World that 
flooded Europe in the sixteenth century did, of course, increase the 
quantity of gold in circulation, but to theorise the concomitant 
universal increase in prices simply in terms of supply and demand is 
to miss the fact that a value revolution had taken place. New World 
treasure was procured by plunder, a very much more efficient form of 
production, thereby setting a new average necessary labour-tim e for 
gold production. No similar revolution occurred in the values of 
commodities at the time, hence the higher prices.69
The commodity which serves for the universal expression of prices 
does for other commodities what they cannot do for themselves. It 
expresses a particular commodity’s va lue  alongside the values of all 
other particular commodities in a unified series centred on its own 
use-value and called price. In other words it, and only it, has a utility 
which springs from the exchange of com m odities itself. It is 
necessary now to exam ine this utility in contradistinction to its 
‘natural’ utility as commodity.
6 9 “The sudden and forcible transfer of hoarded money from one country to another is a specific 
feature of the ancient world; but the temporary lowering of the production costs of precious 
metals achieved in a particular country by the simple method of plunder does not affect the 
inherent laws of monetary circulation", Marx, K. (1977b), p161. For M arx’ critique of David 
Hum e’s quantity theory of money, see ibid. pp160-65 and Marx, K. (1983), pp118-9. For 
Ricardo’s role in the ‘bullion debates’, see Gordon, B. (1976), and also M arx’ critique of this 
role in Marx, K. (1977b), pp174-9.
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The Two Use-Values of the Money-Commodity
There are two dimensions to the s o c ia l  character of gold: it is, first 
and foremost, a commodity, i.e., a use-value in the social form of a 
value. It is therefore, like all commodities, subject to the laws of 
commodities; but in addition to this, it is also money, and hence  
subject to the laws of money. Indeed, it is only as a commodity that 
it can become money: the one commodity set aside from all others so 
that they may all use its use-va lue  in order to express their own 
value for one another. Gold is therefore the medium through which all 
other commodities express their values relative to one another, 
forfeiting the re la tive  expression of its own v a lu e .70 Marx  
encapsulates it thus:
“In so far as the price of a commodity is re a l is e d  in gold, the commodity is 
exchanged for gold as a commodity, as a particular materialisation of labour-time; 
but in so far as it is the p rice  of the commodity that is realised in gold, the 
commodity is exchanged for gold as money, i.e., for gold as the materialisation of 
general labour-tim e".71
In addition to its consumption as particular u se-va lue  (tooth filling, 
jewellery, etc.), gold is now allocated a consumption by its social 
role as abstract wealth. Every product is, in its concreteness, a u s e -  
value. This it is regardless of the social form under which it might 
have been produced. The social form based on commodity exchange  
lends all use-values the additional character of exchange values. As 
particular use-value, gold, too, acquires an exchange value. Hence are 
jewellery, tooth fillings, electronic circuitry, cladding, etc., all u s e -  
values as well as exchange values. However, having once posited the 
money form, exchange imbues the commodity to which the role of 
money falls, in this case gold, with an a d d it io n a l  use-value. And as 
this second u s e -v a lu e  it does n o t  posit exchange value, but is, 
nevertheless, ascribed one, as we shall see again later.
"While commodities thus assume a dual form in order to represent exchange value 
for one another, the commodity which has been set apart as universal equivalent
70 “W e overlook the facts that gold, when a mere commodity, is not money, and that when other 
commodities express their prices in gold, this gold is but the money-form of those commodities 
themselves", MEGA, Vol. 11/9, p90.
71 Marx, K. (1977b), p 9 l.
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acquires a dual use-value. In addition to its particular use-value  as an individual 
commodity it acquires a universal use-value”72.
This “universal u s e -v a lu e ”, of which Marx speaks, is a use-value  
associated with the specific needs of no particular individual. It is 
associated with a need of this form of production  as such. It, 
“satisfies a universal need arising from the exchange process itself, 
and has the same use-value for everybody -  that of being a carrier of 
exchange value or a universal medium of exchange”.73
Generally, in a discussion of use-value, the term “u s e -va lu e” would 
ordinarily suffice without further qualification. In a discussion of 
the money commodity per se, however, the term becomes too broad 
since we now have to distinguish between particular use-value and 
universal use-value. W e wish to propose a number of categories in 
terms of which use-value  -  and in particular the use-va lue  of the 
money commodity -  might be further explored. The distinction already 
made by Marx above will serve as our starting point. For “particular 
u se -v a lu e ” (shoes, road, jazz, tooth filling, etc.) we propose “u s e -  
value I” or “private use-va lue”; for “universal u se -va lue” (money) we 
propose “u s e -v a lu e  I I” or “social u s e -v a lu e ”. Throughout the 
remainder of this document, the terms “use-value I” and “use-value  
II” will be used, and is to be understood to mean, “particular u s e -  
value" and “universal use -va lue” respectively.74
Since the money form of value is a higher form than the commodity 
form, use-value I is subordinated to use-value II (in the same way as, 
e.g., money is subordinated to capital), or, in different words, this 
second u s e -v a lu e , this universal u se -v a lu e , is posited out of 
circulation and as such, therefore, p re s u p p o se s  exchange value. It is 
therefore a more developed form  of the product of labour than is a 
commodity. U se-value II now posits use-value I as a less-than-ideal  
form of itself, as potential use-value II. Thus does it establish itself
7 2 /b/cf., p47. Emph. ours.
7 3 /b/'cf., p48.
74 Under use-value I a distinction can, of course, be made between use-values individually 
consumed (shoes, jazz, tooth filling) and those collectively consumed (road, jazz, weather 
report) - hence individual use-value and collective use-value. No such distinction is possible 
under use-value II, since its consumption is entirely collective. Even the term “consumption" 
requires some qualification when use-value II is gold, as has been suggested.
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in the popular psyche as something more valuable than a common 
article of utility. It therefore becomes ‘wastefu l’ to use gold for 
anything other than money, except where such use serves as hoard, or 
in the narrow function of a deliberate signal of social station.
“Gold and silver articles, quite regardless of their aesthetic properties, can be 
turned into money, since the material of which they consist is the material of 
money, just as gold coins and gold bars can be transformed into such articles. Since 
gold and silver are the materials of abstract wealth, their employment as concrete 
use-values is the most striking manifestation of wealth".75
Gold does not cease to be jewellery, tooth filling, cladding, etc., just 
because it has become money, And since: (i) it is not jewellery, tooth 
filling or cladding as such which becomes money, but the m ateria l  out 
of which these have been fashioned; (ii) the m aterial can be 
subdivided and re -a m a lg a m a te d  at will; and (iii) it cannot be
consumed in the sense of other use-values, adapting its shape to the 
demands of use-va lue  II is as easy as adapting it to the various 
demands of use-value I. Whether it changes from gold leaf to wedding 
ring to tooth filling involves the same process as a change from any
of these into coin, medallion or bullion.
Because one is dealing here with the material as such, one can
abstract from the varying quantities of additional labour required to 
bring about these changes in shape. A great deal of value, e.g., is 
added in smelting, crafting jewellery and making chains, the latter 
two of which combine a high degree of craft skills with a high degree 
of m ech an isa tion .76 Since it is as a m a te r ia l  that it figures as u s e -  
value II, the socially necessary labour-time for its production is that 
which is required to retrieve the material from nature and not that 
necessary to give it this or that shape. It is already in an adequate  
shape as it is found without any further labour having to be expended 
on it. All that is reckoned with is the labour expended in producing it 
(which includes the labour of transporting it to the point where it 
may enter c ircu la tion ).77 It can therefore quite easily serve the 
demands of use-value II while retaining a particular shape associated
7 5 /b/d., p134.
7 6 For the suitability of gold to goldsmithery, see W ise, E. (ed.) (1964), pp253-9. For the 
intricacies of gold chainmaking, see Green, T. (1987), pp157-9.
7 7 For a discussion of seignorage, see Kindleberger, C. (1987), pp30-1.
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with use-value I though not necessarily in the most convenient way. 
The Nazis did not expect the Jews to first melt down and mint their 
own gold teeth before they could recognise them as money, neither 
did Mussollini complain about his getting the funding for his 
Abbysinia campaign in the form of Italian housew ives’ wedding  
r ings.78 Indian peasants cover their womenfolk with gold jewellery at 
harvest time as a form of saving for leaner times.79
U se-va lue  I therefore serves as a huge decentralised hoard for u s e -  
value II (in the same way as, at a higher level, the money form serves 
as hoard for the capital form). For the demands of use-value II, even 
though discreet and equal units of weight is most convenient for its 
d a y -to -d a y  purposes, for its essential purpose even the raw natural 
state of gold as nuggets, grains, dust or flakes will suffice. What is 
important is the m ate r ia l  and not the shape in which it comes.
The point is that in practice it requires no more and no less labour 
for this material to be ensconced in the role of use-value II than it 
does for use-va lue  I, though, in essence it actually requires less. 
Although in practice the adaptation of gold from a use-value I shape 
into one more suited to use-value II (the minting of coin and the 
casting of bullion bars) involves an additional labour expenditure, 
there is no e s s e n t ia l  reason why such additional expenditure should 
have to be made. Indeed, as is implied in these lines, it is as u se -  
value II that the labour expended on the production of the material 
per se is most truthfully revealed.
Marx gives only slight attention to the m oney-com m odity  in its 
aspect as commodity, and, indeed, appears somewhat dismissive of it. 
He says that, “just as the precious metals are useless in the direct 
process of production, so they appear to be unnecessary as means of 
subsistence, i.e., as articles of consumption. . . .T h e ir  aesthetic  
qualities m ake them the natural m aterial of pomp, ornam ent, 
glamour, the requirements of festive occasions, in short, the positive 
expression of supra-abundance and wealth”.80 Here Marx appears to
7 8 Green, T. (1968), p12.
7 9 Green, T. (1987), pp135-7.
8 0 Marx, K. (1977b), pp154-5.
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forget two of his own lessons: firstly, “Money— ...i.e ., the universal 
commodity— must itself exist as a p a r t ic u la r  commodity alongside  
the others, since what is required is not only that they can be 
measured against it in the head, but that they can be changed and 
exchanged for it in the actual exchange process”;81 and, secondly, 
that a commodity is, “an object of human wants, a m eans of 
existence in the widest sense of the term ”,82 or, as later put in 
C a p i t a l ,  “a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of 
some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether for instance, 
they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference”.83
Subsistence, which means “existence in the widest sense of the 
term ”, embracing the satisfaction of all, “human w ants”, whether, 
“they spring from the stomach or from fancy”, is here reduced to 
strictly those wants which spring from the stomach. Fancy, as a 
fountainhead of wants, is here dismissed. He is now saying that the 
commodity which becom es the m oney-com m odity  is not really a 
commodity in the first p lace,84 so that, “any quantity of them can 
thus be placed at will within the social process of circulation 
without impairing production and consumption as such”.85 But he goes 
further, suggesting that whatever use-value  gold (and silver) might 
have, such is confined to, “the positive expression of s u p ra -  
abundance and w ea lth ”. If something becomes a u s e -v a lu e  only 
because its utility is to express wealth, then how could it have been 
a commodity to be set aside as the m oney-com m odity in the first
81 Marx, K. (1973), p165. Emph. orig. “The commodity which has been set apart as universal
equivalent acquires a dual use-value. In addition to its particular use-value as an individual
co m m o d ity  it acquires a universal use-value", Marx, K. (1977b), p47. Emph. ours. Or even 
more emphatically: “The use-value of the money-commodity becomes two-fold. In addition to its 
special use-value as a commodity (gold, for instance, serving to stop teeth, to form the raw 
material for articles of luxury, &c.), it acquires a formal use-value, originating in its specific 
social function", Marx, K. (1983), p93.
8 2 Marx, K. (1977b), p27.
8 3 Marx, K. (1983), p43. "Neither are we here concerned to know how the object satisfies these 
wants, whether directly as means of subsistence, or indirectly as means of production", ibid.
8 4 Herodotus ...says, "the Macrobian Indians, ...took them to a prison for men, where all were 
confined in golden shackles: brass, with these Ethiopians, being the scarsist and most esteemed 
of the metals", quoted in Lock, A. (1882), p4. There were, though, cases where gold, though not 
produced as money, was produced for exchange, dispite its having no particular use-value in the 
society producing it. Thus, does Lock report that, "During his [Mungo Park’s] stay in Kamalia 
[pre-colonial West Africa], the gold collected by the traders, for salt alone, was nearly £198
sterling", Lock, A. (1882), p36.
8 5 Marx, K. (1977b), p154.
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place. If its only use-value is to express wealth, then it is as u s e -  
value  already the product of a social relation. This makes gold in its 
physical concreteness  an abstract thing. This apparent laxity on the 
part of so rigorous a scholar again suggests to us that Marx has not 
made a study of the political economy of gold as such.
It is important that the distinction between use-value  I and use-value  
II be kept clearly in view, in order to know whether the particular 
phenomenon, tendency or law being observed stems from one or the 




The Money-Commodity and the Value of Labour- 
Power
As has been suggested in the introduction to this section, the 
interaction between gold and the economy in general does not only 
take place where it has to circulate other commodities, but also 
where it is itself an object of circulation in its own right. This 
occurs in its production, where it exchanges with labour-power. Marx 
does not explore the production of the m oney-com m odity  with the 
same thoroughness as he does its circulation. His mention of over­
work and barter at the site of production are but footnotes to his 
main argument, which, in the case of the money-commodity, actually 
relates to circulation. His discussion of the production of exchange  
value as such remains sketchy and o ver-re lian t on the dramatic  
impact of Siculus’ descriptions of the horrors of silver mining. The 
production of exchange value must be examined both on the basis of 
labour not  as itself exchange value, and on the basis of labour a s  
itself exchange value.
The Value of Labour-Power in the Production of the Money-
Commodity
As explained above, production of the money-commodity is driven not 
by consumption, but by exchange economy itself. The commodity 
which gives concrete form to abstract wealth is produced, seemingly, 
for its own sake. The dynamic behind this has been explored above 
only in so far as it affects consumption. W hat interests us now is 
how a relation emerging in exchange throws its reflection back into 
production, there to do to labour in production what it has already 
done to labour in consumption. But the most serious constraint on the 
value  of la b o u r -p o w e r  of the g o ld -m in e r  is provided quite
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independently of any variation in the values of gold, commodities, or 
commodity-producing labour-power. It is provided neither by gold as 
use-value I, nor by the technical aspects of mining, but by the socia l  
nature of gold, gold as use-value II.
The tension set up in circulation between whether abstract wealth is 
consumed or preserved, in production takes the form of a tension 
between necessary labour-time and surplus labour-tim e.86 At bottom, 
this remains a curtailment of consumption— that consumption which 
takes place within the exercise of labour-power. The cost of labour- 
power, whether a value or a product, is a direct deduction from the 
total product, i.e., a direct deduction from accumulation. The two 
portions of labour-time enter into conflict with each other only when 
the product assumes the form of the material embodiment of wealth 
in general. Each portion is here measured in terms of wealth in 
general, and not in terms of the consumptive requirements of the gold 
producer. The gold producer himself, even if he is a free worker—  
indeed, especially if he is a free worker— sees the value of his own 
labour-power as curtailing the ability of the money he digs out of the 
ground to accumulate. His own need to reproduce himself confronts 
him as destructive of his wealth. His affirmation as human being 
seems to him his denial, his denial an affirmation. This is the most 
elementary moment of the contradiction between living labour and 
objectified labour. It is to become more developed and generalised  
with the generalisation of wage-labour.
The gold worker gives expression to the contradiction between  
consumption and accumulation by denying to his own labour-power  
that which is necessary for its reproduction. Necessary labour-tim e  
is kept to an absolute minimum and that minimum incessantly pushed 
back in order that surplus labour-time might be extended. Value of 
labour-power in gold mining, v LP(G) is constantly reigned in, in order 
that s u rp lu s -v a lu e , s ,  might be increased. The application of 
technology to mining is prompted by a different set of movements and 
must here be left out of the discussion.87 Necessary labour-tim e in
8 6 For a discussion of the relationship between necessary labour-time and surplus labour-time, 
both in general and in its particular expression under capital, see Marx, K. (1973), pp704-712.
8 7 A discussion of this is offered in Section II.
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gold production can, consequently, only be reduced by reducing v LP(G). 
This is achieved by undermining the standard of living.
The private o n e -m a n  go ld-d igger (the free miner) must become  
contemptuous of his own life as he tries to reduce the value of his 
own labour-power in order that he might accumulate his own surplus- 
value as money.88 The near-bestial existence of the digger is well 
known, and has always been the subject of novels and the cinema—  
hilarious in its brazen disregard for the niceties of civil (and  
civilised) society. In so far as the advancement of society consists in 
the material and cultural advancement of its constituents, a society 
of private individual gold miners can only be a regressive one. 
Illustrations abound from around the globe. At the mines in Paramillo 
in Argentina, e.g.:
“some 4 or 5 miners were working in 3 of these mines, but only extracting 
fragments of ore from old shafts and levels; these ores hold 7 to 10 oz. of fine gold 
per ton, but the quantity is so insignificant, that it can only afford a miserable 
existence to such men"8 9 .
W here gold is produced for others, capitalist forms excepted, the 
reduction of the value of labour-power does not end when the worker 
has reached “a miserable existence”, but proceeds all the way to his 
death. The expropriator of the surplus-value of the gold producer 
turns virtually the entire product into surplus-value.
“In any given economic formation of society, where not the exchange value, but the 
use-value of the product predominates, surplus-value will be limited by a given set 
of wants which may be greater or less, and that here no boundless thirst for 
surplus-labour arises from the nature of the production itself. Hence in antiquity 
over-work becomes horrible only when the object is to obtain exchange value in its 
specific independent money-form; in the production of gold and silver. Compulsory 
working to death is here the recognised form of over-work. Only read Diodorus 
Siculus."90
88  It is this which underlies Jacob’s doubt “whether gold has ever been paid for at its full 
value”, and not the amount of value that goes into its production, as Marx seems to think. His 
linking of diamonds with this speculation of Jacob is inappropriate. See Marx, K. (1983), p47. 
The way in which to understand Jacob’s remark is that the gold-producer has a tendency not to 
return to labour-power (whether his own or that of others— prior to w age-labour, that is) the 
value  it has expended on gold-production, but less than that value. Siculus’ observation of silver 
miners being worked to death is a particular expression of this.
8 9 Lock, A. (1882), p200.
9 0 Marx, K. (1983), p226.
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Throughout history, such labour has always been characterised as 
‘slavery’. One reads of “gold slaves”, “gold-mining slavery”, etc. The  
accuracy of such a characterisation extends, however, only as far as 
its external appearance. Brutal and inhuman as it might have been, 
slavery, as a form of economy, allowed for the reproduction of the 
labour-power of the slave, albeit at a very primitive level. Producing 
gold as money for others definitely proceeded on the basis of the 
physical destruction of the worker, his working to death.91
To briefly anticipate an argument which properly belongs to a later 
point in this discussion,92 it may be pointed out that gold-mining  
capital here appears to be more humane than the self-employed gold 
digger. The go ld-m in ing  capitalist will m ake a strict economic  
calculation of the volum e of investm ent required against the 
expected returns, knowing that there are distinct limits to the extent 
to which the value of labour-power can be reduced. He operates in a 
world of exchange of equivalents. The private one-m an gold digger, 
though, does not go on strike against himself. He does not break any 
minimum wage laws. He sacrifices the value of his own labour-power 
in the hope of turning his non-wealth into wealth.
The Effects of Different Value Changes on the Production of Gold
Although Marx does distinguish between the value of gold as its own 
labour value and the value of gold in terms of other commodities, this 
distinction is only conceptual. He does not actually investigate  
empirically when a change in the value of gold is on account of an 
actual change in the labour-tim e required for its production, and 
when it is on account of a relative change in relation to commodities. 
That the cause of change in the value of gold itself is subject to 
change therefore escapes him. He does not anticipate the setting of 
gold production on a new basis, entirely new value relation, although 
he does anticipate its eventual depletion of the resource.93 This 
distinction forms an important part of the rem ainder of this 
d iss e rta t io n .
91 This may, perhaps, be the first form of parasitic production.
9 2 See Sections II and III, below.
9 3 See the discussion of the precious metals in Marx, K. (1977b).
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W e will first consider the relations between the values of g o ld -  
producing la b o u r-p o w er, v LP( G) , gold, v G, commodities, v c , and 
c om m odity -produc ing  labour, v LP(C) as simple relations between  
commodities, with gold serving only as measure of value and medium 
of circulation, i.e., as relations of simple circulation. Separately  
from this we will then consider these same relations as determined  
by money. There are hence two complexes of relations which will be 
explored: on the one hand, the relations between v LP (G) , v G, v c , and 
v Lp (c) with money posited by commodities ( c -  m-  c);  and, on the 
other hand, these same relations with commodities posited by money 
( m-  c -  m) .
A distinction has to be made between the s u b s ta n c e  of value and its 
e x press io n .  The former is the amount of labour-tim e recognised by 
society as necessary, on the average, for the production of a 
particular use-value: while the second instantiates that amount in 
terms of units of other use-values. The former expresses a relation 
of economy in general; while the latter expresses a relation of 
com m odity-econom y in particular. Because the material gold came  
universally to play the role of the use-value  in terms of which the 
values of other commodities are expressed, this distinction is 
important if a political economy of gold is to be constructed. It must 
be clear that the expression  of value presupposes its substance.
If the values of commodities are expressed in terms of gold, changes 
in the values of commodities, v c , register as changes in the 
quantities of gold that they will command as equivalents. It follows, 
equally, that changes in the value of gold, v G, will be reflected in 
changes  in the quantities in which various com m odities will 
command fixed amounts of gold. But this is still, strictly speaking, 
dealing only with the expression of value: that of commodities in 
terms of gold; and that of gold in terms of commodities. W e are 
dealing with instances of objectified labour weighed up against one 
another. But outside of the a rea  of commodities, as bodies of 
objectified labour, serving as expressions of value for one another, 
there is the process of turning living labour into those bodies of 
objectified labour.
54.
Let us assume, for the moment, that the social form of labour is 
identical with its natural form, i.e., labour-pow er itself is not a 
commodity. The economic question then becomes only one of the 
productivity of labour. This is a stra ightforward in p u t-o u tp u t  
question. Labour-pow er is a product (of labour) which, during its 
exercise, objectifies more labour than it assimilates. Productivity of 
labour concerns itself with the differential between the quantity of 
labour objectified and the quantity of labour assimilated, the latter 
itself consisting of objectified labour. The m om ent this labo ur-  
power, during its exercise, has fully re-objectified the labour-power  
which it has assimilated, we say that the labour-power has replaced 
the cost of its own reproduction. A certain portion of the labour­
time, therefore, goes towards its own reproduction, this portion 
being directly expressed in a definite number of products. This 
constitutes necessary labour-tim e. W here  labour is performed in 
isolation, as, e.g., where the (theoretical) labourer produces his own 
necessaries of life, it is immediately obvious when enough has been 
produced for his labour-pow er to be reproduced, and when that 
amount has been exceeded, or, indeed, when there is a shortfall. The 
distinction between necessary labour-tim e and surplus labour-tim e  
is, therefore, similarly obvious. The same applies in those forms of 
economy where labour is immediately social.
To return now to the world of generalised commodity production. Here 
labour takes the form of w age-labour and is, therefore, as much a 
commodity as anything else, including gold, is a commodity. The value 
of labour-power, like the value of everything else, is the amount of 
labour-time recognised by society as necessary, on the average, for 
its production. The expression of this value alongside other values in 
terms of the use-value of a single commodity gives to the value the 
form of price. Price is the rendering commensurable of all values in 
their infinite range of concrete embodiments through their being 
expressed as so many different quantities of a single concrete  
embodiment, a single commodity.
If the values of all commodities are expressed in terms of gold 
(price: .r gold), then so must be the value of labour-power. W a g e -
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labour is labour for m o n e y .  That it must, during its exercise, assume 
this, that or the other concrete form is of only secondary importance. 
Through its exercise, labour-power makes the same metamorphosis, 
c -  m as do all other commodities. Where money is gold, wage-labour  
is labour for gold. The value of labour-power in general,  living labour, 
rather than the value of commodities, objectified labour, now 
confronts the value of gold.
A rise in the value of gold means a decline in the p r ic e  of labour-
power; while, similarly, a decline in the value of gold implies a 
corresponding appreciation in the price of labour-power. But this rise 
or fall in price demonstrated by labour-power, occurs across the 
board, affecting all commodities with values expressed in gold, i.e., 
in the same price-jurisdiction, so to speak. The value of labour-
power, therefore, neither appreciates nor depreciates v i s - a - v i s  
commodities in general. The ratios in which it commands its own 
means of consumption remains the same. Its value remains the same 
despite an alteration in its price.
“If there is a fall or rise in the value  of gold..., in which the exchange value of 
commodities is measured as price, then prices rise or fall because a change has 
taken place in their standard of value; and an increased or diminished amount of
gold... is in circulation as coin because the prices have risen or fallen’’.94
W e notice that a rise or decline in the value of gold makes no
difference to the value-relation between commodities which express 
their values in terms of that gold, i.e., in c irc u la t io n ,  and that the 
commodity labour-power is no exception. But how is in product ion? In
order that this may be better explored, we need to separate gold as
particular wealth from gold as abstract wealth. This is necessary  
because the production of use -va lu e  I is subject to completely  
different laws from those governing the production of use-va lue  II. 
W e therefore first consider a rise in the value of gold as particular 
use-value, i.e., as a lump of metal, and then, separately, as universal 
use-value, i.e., as the material of money.
When something increases in value, it means that a greater amount of 
labour-time has henceforth to be spent on its production than before.
9 4 /b /d , p160, emph. orig.
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It is no different with gold. A rise or fall in the value of gold means 
that, respectively, a greater or lesser amount of labour-tim e is now 
needed for the production of the same quantity of gold. For simplicity 
of argument, we shall confine ourselves to a rise in the value of gold, 
since the case of a fall requires a simple inversion. In this case more 
labour-time will be required for the production of the same quantity 
of gold. Put differently, for the same expenditure of labour-time, less 
gold is produced. Less gold will have been produced within that 
portion of the labour-tim e which constitutes the socially necessary  
labour-time for the reproduction of gold-producing labour-power than 
had been the case before.
In q u a n t i t y , therefore, the gold will not attain to that formerly 
necessary to reproduce the labour-power. In va lue , though, this lesser 
quantity does so adequately, since it has been produced with the same 
am ount of labour-tim e as the larger quantity before it. This is 
reflected in the higher value of gold in production. If we now cast 
gold in the role of g e n e r a l  equivalent, i.e., still ordinary commodity, 
we find that while gold-producing labour now produces less gold for 
the same amount of labour-time, it is nevertheless able to continue 
reproducing itself as if no change has occurred, since the lesser gold 
commands the same basket of commodities as did the greater amount 
before. The important point to establish here is that a change in the 
value of gold as ordinary commodity  does not affect the value of 
gold-producing labour-power.
That it is in the nature of gold as money-commodity that the value of 
the labour-power producing it be reduced to its absolute minimum has 
already been established. What we are about to describe applies over 
and above the constraint imposed by abstract wealth. Because the 
value of go ld -producing  lab o u r-p o w er is a lready at its barest 
minimum any increase in the value of gold must have the following 
results:
The increase in the value of gold, i.e., the increase in the labour-time  
socially necessary for its production, means that in a given amount of 
time less gold is produced. The portion of labour-tim e in which the 
value of labour-power is reproduced is thus increased and surplus
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labour-time reduced. A larger portion of the total product would have 
to be set aside for the reproduction of labour-power. Production will 
proceed upon the smallest of surpluses for the simple reason that its 
product is abstract wealth. But when the surplus portion has been 
entirely annexed by the necessary portion, i.e., the entire product is 
given over to the reproduction of labour-power, then production is 
abandoned. At such a point labour-pow er will have ceased to be 
labour-pow er, for the inherent ability of labour-pow er to produce 
more than it consumes will have been annulled.
This is so regardless of the social form that labour assumes. The  
state-run, serf-based goldfields in Siberia were abandoned in just the 
same way as white free diggers in the United States abandoned their 
claims and allowed them to be taken over by Chinese and Indian free 
diggers who could work them at a lower value of labour-power than 
even the crude white diggers of ‘western’ film notoriety. Del Mar’s 
observation about California and Russia makes the point:
"The Yenesei gold regions [Siberia] were first worked by the government, 
employing convict labour, including women and even children. This practically 
meant cruelty, revolts, desertions, the knout, and the stealing and embezzlement of 
gold. ...In 1853, due to the falling off in returns, it ...abandoned the mines to 
‘private enterprise’ [a system of private ownership of the enterprise based on 
production by unfree labour -  FS], a system, which, combined with police lettres de 
cachet and the hiring of convict labour, increased for a time the productiveness of 
the mines. Under this system ...the cost to Russia ...m ay be briefly summed up as 
follows: Twenty thousand Russian lives, consigned to exile, neglect and oblivion: 
plus the trifling cost of keeping these unhappy creatures alive until they were worn 
out. The average value of the gravel was about 12 cents (6d. sterling) per ton. 
There are hundreds of square miles of far richer ground in California, which has 
never been worked and which can be had to-day for the asking, but from which 
American labourers turn with disdain. This computation may serve to measure the 
difference between a free man’s ration and the meagre one upon which the Russian 
convicts were condemned to die".95
Or, to cite the case of free miners in British Columbia, Lock says of 
their claims, “from their inaccessible position, limited character, 
poor pay, or depth of cover, they [the claims] have been abandoned or 
allowed to fall into the hands of Chinam en”96. W hat immediately  
strikes the reader from a list of all the gold mines operating in the 
Cariboo District of British Columbia in the late 1870s provided by
9 5 Del Mar, A. (1969), p385.
9 6 Lock, A. (1882), p47. “The canon near the 49th parallel,...soon abandoned by whites, was 
worked for years by Chinamen", ibid., p52.
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Lock, is that a watershed in gold-mining had been reached: though 
there was still gold, no further gold could be extracted unless either 
there was a drop in the value of labour-power, or the technology was 
revolutionised. Of the 45 sites mentioned, most of them had either 
“not yet been p roved”, i.e., awaiting a d e q u a te  technological 
application; or “worked out”, i.e., too much labour-value had to be put 
in for too little gold-value derived. In both cases the mines could be 
rendered productive by the application of new technology, but in the 
meantime, in both cases the mines were being worked by workers 
whose labour-pow er was of much lower value, viz., Chinese and 
Indians. Lock eventually does make this connection when, later, he 
observes about the Fraser River, British Columbia, that, “much gold is 
obtained by Chinamen and Indians on the Fraser, and it is probable 
that eventually, many of even the higher flats and benches will pay 
for hydraulic work”97. Of Illinois Canyon, California, Lock says: “this 
ground has been worked by the hydraulic method, and is said to have 
paid a little less than wages, on the average”98.
Of course, this would all be avoided if the productivity of labour were 
sufficiently increased, which, from time to time, it is. But the 
productivity of labour in mining, an extractive industry, develops  
differently to the way it does in other industries.99 Gold in its 
character as ordinary commodity needs to be briefly recalled. 
Extractive industry suffers the peculiar handicap that for every unit 
extracted, one unit less remains. O ver time, therefore, running 
contrary to the general development in the productivity of labour, the 
productivity of labour in mining necessary declines as the material 
extracted becom es more thinly spread. The actual movement in
9 7 Lock, A. (1882), p62. The list appears on pp56-9.
9 8 /b/d., p142.
9 9 Marx makes this same point about extractive industry. However, he includes also agriculture 
(in the broad sense) as extractive industry. This is wrong for two reasons. Firstly, although it is 
correct to say that the productivity of labour in agriculture is subject to the vagaries of nature, 
e.g., poor soil, crop failures, etc., the product of the soil is not a finite resource. It is 
regenerated in that every year new seeds are sown and new crops harvested. Even the soil itself 
is not a finite resource, as barren or exhausted soil is brought or restored to vitality by 
particular methods of agriculture and soil treatment techniques. The second reason, and perhaps 
the more important, is that all of industry has its basis in mining and agriculture. If they were 
both extractive, i.e., operating on continually diminishing resources, it would be difficult to 
explain the evolution of production beyond mining and agriculture. See Marx, K. (1977b), pp37- 
8 .
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mining productivity is the resultant of these two contradictory
movements.
But, in addition, the positive movement, the movement consistent
with the general upward movement of productivity as characterises  
industry in general, is itself only partially and tardily manifested in
mining. This is on account of the general inaccessibility of the
resources (e.g., inhospitable terrain, deep underground, etc.) and the 
generally constricted space in which production takes place, as 
discussed above.
These objective circumstances serve to isolate the productivity of 
labour in mining from the average for production in general. Whereas  
labour in production in general can reduce the value of commodities 
by improving its productivity, i.e., by reducing necessary labour-time, 
thus both reducing the value of its labour-power a n d  maintaining its 
standard of living, labour in mining is not so adaptable. The result is 
that there has been very little room for variation in the value of gold. 
Hemmed in between the value of labour-power on the one side and the 
productivity of labour on the other, there were distinct limits to the 
extent to which gold production could accomm odate a rise in the 
value of gold. A d e c l in e  in the value of gold simply means that the 
q u a n t i ty  of the product accruing to the labourer, or which the free 
miner puts towards his own consumption, will be reduced to reflect 
the maintained value of labour-power, rather than the new value of 
gold.
We return to the main question. What are the implications of a change 
in the value of gold-producing labour-pow er itself for the inter­
relationships between v LP (G), v Gl v c and v LP(C) ? v LP(G) may change  
for a number of reasons, mainly relating to changes in the values of 
those commodities, v c, which go towards the necessaries of life of 
the gold producers, and changes in the standard of living of the gold 
producers themselves. Returning to circulation, let us assume a rise 
in v c and that this rise is unrelated to any movement in the value of 
gold, v G.100 Each commodity would then command a higher price in
100Again we shall confine ourselves to examining only a rise in v L P (G ), as a simple inversion 
of the argument would suffice to explain a decline.
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gold than it had previously done. The total of prices of those 
commodities going towards the gold producer’s means of living, too, 
would be higher. A greater portion of the product of the gold producer 
would therefore have to be set aside for acquiring his means of 
living. Necessary labour-tim e in gold production therefore increases 
to become a larger portion of the total production time than before.
What happens when v LP(G) rises? A rise in the value of labour-power 
(for whatever reason) means that a larger portion of the total labour­
time will be given up to necessary labour, resulting in a diminished 
portion remaining as surplus labour. Once the entire former surplus 
portion has become part of the necessary portion, production will be 
abandoned (the surplus portion can, of course, be expanded by an 
increase in the productivity of labour).101 A decline in the value of 
gold-producing labour-power means that more room is created within 
which the value of gold may vary, given the uncertain way in which 
the va lue  of gold will in the future be a ffec ted  by the  
richness/poverty of the source. The early South African gold-mining  
industry illustrates this point well, as is examined in Section III.
A distinction has to be made between gold in its aspect as measure of 
value and gold in its aspect as standard of price. This is necessary 
because these place different demands on the p h y s ic a l  form of the 
material. In its aspect as measure of value, gold needs present itself 
only as a homogeneous, stable material infinitely capable of division 
and re-unification. It is unimportant w hether this gold appears  
physically as dust, nugget, jewellery, coin, bullion, or anything else. 
Indeed, the more amorphous its physical form, the more adequate is it 
to this role. The lack of specificity of its physical form most 
adequately expresses the lack of specificity of the labour it has to 
measure. It must, of course, socially  itself be a thing of value.
101 Such a universal increase in the value of labour-power did, in fact, take place in the middle 
third of the nineteenth century with the abolition of slavery and the universalisation of wage- 
labour. Overall, however, it is likely that the second half of the nineteenth century saw a decline  
in the value of labour-power as the general productivity of labour soared. Gold-mining labour- 
power, though, was subject only to the rise and not the decline in value. This is taken up in 
Section II.
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Standard of price, on the other hand, has its own, quite different, set 
of dem ands. Since the value of commodities is measured in the 
physical body of a single commodity, a definite quantity of that 
commodity must stand as the unit of price. And, like all units, it 
im m ediately posits a system structured around itself as central 
calibration, with fractions below and multiples above it. In the case
of gold this unit is a unit of weight. The expression of the values of
commodities are now measured in- terms of unit quantities of gold. 
The value of gold assumes a mere relative form while its use-value 
serves as equivalent. “Gold as materialised labour-time is a measure 
of value, as a piece of metal of definite weight it is the standard of 
pric e”.1 02
The standard of price is essentially ‘internally directed’ (for want of 
a better phrase) since unit of weight serves for the systematic  
expression of different quantities of gold as fractions or multiples of 
a central quantity  which is a c learly identifiable and easily  
com prehensible  unit. The infinite range of c o m m o d i t y  values, 
expressed in an infinite range of quantities of gold, can thus be 
meaningfully related to one another as representatives of the values 
of commodities, rather than the value of gold.
A unit of weight remains a unit of weight, and any fluctuation in the 
value of gold will merely give a different value to the unit of weight. 
The latter, therefore, need not change in response to a change in the 
former. The standard of price is therefore stable, acting as a kind of
damper between the value of the measure of value and the values of
the various commodities needing to be measured by it. “Gold is the 
measure of value because its value is variable; it is the standard of 
price because it has been established as an invariable unit of 
w e ig h t”. 103
This is the contradiction of gold: ideal fluidity and ideal fixity housed 
simultaneously in the identical physical thing. This begins to show  
itself the moment we resituate standard of price into circulation 
(although it must be remembered that standard of price functions
1 0 2 Marx, K. (1977b), p71.
103 Ibid.
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independently of w hether the material of that standard actually  
circulates). The unit weight of metal which is the standard of price 
is rendered adequate to circulation by the metal being divided into
discreet bodies, some having that unit weight, others fractions of
that unit weight, and still others multiples of it. Initially, i.e., 
historically, they had their respective weights marked on them for 
ease of recognition. They also came to be shaped into discs for ease  
of handling. Thus does the physical shape of the material gold, at this 
point, administer to the needs of circulation by adopting the form of 
coin, and of coin of different denominations.
When we say that gold is the money-commodity, it means that all 
other com m odities  express their exchange values as particular 
quantities of gold. The values of various commodities are here 
compared to the value of gold, that is true. But for so elementary a 
purpose there is no need for a universal equivalent. The elementary 
expression of value would suffice. The purpose of expressing value in 
an universal equivalent form has, in fact, nothing to do with the value 
of the particular commodity which serves as universal equivalent.
The universal equivalent is posited by commodities in their exchange  
with one another. That the exchange value of commodity A appears as 
x oz. of gold, serves only to compare it with the y oz. of gold which 
expresses the exchange value of commodity B. Since it appears as if 
com m odities are com paring their values with the value of the
universal equivalent, whereas they are, in fact, comparing their value 
with one another, and since one ounce weight of gold will always be 
one ounce weight of gold, the standard of price parts company with 
the measure of value. It, therefore, does not matter what the value of 
gold is, its variation will merely mean that, all else remaining the 
same, commodities will exchange for one another  in greater or lesser 
quantities at the given unit weight of gold but the ratios in which 
they exchange will remain the same. In its capacity as standard of 
price, the demand on gold is merely that it has a value, not that that 
value be of this or that magnitude. As measure of value, it has to have 
a definite magnitude of value.
Since commodities exchange for one another and not for gold, and the 
actual value of gold is irrelevant in its role as standard of price, the
63.
value of the unit of gold which serves as standard of price, does not 
have to reflect the actual value of that unit of gold as measure of 
value. The function of standard of price would be equally well served 
by coin, paper, strips of leather, etc., provided only that gold remains 
the measure of all values. Gold can, therefore, be withdrawn from 
circulation and replaced by paper tokens with national names printed 
on th e m .104 The paper currency (or other token), when first 
introduced, would be a simple replacem ent for the unit of gold 
serving as the standard of price, in this case the ounce: x units of 
paper currency = 1 ounce of gold. The amount of value represented by 
such a token as standard of price  is the value of commodities  
expressed by the unit of gold which that token represents. It thus 
becomes a surrogate expression of the prices of commodities and as 
such, of the values of commodities.
“A definite quantity of gold as such does not express a value relation, nor does the 
token which takes its place. The gold token represents value in so far as a definite 
quantity of gold, because it is materialised labour-time, possesses a definite value. 
But the amount of value which the token represents depends in each case upon the 
value of the quantity of gold represented by it. As far as commodities are concerned, 
the token of value represents the reality of their price and constitutes a token of
their price and a token of their value only because their value is expressed in their
p ric e " .1 05
If an actual ounce of gold was the reality of the price of the
commodity, then a token of that gold is a mere token of that price. 
But since it is the price of the commodity  and not the price of gold, 
this token now appears to distance itself from gold, where it appears 
not to belong, and conceptually appears to move closer to the
commodity, where it does appear to belong.106 This token of value, 
not being value itself, has no existence other than as a means of 
purchase, as a representative of the universal equivalent in this 
narrow specificity. It does not itself circulate as value. The actual 
value of this token, the labour-time necessary to produce it, is 
therefore as irrelevant as that of gold as standard of price. Indeed,
1 0 4 “ln many states notes or paper-moneys are rapidly usurping the place of coins. ...The
general progress of the note-system is shown by the fact that in the early part of the 19th 
century notes formed about one-fourth of the entire circulation of the Occidental world. At the 
present time [1900] notes form rather more than one-half”, Del Mar, A. (1969), p453.
1 0 6 Marx, K. (1977b), p 1 15, emph. orig.
106uBut the appearance is deceptive. The token of value is directly only a token of price, that is 
a token of gold, and only indirectly a token of the value of the commodity", ibid., emph. orig.
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the token of value becomes a more adequate expression of the 
standard of price, the less value it itself has— hence paper currency. 
Its quantity in circulation does not, therefore, depend on the total of 
prices needing to be circulated, but can be any arbitrary amount.
This is unlike where gold directly circulates, i.e., where it functions 
directly both as standard of price and as measure of value, even 
though it is present in circulation only in the former and not in the 
latter. The rate at which paper notes will represent value will depend 
on their quantity in circulation. To put the matter differently, since 
these ideally valueless tokens do in circulation represent gold, their 
q u a n t i ty  will depend on the quantity of gold that would otherwise 
circulate, and since they are tokens of value ,  the amount of value 
they are able to command depends on their quantity. “W hereas, 
therefore, the quantity of gold in circulation depends on the prices of 
commodities, the value of the paper in circulation... depends solely on 
its own quantity”.107 In other words, each unit of paper currency 
becomes a fraction of a definite total quantity of value needing to be 
circulated. The total value represented by paper currency must, for 
now, represent this total quantity of value.
Whatever the value it represents may be, though, it must be constant
long enough for it to become generalised throughout the network of 
exchange relations and to be a reliable bearer of value from sale to 
purchase and vice versa. The custodian of the form of economy, the 
state, which issues these tokens in the first place, also ascribes to 
them a legal rate at which they will represent gold. This legal rate at 
which it r e p r e s e n t s  gold is, initially, also the rate at which it is 
convert ible into gold. Thus has the reality of price as a converted 
form of value at first to be acknowledged if a token is to be the 
instrum ent of that co n ve rs io n .108 Although physical gold will, 
therefore, continue to circulate as coin, there is, in essence, no
longer any need for it to do so. The token will gradually replace it as
medium of circulation not only because the former is a more efficient 
medium than the latter, but because physical gold can then freely
' 0 7 Ibid., p 119.
108o f course, the state is in a position to ignore its own rules.
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withdraw into that aspect of money to which its physical form is 
most adequate: value-for-itself, or store of value.
W e must now make a lengthy digression to introduce paper currency 
and the contradiction between capital and money as it emerges in the 
relationship between gold and paper currency. This is necessary in 
order to explain the imposition of a ‘fixed price’ on gold together 
with fixed rates of exchange between currencies. This arrangement, 
it will be shown, contradicts the very nature of gold as m oney-  
com m odity .
The ‘Fixed Gold Price’ and the Value of G old-M ining Labour-
Power
W h ile  c ircu lation  unquestionab ly  d eve lop s  forw ard  with the  
introduction of paper currency, such a move, at the same time, 
rep resen ts  a re trogressive  step. The  h ith e rto -e x is t in g  direct 
circulation of gold in the domestic economy, meant that all domestic 
economies had the same currency. Their respective average levels of 
productivity were directly able to influence one another through the 
conduct of international trad e .109 The same gold which bought a 
kettle in a village in North Yorkshire could buy a sackfull of grain in 
I t a ly .110 Paper currency were strictly national money, and their 
circulation isolated domestic economies from one another.
Paper Currency, Convertibility and World Gold Movement
Changes in the average level of domestic productivity reflected in 
changes in the general level of prices in the local currency. And since 
the currency was only a standard of price and not a measure of value,
1 0 9 ln addition to gold, bills of exchange (a credit instrument) also served as medium of 
international circulation already in the Middle Ages.
11 °W hen  gold circulated as currency in domestic economies, coins from the most diverse realms 
circulated side by side in any one country, especially where the mint was simply too remote. 
What mattered was that they were all of gold. Their respective values were recognised by their 
respective weights. In closer proximity to the mints, foreign coins were less readily accepted 
and had to be melted down and reminted.
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there was no way of comparing international productivity levels, and 
no way of knowing whether a particular commodity was more cheaply 
produced in one country as opposed to another. The matter is further 
complicated by the fact that each state set the rate at which its 
paper currency would represent the unit weight of gold only in 
reference to itself. If all national currencies were set in such a way 
that a single unit of each currency represented the same unit weight 
of gold, then any changes in national price levels would still be 
discernible internationally. But this was not so. Each national 
currency had its own datum, so to speak.
International trade now required a mechanism for providing buyers in 
one country with the means of purchase in another. The foreign 
exchanges, though, were not exchanging values, but tokens of value. 
Their rate of exchange internationally depended purely on the extent 
to which they were in demand. By their nature, therefore, paper 
currencies lend them selves to wholesale  speculation, and the 
essential quality of the medium of circulation, that the value it 
represents endures throughout the act of exchange, disappears.
If this is a problem for the circulation of commodities, it is even 
more so for money. In the same way as the circuit c -  m -  c 
obscures the object of commodity circulation, c -  c , so the circuit 
m -  c -  m obscures the object of money circulation, m -  m,  indeed, 
m -  m' .  Preserving value for the duration of the act of exchange, i.e., 
from sale to purchase, is a problem which commodity circulation 
solves by settling upon gold as its medium. W e have seen how the 
conscious hand of the bourgeoisie, the state, has to contrive a device 
for ensuring such preservation once the further developm ent of 
exchange itself marginalises gold from this role. Enhancing value 
(instead of merely preserving it)111 during the course of the act of 
exchange, i.e., from purchase to sale, is a problem which money 
circulation solves by money positing capital. Marx puts it thus:
1 1 1 1ndeed, its enhancement is its preservation, for mere preservation— as in C -  C — removes 
the point of money circulation.
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“Posited as a side of the relation, exchange value, which stands opposite use-value 
itself, confronts it as money, but the money which confronts it in this way is no 
longer money in its character as such, but money as capital”.112
The circulation of tokens of value, which we shall call t ,  in the 
national economy compels the circuit m -  c -  m' to assume the form 
of m -  t -  c -  t  - m ' ,  where two metamorphoses have become four. 
Two of these, m-  t  and c -  t 1 involve, in fact, a complete  
dissolution of not only the form of value, but value itself, while the 
other two, t -  c  and t ’ -  m ’ am ount to the restoration not of 
particular forms of value, but of value itself. Already, in the ‘mere’ 
act of introducing paper currency, not only is a more efficient 
allocation of social labour effected, but value begins to abolish 
itself, at such points to be replaced by conscious decision-making at 
the level of the society as a whole. But this development, being a 
moment of the contradiction inherent in the commodity, that of u s e -  
value and exchange value, has here, too, its opposite pole. For m this 
is a gauntlet, and it must seek to guarantee t  as an adequate  
representative of itself. Thus must conscious social action turn on 
its head and immediately salvage that which it has just annulled. 
Thus does the state institute a fixed rate at which t  will always 
represent m.
No sooner is such a rate fixed, and the metamorphosis t ‘ -  m ’ can be 
dispensed with, or at least, suspended, t ' -  m -  m -  t  becomes  
superfluous, since t ‘ is by reflux a lready t .  To effect the
transformation t '  -  m' is to depart from circulation and the moment 
money departs from circulation, it does not function as capital. The  
object now becom es to avoid m altogether so that the circuit
t -  c -  t ‘ may be repeated over and over again.
“Since merchant’s capital is penned in the sphere of circulation, and since its
function consists exclusively of promoting the exchange of commodities, it requires 
no other conditions for its existence— aside from the undeveloped forms arising 
from direct barter— outside those necessary for the simple circulation of 
commodities and money".113
1 1 2 Marx, K. (1973), p269.
11 3 Marx, K. (1984), p325.
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There thus appears to be no need to maintain the convertibility of t ‘ 
to m \  and hence of t  to m. The abolition of convertibility is inherent 
in the concept of convertibility itself. The very protection which 
value seeks for itself becomes its barr ier.114 “It is evident that 
banks issuing notes can by no means increase the number of 
circulating notes at will, as long as these notes are at all time 
e xc h a n g e a b le  for m o n ey ”.115 In other words, convertibility is a 
constraint on capital (but in more ways than one). This is a 
contradiction between two forms of value: money and capital.
The fragmentation of circulation into distinct national components  
each with its own m edium  of c ircu la tio n , h e ig h ten s  this 
c o n tra d ic t io n .  Let us re tu rn  to th e  d o m e s t ic  c ircu it  
m -  t -  c -  The same basic processes which occur in the
domestic circuit occur internationally, except in a more complex  
manner. An import of commodities is, at the same time, an export of 
money: though an export of money is not necessarily an import of 
commodities. W e shall first exam ine the import and export of 
commodities, then the import and export of money, which may be 
either as means of purchase, means of payment or capital.
The above circuit, as it is extended across more than one country, 
may be given as: (i) money export-commodity import:
m -  T : -  t 2 -  c -  t x* -  M
(ii) commodity export-m oney import:
m -  t x -  C -  t 2( t 1 ) -  t x -  m'
With respect to (i): Money (gold), m, is converted to local currency, T lt 
at the central bank; local currency, T lf  is converted to foreign 
currency, t 2, at the foreign exchange (either locally or in the foreign 
country): foreign currency is exchanged for commodities, c , in the 
foreign country; the commodities are imported and sold for local
1 1 4 When the ‘Great Anti-Fascist Barrier* came down in 1990, it was those protected behind it 
who streamed out.
1 1 5 Marx, K. (1984), p523.
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currency, t x; which is, in turn, converted back to gold, m, at the 
central bank. If m has proved successful as capital, then the imported 
commodities would sell at local currency t 1’ , which would become
m ‘ .
In the case of (ii): Money (gold), m, is converted to local currency, t x, 
at the central bank; with this local currency commodities, c , are 
bought; these commodities are exported and in the foreign country 
sold for foreign currency, t 2; this foreign currency is converted back 
into local currency, T lt (either in the foreign country or locally); and 
the local currency is redeemed in gold, m, at the central bank. Again, 
if m has proved successful as capital, then the foreign currency, t 2, 
would be the equivalent of an enhanced local currency, t ^, which
would become m'.
All of these metamorphoses have already been discussed in respect of 
the domestic circulation of convertible paper currency, above, except 
for the conversion between two national currencies, t x -  t 2 and 
t 2 -  t x. It has been argued above that the foreign exchanges do not 
exchange value, but tokens of value. While it is the state which fixes 
the legal ratio in which paper currency represents a given weight of 
gold, it is also the state which creates paper currency. Because their 
quantity in circulation is not determined by the total of prices 
needing to be circulated, any quantity may be printed. The rate at 
which each unit will exchange against commodities depends on what 
fraction of the total prices is accounted for by that unit.
The m oney-dea ler inserts himself between the dem ander of foreign 
currency (the latter being also a supplier of local currency or gold) 
and the supplier of foreign currency (who is at the sam e time a 
demander of local currency or gold). The m oney-dea ler’s own capital 
follows the circuit:
M “  T j  -  T ^ T ^ ) -  T 3( T 1” ) -  T ^ T , ' " ) . . .  - M '
Again, as soon as money is represented by any token, it can quite 
happily rem ain  in that condition, increasing  its pow er of 
r e p r e s e n t a t io n ,  rather than of realisation, with every transaction.
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Once money leaves the physical body of gold behind it, it will delay 
its return to that form in order to remain in circulation, where it 
continuously increases its c la im  on gold, without ever realising that 
claim. Convertibility assists money in its becoming capital, but 
capital, in turn, drives money to inconvertibility.
But the rate at which t x will exchange for t 2 is not only a simple 
function of supply and demand. For the same two currencies there 
would be different rates of exchange depending on whether the 
transaction is conducted in the one country rather than the other; and 
also depending on whether the transaction takes place today or 
tomorrow. Uncertainty as to the ‘rea l’ rate of exchange— as it 
expresses different productivities of labour and different intensities 
of trading activ it ies  in the d iffe ren t coun tries— is there fo re  
compounded by an exponential factor.
This has the effect that not only would money go into circulation for 
shorter periods, but that it would also restrain itself from venturing 
too far along its circuit of formal transform ations. There  is a 
reluctance on the part of the owner of capital to tie up his capital for 
too long in forms which cannot be easily reconverted into gold. The  
many uncertainties brought about by the existence of many national 
currencies is therefore a direct impediment both to money and to 
c ap ita l.
In the exchange of commodities between national economies, some 
countries, after a definite period, find themselves in possession of 
com m odities which they have not paid for, while others find 
th em selves  d ivested  of com m odities  w ithout having received  
payment for them. This in itself amounts to a sophisticated clearance  
system, where actual circulation of the money material is confined 
to the settling of balances. Unfortunately for the policy makers, the 
m ovem ent of gold into or out of a domestic circulation area  
interferes with the functioning of the convertible national currency. 
Its volume has to be adjusted so that it maintains the legally 
required ratio to the national gold reserve. Currency was injected 
into or withdrawn from circulation by central bank interest rate
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manipulation. Higher interest rates reduced the level of currency, 
lower interest rates increased it.
But this very device turns the currency into an object of capital.
Monies which might in a former age have petrified into hoards, find 
here one more opportunity for expansion, a chance to realise the 
essence of money— to become capital. A third international movement 
of value, in addition to those of goods and money, is now a movement 
of capital. This created its own demand for national currencies quite 
separate to the demands of trade or those of the money dealer, with 
its own influence on currency exchange ra tes .116 Such capital 
movements, too, occurred in the form of gold shipments. The result is 
that the very material by means of which national governments  
sought to stabilise the re lationship be tw een  their dom estic
economies and the world economy, was the very instrument of 
instability. As money, gold enabled capital, as capital gold disabled 
money. By international agreement, the commercial powers of the 
world sought to stabilise money by instituting a system of fixed 
exchange rates based on a fixed rate at which certain key national
currencies may be redeemed against a definite unit weight of gold. In
other words, a single international standard of price was put in place. 
This was called the international gold standard.
Our purpose is solely to expose the implications of the International 
Gold Standard system for the value of gold-producing labour-power. 
This is done firstly by simply describing empirically the workings of 
that system. We then see whether its workings can throw any further 
light onto the nature of the money-commodity. This chapter will show 
that the International Gold Standard system merely gave institutional 
expression to the contradictions inherent in the commodity, and 
which are developed to a higher degree in the money-commodity. The  
contradiction between use-value and exchange value, which is solved  
for the m oney-com m odity , gold, is reinstated for it by the gold 
standard on account of its inability to accom m odate  the dual 
character of gold as both commodity and non-com modity. At this 
point, the so-called ‘fixed gold price’ emerges as a fixed gold value.
1 1 6 For Marx’s discussion of exchange rates, which was not yet a system in his day, see Marx, 
K. (1984), pp317 -2 2 , pp568-9 . pp574-84 .
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The latter set the limit beyond which the value of gold-producing  
labour-power could not appreciate.
The International Gold Standard system117 consisted of the following 
institutional arrangem ents:
1. The national currencies of m em ber countries are directly  
convertible to gold at a fixed, cu rre n cy -to -g o ld  ratio118 and in 
unlimited am ounts; 2. the ratio shall be practically the same  
regardless of whether the state acts as seller or purchaser of gold; 3. 
all m em ber states shall permit unrestricted import and export of 
gold.119
Although it was immaterial to the principle of the system whether 
gold actually circulated in the domestic econom y (gold specie  
standard), or whether this role was played by a fully-convertible  
paper currency (gold bullion standard), this did make a big difference 
in the practical operation of the system, since, the arrangements  
listed above require each member country to hold, in fact, two  gold 
reserves: one for domestic; and the other for international purposes, 
if it did not want its own circulating medium controlled by the 
international movements of gold.
Where gold directly circulates in the domestic economy, the domestic 
reserve would, strictly speaking, be the same body of gold as the gold 
in circulation. The volume of gold in circulation would contract and 
expand in response to the need for gold in the economy. This would be 
the sum of, on the one hand, a function of the total of prices to be 
circulated and the velocity of circulation, plus, on the other hand, the 
total amount of gold issued as money capital. W here gold does not
1 1 7 Opinion is divided as to the date of inception of the International Gold Standard, but most 
writers put it to 1873 when Germany went onto the standard. Some, though, do suggest the 
fixing of the value ratio of the pound sterling to a definite weight unit of gold by Isaac Newton in 
1717 as the birth of this system.
1 1 8 The phrase “currency to gold ratio” is deliberately chosen. All economics textbooks, 
departing as most of them do, from the quantity theory of money, conceptualise this ratio as a 
“gold price", which makes it synonymous with the price form of the values of commodities as 
they are expressed in particular quantities of the use-value of the universal equivalent. It is, 
therefore, a designation which does not illuminate. A gold price does, indeed, emerge, but this is 
secular, i.e., by no means the same order of category as price, the unified expression of value.
11 9 Day, A. (1960), p438, or, indeed, any textbook which mentions the gold standard.
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circulate, but is represented by a fully-convertible paper token, the 
domestic reserve should vouch for the entire sum of paper currency. 
This paper currency would then, naturally, require its own p a p e r  
currency reserve, for as it expands and contracts, it will be expelling 
from circulation such amounts of currency as become, from time to 
time, superfluous, and recalling back into circulation such varying 
amounts as and when needed. Since the currency remains fully 
convertible, the domestic gold reserve may be described as semi­
active. It nevertheless has to be kept.
As far as the international exchange of commodities were concerned, 
payment was made either in the currency of the country selling, or in 
g o ld .120 Here we might describe a country’s international gold reserve 
as a reserve for money. Realisation in commodity circulation, 
whether domestic or international, consists in the owner of value in 
the form of commodity A eventually being the owner of that same  
value in the form of commodity B. Realisation in money circulation 
consists in a certain amount of money, m, being converted into a 
higher amount of money, M ' .
The same problem of the medium of circulation enduring as a value 
through the act of exchange arises here too, only more starkly so. The 
duration of the circuits c -  m -  c  and m -  c -  m are not only longer, 
but also more complex, as discussed above. Their longer duration 
allows greater opportunity for the rate at which different national 
currencies exchange for one another to change, thereby increasing the 
chances of non-realisation. Hence the need to fix the rate at which 
currencies convert into one another and into gold. But this conversion 
of currency into gold is also a conversion of gold into currency. This 
reversibility of the relation is purely formal, though, since paper  
currency remains, essentially, a token of the value of gold. Value, a 
thing which is by its nature variable, is now subjugated to the 
standard of price, a thing which is by its nature fixed.
1 2 0 W e ignore the bill of exchange as medium of circulation. Although this was a credit 
instrument and, as such, an economiser on the circulating medium, it is not a form posited out of 
the evolution of money. As a form, it has no inherent relation to gold. A lengthy history of the 
bill of exchange is offered in Powell, E. (1966), and also Kindleberger, C. (1987).
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We now return to the value of labour-power in gold production. The 
latter half of the nineteenth century saw a dramatic rise in the 
average level of productivity in the industrial economies and hence a 
decline in the average value of labour-power. Particular contributors 
to this were, e.g., the decline in transport costs afforded by railways 
and steamships, the substitution of high-quality steel for iron and a 
grain market which spanned the globe. Not only fixed costs, but 
variable costs, too, declined.121 Although commodities exchanged for 
tokens of value and not for gold directly, these tokens were  
nevertheless convertible to gold at a fixed rate. In general, the values 
of commodities would not change in relation to each other (of course 
the rate of productivity increase happens differently for different 
commodities, but their values were all moving in the same direction), 
but they would change in relation to gold. Assuming the value of gold 
to have remained constant (this was not the case), then commodities 
would become cheaper in terms of gold, while gold becam e more 
expensive in terms of commodities.
But the production  of gold was not subject to the same movements in 
productivity as was its circulation.  The first reason for this has been 
discussed above, and relates to the isolation of the productivity of 
labour in extractive industries from the genera l m ovem ents of 
productiv ity  in industry in g e n e ra l .  In e x tra c t iv e  industry  
productivity gains following on the introduction of new technology  
tends to be offset by increasing difficulty in maintaining the volume 
of production of the material being extracted.
This isolation receives further impetus from the actual geographical 
isolation of gold production from the centres of industry and the 
technological backwardness of gold-producing areas when compared  
to industrial areas. The average level of values is higher in mining 
areas in general, than it is in the industrial centres. The underlying 
tendency is therefore that the values of the products of extractive 
industry will, on average, be higher than those of industry in general.
121 This ‘second industrial revolution’ is well documented, and is discussed in detail in Section II.
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To the extent that capital is restrained from flowing freely in and 
out of industries, and the products of particular capitals from having 
to compete for sale against one another, a rent will emerge. Prior to 
capitalist mining (viz., the ground owned by the owner of the capital) 
the surplus-value eventually realised through the sale of the product 
had to incorporate a portion to be handed over to the landlord. With 
the rise of capitalist mining in the late nineteenth century, this rent 
d isa p p e ared .122 Monopoly rent, i.e., the difference between a monopoly 
price and the ordinary market price, persists in mining in general. 
Such monopoly rent may arise on account of: (i) a more favourable 
location or endowment with richer ore— either way, amounting to an 
increased productivity of labour which has nothing to do with the 
organic composition of capital; or (ii) “the purchaser’s eagerness to 
buy and ability to pay, independent of the price determined by the 
general price of production, as well as by the value of the 
products”.123
Gold-mining has its own, more elementary response to differences in 
productivity between different enterprises, and between itself as an 
industry and industry in general. The ‘fixed price’ of gold means that 
sudden increases in the productivity of labour does not translate into 
monopoly rent, instead, the ‘latitude’ provided by this increased  
productivity is taken advantage of to extract a lower grade of ore 
than would normally be economical to extract. What is potential value 
one day becomes actual value the next. The fixed price serves as a 
barrier to the competitive transfer of surplus-value between go ld -
production and other industries. Such transfer can only take place 
indirectly, as social capital. This is discussed in more detail under 
Competition in Gold Production, below.
Changes in the value of gold does not affect the rate at which
commodities exchange for one another. Hence neither does fixing the 
rate of convertibility of paper currency into gold at a certain point 
affect the rate at which commodities exchange for one another.
1 2 2 The depletion  of the resource itself encourages this developm ent. “He [the 
landowner/capitalist mine owner] only gives himself permission to exploit the mine. This does 
not enable him to draw a rent, but it does enable him to exclude others and to invest his capital in
the mine, with profit”, Marx, K. (1975), p362.
1 2 3 Marx, K. (1984), p775.
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Fluctuations in the values of commodities relative to one another are 
reflected in their changing relative prices. Gold here officiates in its 
capacity as standard of price although it does not circulate. Its value 
is represented for it by paper currency.
W here gold does, however, directly circulate, it must represent its 
own value. This it does (i) between the boundaries of the circulation 
areas of the various national currencies, and (ii) at its point of entry 
into circulation, the point at which it leaves production. In neither of 
these areas, however, was it able to do so. Although gold circulated 
physically between countries, it now no longer circulated as value. 
The material gold now performed a function for  paper currency: It 
went where paper currency could not go. Real gold now became a 
representat ive of pa p e r  currency. Thus does the token of value, 
posited by gold, now posit gold as a token of it.
(ii) As its point of production, gold enters into its social intercourse
not as money,  but as commodity.  And commodities are circulated by a 
token of value, paper currency. When Marx speaks of the contradiction 
between use-value and exchange value having been solved for gold,124 
that solution is annulled when gold, as it emerges from production as
commodity does not  barter, as Marx contends, but is ass igned  a price,
one quite unrelated to its value. The token of value can represent only 
a f ixed quantum of  value, which, after all, is why it can be a 
convertible token. Although the values of commodities find their 
fluctuating values expressed in fluctuating paper currency prices, it 
is not so with gold. The rate at which gold exchanges for paper 
currency is fixed in the capacity of gold as m o n e y .  That very same  
m ater ia l  now confronts paper currency as commodity.
"In so far as gold is to be established as the unit of measurement, the relation of 
gold to commodities is determined by barter, direct, unmediated exchange... With 
barter, however, the product is exchange value only in itself; it is its first 
phenomenal form; but the product is not yet posited as exchange value",125
In other words, gold is here commodity, but it is not yet money. But 
the token of value, paper currency, makes no such distinction. It
1 2 4 Marx, K. (1977b), p48.
1 2 5 Marx, K. (1973), p204. Emph. ours.
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knows gold only as a material. It recognises only its weight, and not 
its social form, although it is itself a product of that very social 
form. When it represents the value of gold, that gold is something
which effects  exchange, not something which part ic ipates  in it.
Since nothing can be its own equivalent, the token of value cannot do 
for the commodity gold what it does for other commodities. It cannot 
give a price form to the value of gold, as it does to all other 
commodities. While the standard of price is embodied in something 
other than the measure of value, it must have its relationship to that 
m easure  defined by the state . This re lationship is one of 
representation, and representation at a definite ratio. While, for 
whatever reason, the state has to maintain this ratio unaltered over 
time, the token of value has no authority to represent any more than a 
fixed maximum of the value of the material which serves as measure. 
To the extent that the value of the measure of value, i.e., gold, 
exceeds this maximum, gold has no mechanism through which to 
assert its value equivalence against other commodities. Fluctuations 
in the value of gold can thus not be reflected in the token.
The producer of gold must, therefore, produce gold b e lo w  this value 
or not at all. This holds equally for whatever social form that 
production might assume. It makes no difference whether that gold is 
produced by slaves, free diggers, wage-labourers or a co-operative, 
whether the enterprise is run on the basis of one man or as a vast-  
scale venture, whether production is controlled by the state, private 
capital or joint-stock capital, and, regardless of whether production 
takes place in the same country as that where its product is to serve 
as money, or in a different country.
This does not mean that the value of gold cannot fluctuate. It is
produced by labour, therefore it has a variable value. W here  
production is carried on under value conditions, variable value (that 
expended on labour-pow er) and fixed value (that expended on 
equipm ent, raw m aterials, etc.) fuse to confront the producer 
generically as his cost of production. All producers seek to reduce 
their cost of production, although this assumes a peculiar form in
78.
capitalist gold production, which is discussed under competition in 
gold-mining, below.
Thus there arose, in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, a 
situation in which the organic link between the value of the m oney-  
commodity and the values of commodities in general was severed. The 
value of gold as it entered into circulation became, effectively, fixed 
by the fixing of the ratio in which any one national currency was 
allowed to represent a unit weight of gold, and the fixing of the 
ratios in which various national currencies were permitted to take 
the place of one another as representatives of that gold.
Since the richness with which gold occurs in nature remains highly 
subject to chance, its value, independently on this account, must 
remain variable. The room required for this variability can only be 
provided by not allowing the value of gold-producing labour-power to 
appreciate. That which is by nature variable,  must now become fixed. 
How these developm ents  played them selves out empirically is 




Gold has been examined as use-value and as money. W e must now 
examine gold in its specific nature as capital. By the late nineteenth 
century, gold has, of course, already functioned as usurer’s capital, 
m erchant’s capital and money dea ler’s capital. The material itself 
only becomes an object of capital with the creation of a world 
market with its different productivities of labour in its different 
national spheres. The insertion of the material gold into the circuit 
of productive capital as commodity-capital is the new development 
of the late nineteenth century. It is this form, in particular, which we 
are interested in examining since it is this form which relates 
directly to modern gold-producing labour-power.
Chapter One has explained that once the role of money-commodity is 
ascribed to gold (or any other commodity, for that matter), then the 
same material, gold, assumes two, quite distinct use-values. One of 
these, particular use-value  (what we called U se -V a lu e  I), is of the 
same category of use-value as that of all other commodities. It is a 
particular object resulting from the objectification of particular  
concrete labour. As such it addresses a particular need of a particular 
individual. The object of its production, ultimately, is its private 
consumption. Its second use-value, universal use-value (U se-Value  II), 
does not address any particular need of any particular individual, but 
a universal need of exchange economy. Its consumer, therefore, is 
exchange itself.
All commodities, including gold, are no n -u se -va lu es  to their owners 
and use-values to their non-owners, which is why they exchange and 
cease to be commodities. The money-commodity, i.e., gold as U s e -  
Value II, is a use-value to both its owners and its non-owners. Here 
its use-value is its exchange value. Its use-value  II is its exchange  
value I. As U se -V a lu e  II, its owner consumes its utility the moment
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he exchanges his money for U se-V a lue  I, i.e., as soon as he buys 
something with it.
But as U se -V a lu e  II it persists. It continues to be the material gold 
even after something has been bought for it. Its utility as exchange 
value, therefore persists. Unlike U s e -V a lu e  I, which is realised in 
consumption, U se-V a lue  II is realised in circulation. Where U se-Value  
I lacks, there is consumption restricted; where U s e -V a lu e  II is 
deficient, there is circulation restricted (we are not yet speaking of 
c red it) .
As soon as a symbol of the medium of circulation begins to circulate 
alongside or in the place of that medium, and is at all times fully 
redeem able against that medium, everything is in place for the 
commoditisation of the medium of circulation as such. To find the 
genesis of this, we must look at the most token of value, specie 
coins.
A gold coin is a fixed quantity, i.e., weight, of the metal which at the 
time of its production contained a certain amount of value. Coins, for 
ease of reckoning, appear in fractional and multiple denominations. 
The infinite divisibility and ability to be re -un ited  has now been 
restricted to these denominations. Subtle variations in the value of 
gold can now only be reflected in the quantity of commodities  
commanded by each denomination. The essential relation is now, in 
effect, reversed, with commodities reflecting fluctuations in the 
value of gold, rather than the other way round. In this situation the 
medium of circulation itself stands as relative value across from 
particular commodities, its various equivalences. Essentially the 
condition for trading in the medium of circulation as if it were an 
ordinary commodity  is already in place.
But gold cannot trade as an ordinary commodity until another single 
item can stand across from all other commodities, including gold, to 
officiate as their equivalence. The symbol of the medium of 
circulation, paper currency, takes up this role. Gold can now be bought 
and sold by paper currency. A potentiality inherent in use-value  II, 
that of exchange value II, now rises to actuality, and gold becomes,
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for a second time, a commodity.126 While gold remains merely a 
commodity with an additional, social use-value, it is money. When 
that social use-va lue  assumes its own exchange value (quite apart 
from the exchange value which it has in its character as ordinary 
commodity), then gold has become capital.
Given that the same item, the material gold, came to be demanded in 
each of its three different characters— as use-value I, as money and 
as capital, it follows that there would simultaneously be different 
degrees of demand for it. It can therefore be bought as one form and 
then sold as another. It is therefore only natural that, in spite of its 
fixed price, it would develop a daily-fluctuating premium.127
Here gold as capital remains of the order of m erchant’s capital, 
m  -  c -  m ' . As such it is confined to circulation and i$ involved only 
in the redistribution of surplus-value. But gold also becomes the 
object of productive capital, m -  c . . .P . . .  c -  m '. It is here that it 
is most relevant for this thesis, for here capital must engage go ld -  
producing labour directly.
Gold Production and the Circuit of Capital
In regarding the circuit m -  c -  m ' , we are normally only concerned 
with m  which becomes m ' , i.e., with capital, c, the commodity, does 
not interest us because it enters capital’s circulation process as and 
when summoned by capital and drops out of such circulation when 
dismissed by capital, c is therefore only of economic interest insofar 
as it circulates capital, c is normally a real use -v a lu e  (either a 
product of labour or labour-pow er itself). Prior to its entering the 
circulation process it is created and after its departure  it is 
consumed. Capital, however, carries on to engage other commodities 
as it reproduces its own circulation by the proliferation of further 
c irc u its .
1 26This is briefly sketched out by Marx in the Grundrisse. See ibid., pp150-1.
127This is touched on again briefly in Section II.
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In the relationship between money and capital and the ousting of gold 
from the money role, the c in the circuit assumes a more illustrious 
r o l e . 128 While in the circuit c -  m -  c , m  was retained for the 
purposes of acquiring the second c, it is now, in m -  c -  m ' , pressed 
into service as capital. Since the objective of m  is m ' , there would be 
two basic ways of achieving this: m -  c -  m ' , as above; or m  -  m ' 
d ire c tly .
In the basic configuration of the circuit m -  c -  m' ,  viz. as it 
appears here, c is a product of labour, objectified “dead” labour. In 
this instance capital merely appropriates surplus-value. In one of its 
more complex configurations, m -  c  c -  m',  the c consists
partly of objectified and partly of living labour ( labour-pow er). In 
this case capital both creates and appropriates surplus-value. It is 
assum ed that c goes into particular consumption, A c  (added  
commodity) having become A m  (added money) to be joined to m  to 
restart the circuit.
In another of its more complex configurations, m -  c  . . .P . . .  c  -  m ', 
c again consists of both objectified and living labour, except that the 
objectified labour distilled at the end of the production process 
coincides with that objectified labour which serves as the universal 
u se -v a lu e , money. It therefore em erges as both an object for 
particular consumption and an object for universal consumption. In 
the first case its consumer is the living individual (living labour), in 
the second case it is capital, i.e., commodity capital and money 
capital at the same time. This role as object of consumption for 
capital, i.e., dead labour, is grounded in its role as object of 
consumption for the individual, i.e., living labour.
In the configuration m -  c . . . P . . . c ' -  m ', c remains value in the 
commodity form and there is no compulsion for it to re -e n te r  the 
circulation process. However, in the configuration m -  c  . . .P . . .  m ', 
while value here, too, emerges in the commodity form ( c ' = m ' )» that 
commodity partially effects the transformation of c in m -  c -  m ' 
into m  in that c emerges as m  directly out of the production process.
128The following discussion is based on Marx, K. (1983), Ch. IV and Marx, K. (1977a), Chs l-IV 
and pp330-43.
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Its next action is therefore not to close the circuit m -  c -  m \  but 
to open a new one, that action being the starting point, rather than 
the end point of the circulation process. This is the circuit of such 
capital as is applied to the production of a money commodity. This 
circuit, though not yet adequate to the ideal capital, represented by 
the circuit m -  m ' ,  approxim ates it more c losely  than does  
m  -  c . . .P. . .  c -  m ' .
In both m -  c -  m ' and in m -  c . . .P. . .  c  -  m ' capital must twice 
change its form: from money into commodity and from commodity 
back into money. In the case of m  -  c . . .P. . .  m ' ,  it needs make only 
one such transformation: from money into commodity, since the 
second transformation is effected with in  the production process  
itself. Thus do we find not only the production process taken into the 
circulation process of capital, as in m -  c  . . .P. . .  c ' -  m ' ,  but the 
circulation process of capital taken into the production process
( . . . / > . . .  M ' ) .
This latter transformation, . . .P. . .  m ' ,  of course, presupposes: (i) that 
c which enters the production process consists of means of 
production ( m p ) and labour-power ( l p );  and (ii) that enough of m p  and 
l p  are added to the production process to bring about m ' . While m ' 
presupposes surp lu s-labour as its A m  component, it does not, 
however, presuppose m  as the starting point of the circuit, since what 
emerges at the end point is not m ' but C ' . Since the production of m ' 
directly does not require the conversion, prior to production, of m  into 
c, such production is not dependent on the prior existence of capital.
“Capital has not invented surplus-labour. Wherever a part of society possesses the 
monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the 
working-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to 
produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production...”129.
And all forms of society apply labour-power to means of production. 
Ac— or, more precisely in this case, a p  (added product)— can therefore 
be increased only the more l p  is exhorted (or improved) to produce 
more. That the surplus product will be transformed into surplus 
money is, however, dependent on the prior existence of money, else
12 9 Marx, K. (1983), p226.
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c '  would not be posited as m ' .  Gold miners do not produce either 
money or the money commodity, they produce the material gold 
which, if the economy in question is a money economy, is then 
immediately posited as money or the money commodity. And as such 
it is posited as the starting point  of the circuit of capital.
When a Marxist theory of gold, or the beginnings of such a theory has 
been offered , the circuit of go ld -producing  capital is usually  
reproduced straight out of Marx's Capital and taken as axiomatic. 
W hatever discussion is offered amounts to a paraphrasing of Marx  
without the circuit itself being subjected to any scrutiny. W e will 
show that Marx, whose concern was not with gold, but with capital, 
offers a circuit which explores gold only in so far as it intersects 
with capital.  In order to correct this shifted spectrum, we shall 
discuss gold and examine capital in so far as it intersects with gold.
The circuit for gold production described by Marx in Vol. II of C a p i ta l  
is not wrong. It is simply weighted for an analysis of capital, rather 
than an analysis of gold. The circuit offered by Marx for gold 
prod uction130 is:
m  -  c m '
This cannot be the e l e m e n t a r y  circuit of gold production, for it 
assumes capital as a prerequisite to gold production. In simple placer 
production, the simplest form of gold production— indeed, so simple 
as to be indistinguishable in its circuit from stra ightforward  
plunder131— we have simply:
130The circuits described below are based on those of Marx as laid out in Marx, K. (1977a), Ch 
1: C = Commodity(ies); M = Money or Capital; ... P  ... = The production process; (prime) = 
enhanced/of heightened value, e.g., M’ being M enhanced to a higher value, etc.; MP = Means of 
production; LP = Labour-power; M| = Individual (private) money; Ms = Social (anonymous) 
money; A dash (-) indicates that a change of form takes place, e.g., M - C = Transformation of 
value from the money form into the commodity form.
131 “...the wealth which these brigands [the Cossacks] had obtained through plunder and placer
mining", Del Mar, A. (1969), p377.
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But the conditionality of this circuit is already obscured by the
presence of m ' , a form of the product which is not present at the
opening of the circuit. In other words, the product is already
presented in a form in which it is insertable into a circuit outside of 
the economy to which its production belongs. But whence a m , or, 
differently put, how can a m  be known if m  is not present at the 
opening of the circuit?
What looks like m ' from the vantage point of money economy, looks, 
from the point of view of its primitive producer, as (JJf)'. It is here 
that the special attribute of labour-power to produce more value than 
it itself has may be directly observed, for the circuit of gold 
production is now reduced to the elementary circuit of all production:
MP p  . M P . '
LP \u >  )  '
W here the product of labour-pow er does not assume the form of
commodities, the circuit of gold production, or any production for
that matter, stands as:
p£T p ‘ .
Production under conditions of barter presents the circuit as:
c-w p  c'^ L P  • • • * . . .  ,
Thus is it where gold is but a particular use-va lue , and not yet
elevated to universal use-value. Exchange value has not yet settled 
into gold as its own particular corporeality. The production of gold is 
no different to the production of anything else. Its limits are the
limits of consumption.
"It is, however, clear that in any given economic formation of society, where not 
the exchange value but the use-value of the product predominates, surplus-labour 
will be limited by a given set of wants which may be greater or less, and that here 
no boundless thirst for surplus-labour arises from the nature of the production
itse lf”. 1 32
13 2 Marx, K. (1983), p226.
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It is otherwise where gold has become money, for now the circuit 
becomes:
CMJ  M'
Suddenly the production of an ordinary commodity transforms itself 
into the production of money— and that in the most direct way. This is 
the circuit of working to death, and not the one below, as suggested 
by Marx. Here s lave-ow ner and feudal state alike set labour-power  
and means of production to the production of the commodity which 
has become abstract wealth, value-for-itself, and they do so without  
capital.  Brute force, rather than money, is the opening element of this 
circuit, and it remains significant throughout. The opening of the 
circuit by money presupposes generalised money relations, i.e., 
capital, which obviates the need for brute force as an element in its 
continued reproduction, thus also implying wage-labour. The presence 
of wage-labour and capital, rather than working to death, underlie the 
gold production circuit offered by Marx, which reads:
m -  c MLPp . . .P. . .  m or m -  c M
W hereas in capitalist production in general, m -  c  . . .P. . .  c -  m ', 
production is drawn into the circuit of capital, production here is the 
circuit of capital. Even gold production in its simplest form, viz., on 
the basis of the isolated individual free producer, truthfully  
expresses the circuit m -  c , . .P. . .  m '. The relations of capital are
therefore already concentrated in him. Surplus-value production, the 
conditio sine qua non of capitalist production, expresses itself 
primitively in the free gold producer in that he is both capitalist and
w age-labourer at the same time, thereby turning him into his own
exploiter. Capital is not capital without the enhancement of m  into m ' . 
The efficiency of capital reduces itself to the smallest number of 
refluxes necessary to achieve a given enhancement of m ' over m , or a 
given composite m agnitude of a m . The gold producer, like any 
capitalist, achieves this by continually reducing the value of c . But, 
as has been explained above, there are both theoretical and objective 
limitations to such reduction. Ultimately, such reduction is confined 
to the value of the gold producer’s own labour-pow er. He thus
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increases his surplus-value by reducing his own necessary value. The 
inherent tendency is for this to be done w i t h o u t  resort to 
technological improvement. This is discussed under competition, 
below.
W here the gold producer works for others under pre -cap ita lis t  
cond it ions , we get ca p ita l is t  p roduction  w ith o u t cap ita lis t  
circulation. The labourer is not a w age-labourer and his labour-power, 
therefore, not a commodity. S u rp lu s -va lu e  production does not 
proceed on the basis of exchange. In the same way as the product of 
such labour is more logically plundered than exchanged for, so is the 
labour which produces it more logically plundered than exchanged for. 
Historically this took the form of simply working the labourers to 
death, i.e., plundering their labour-pow er, and replacing them by 
plundering the living inhabitants of neighbouring societies as slaves.
“Hence in antiquity over-work becomes horrible only when the object is to obtain 
exchange value in its specific independent money-form; in the production of gold and 
silver. Compulsory working to death is here the recognised form of over-work"133.
Co-operative gold production involves a more sophisticated labour-  
process than that of the individual free producer. This becomes  
necessary where the gold has a higher value than the social average 
necessary for its production. Access to individual accumulation of 
money is here restricted by necessary labour-time becoming so high 
as to all but eliminate the surplus. Reduction of the value of labour- 
power to restore the surplus-product is impossible on the basis of 
free production, since n o -o n e  freely works himself to death. 
Introduction of technology and a technical division of labour is thus 
forced upon the gold producers.134 While the technology remains 
relatively simple, i.e., largely producable by the gold producers
1 3 3 /b/d.. Marx is here citing Siculus which means that the passage needs qualification, since 
Siculus was describing lode mining rather than placers, the latter of which set the socially 
necessary labour-time for all gold production. Placer production, as suggested above, did not 
lend itself to production for others. Placer gold production, while near-bestial, did not amount to 
working to death. W e could find no evidence to suggest that Marx knew of this distinction.
1 3 4 Refering to Tacquah (pre-colonial West Africa), Lock estimates that, “Taking a fair average, 
it may be said that cutting out will take occupy one day, crushing a second, and washing two 
more - four days in all; the return may be 3 dwt., to be divided amongst 4 miners and 4 
washers”, Lock, A. (1882), p34.
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themselves for them selves ,135 they remain in control of their newly-  
necessary means of production. But technology and co-operation  
notwithstanding, they are still producing the material of money and 
they will continue to do so while keeping their own personal 
consumption to the absolute m in im u m .136 As soon as the new 
necessary technology begins to fall outside of the ability of labour- 
power to put in place (usually through its having to be brought in 
from outside), the co-operative begins to break down. Its members 
must then seek out those in possession of capita l,  and resume gold 
production on the basis of wage-labour, or abandon gold production 
altogether.
W here capital is generalised as the social basis of all production, 
there wage-labour is generalised as the social form of all labour. The 
form of economy based on capital distinguishes itself from other, 
earlier forms of economy in many ways. One of these is the fluidity 
and flexibility with which both capital (objectified labour) and 
(living) labour are applied to society’s varied and varying productive 
tasks. All the particular instances of the allocation of capital and 
labour form part of a seamless landscape of general social resource 
allocation. The form of economy increasingly develops the facility 
with which social resources may be withdrawn from one particular 
allocation and directed at another. This may be split into any number 
of parts and become so many new allocations of capital and labour, or 
any number may be combined to form a new, larger allocation.
W here  gold production proceeds on the basis of capital and  
generalised w a g e -la b o u r , such capital and such labour become  
integral parts of the general mass of capital and the general mass of 
labour of that society. Their attributes are set by the general 
attributes of capital and labour for the society as a whole. The  
genera l tendency, therefore , is for go ld -p ro d u c in g  capital to 
approximate the average profitability of the economy as a whole,
13 5 and the land tenure system allows it.
136«som e 4 or 5 miners were working in 3 of these mines, but only extracting fragments of 
ore from old shafts and levels; these ores held 7 to 10 oz. of fine gold per ton, but the quantity 
is so insignificant, that it can only afford a miserable existence to such men”, Lock, A. (1882),
p200.
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while for labour it is to approximate the average value of labour-  
power.
That the interface between, on the one hand, extractive industry in 
general and mining in particular, and on the other hand, industry in 
general is not entirely seamless, has already been discussed. But it 
has similarly been suggested that the general tendency is towards 
such seam lessness. This free flow of capital and labour, while 
embracing other industries first,137 eventually also draws mining 
into its ambit.
But the value of labour-pow er in extractive industry in general is 
constrained by a different set of objective conditions, and in gold 
production in particular, is determined by a different set of laws, to 
that of industry in g e n e ra l .138 The ob jective  condition that 
m echanised production comes but slowly and with difficulty to 
mining, means that the constraint placed upon the value of gold by the 
fixed ratio at which it is represented by the token of value, can only 
be accommodated by keeping the value of labour-pow er in gold 
production low. But this low value of lab o u r-p o w er cannot be 
achieved on the basis of high productivity of labour, as in mechanised 
industry in general, for mining retains primitive labour processes for 
much longer. The difference between the two is in their respective 
standards of living. Low-value, low-productivity implies a low level 
of consumption, while low -value , high-productivity implies a high 
level of consumption. In the competition for labour, a higher standard 
of living for the same labour-tim e expenditure is always more 
attractive to the worker. The result is that now, for the sake of 
production of the m oney-com m odity , go ld-producing capital must 
become integral with capital in general, in order that it might have 
the wherewithal to, as rapidly as possible, mechanise its labour 
processes, while at the same time isolating its labour force from the 
labour force in general, in order that it might cling to its low-value, 
low-productivity labour force in an environment of low -value, high-  
productivity labour.
13 7 Agriculture, too. does not easily submit to the free flow of capital and labour.
138This has been discussed in the Chapter: Gold as Money.
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This simultaneous integration and segregation m eans that g o ld -  
producing capital is both part of capital in general and not part of 
capital in general. But not in the above sense alone. While production 
of all use-values is, ultimately, determined by consumption139, that 
of the money-commodity, being a universal use-value, is determined 
by the very existence of the economy which conjures it into being. 
Capitals compete for surplus-value through the disposal of their 
products on the market. Gold-producing capital does not do this. The 
effect which competition has of lowering the value of labour-power  
on the basis of increasing productivity of labour, therefore, does not 
apply to go ld-producing capital. To explore the circuit of gold 
production on the basis of capital, it is necessary to introduce the 
category of competition.
Competition and Gold Production
From the commodity’s fixed price, the natural deduction is that there 
can be no competition between the various gold-producing capitals to 
dispose of the product: from the point of view of cost of production, 
the fixed price is kept low,  from the point of view of competition, it 
is kept hi gh.  The implication of this is that: (i) the industry must 
dispose over a no n -co m p etit ive  m echanism  for s u rp lu s -va lu e  
apportioning; and (ii) the mechanism which drives com pet ing  capitals 
to constantly improve their productivity of labour therefore falls 
away. Does this mean that gold mines have no inherent drive to 
mechanise? Three writers would answer this in the affirmative, two 
basing themselves on the social role of gold,140 and another on an 
observation by M arx.141 Most, though, allege lack of mechanisation for 
different reasons. The implications of this lack of competition has 
not yet been seriously taken up on a theoretical level.
In M arx ’s explanation of how surplus-value is apportioned where  
production proceeds on the basis of capital, the role of competition is
139Even though, in capitalist economy, it might take the form  of production for exchange.
14 0 Williams, M. (1975) and Trewhela, P. (1986a).
141 Ticktin, H. (1991).
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crucial. Capitalists dispose of their commodities at prices below  
their competitors’ cost of production but above their own, thereby 
capturing the difference in value as their share of the total surplus- 
value in the market. It is, indeed, this totality of all capitals in 
competition with one another which, for Marx, defines competition:
“Conceptually, com petition  is nothing other than the inner nature o f capital, its
essential character, appearing in and realised as the reciprocal interaction of many 
capitals with one another, the inner tendency as external necessity. ...Capital exists 
and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as 
their reciprocal interaction with one another"142
The question then becomes: What form does their competition take,
and how do the individual gold-mining capitals capture their share of
the total surplus-value? Competition in gold-mining takes two forms:
(i) competition to buy labour-pow er and means of production; (ii) 
competition to secure equity capital. Given the fixed value at which 
the product is disposed of, such capital would, from the start, seek  
also to procure its inputs on a fixed-value basis. If prices fluctuate 
freely at one end of the circuit, then so, too, must they at the other, 
in order better to allow ‘adaptation to changed circumstances’ (which 
usually means ‘passing on to the consumer’). However, where one end 
of the circuit has a fixed price item while at the other end price 
fluctuates freely, the tendency will be to a ttem pt to fix the 
fluctuating end, rather than free the fixed end. The elimination of 
uncertainty answers the inner tendency of capital for proportional 
production, i.e., it gives capital greater control over its surplus-value  
production. W hether it can afford its investments and whether its 
returns are adequate need no longer be established post  factum  
through the market, but can be known beforehand, working back from 
its fixed-value product.
Competition and the Circuits of Capital
Although modern go ld-m in ing capital is jo in t-s tock  capital, the 
processes we wish to examine may be more clearly illustrated by 
first looking at private capital. Wherever, along the circuit of capital 
a change of form occurs, there an interaction takes place with the
1 4 2 Marx, K. (1973), p414, emph. orig.
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total social surplus-value. It is at these points that a redistribution 
of surplus-value takes place. These are the points of competition -  
where capital has to influence that redistribution in its favour. Along 
the circuit of individual or private capital, this occurs in two places:
m -  c ... P... c' -  m '
Competition in m - c : Competition for inputs (means of production and 
labour-pow er). Here the object is to part with as little value as 
possible in exchange for a fixed value, c, required. Competition here 
takes the form of capital offering the lowest possible price above 
that offered by competitors. Competition also occurs at
m  -  c . . .  P... c -  m '
Competition in c ' - m ' :  Competition for surplus-value. The object is to 
gain as much surplus-value as possible from the available quantity of 
c. Competition entails demanding the highest possible price below  
that dem anded by competitors. It is through competition in this part 
of the circuit that capital realises its share of the total surplus-  
value. Here the investor converts his capital back into a form which 
tells him whether or not his money has been successfully converted 
into capital.
That C ' - m 7 takes place also implies its complement: m - c .  A trans­
form ation  of c ' - m '  for one capita l is s im u ltaneo us ly  a 
transformation of m - c  for another. These two capitals are therefore 
u s e -v a lu e s  to each other, and their respective  circuits are  
complementary. The form of competition here is that of one capital 
seeking to gain as much as possible for a fixed value ( c ' - m ' )  while 
and the other seeks to part with as little as possible for a fixed value
( M - C ) .
Alongside one productive  capita l seeking to carry out the  
metamorphosis c ' - m ' ,  there are other productive capitals intent on 
the  s a m e  m e ta m o rp h o s is . F a ilu re  to carry  th rough this 
metamorphosis means failure as capital. These productive capitals 
are therefo re  in com petition with each other to secure  the
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com plem entary m - c .  To any one capital seeking to effect c ' - m ' ,  the 
presence of other capitals attempting the same is an unwelcome  
interference. It places a limit on how much surp lus-va lue  it can 
redistribute in its favour in the complementary metamorphosis c ' -  
M 7 / m - c .  This competition between productive capitals then assumes 
the form of each testing the other’s capacity to meet the demand of 
the complement. Thus are they constrained to demand less than they 
otherwise might have. This double competition occurs at both ends of 
the circuit: at the opening m - c ,  and at the closing c ' - m '  .
The circuit of capital of a company run on a joint stock basis 
however, offers one more opportunity, in addition to those of the 
private company, for a redistribution of surplus-value, and hence, 
competition. Let us consider the circuit of productive joint stock 
cap ita l:
M/ -  c . . .  P... c -  u sr
(For the moment we need not yet distinguish the particular circuit of 
g o ld -m in in g  cap ita l) . M oney (m ) at the opening of the circuit 
originates, in this case, not only from an individual source, but also 
from a social source,143 the stock market. The money thus has both a 
social component ( m 5) and an individual component ( m , ) .
The first share capital is also attracted on the basis of an 
anticipated fixed portion of the surp lus-va lue  in the form of a  
dividend. But dividends can be withheld, reduced, paid in full or 
increased. Whichever occurs could either fully, partially or not at all 
reflect the am ount of su rp lu s -va lu e  produced. Flexibility and
1 4 3 It may be argued that a bank is a social, rather than an individual (private) source of capital 
and that, hence, where m consists, either wholly or in part, of a bank loan it should be considered 
along with joint stock capital. The difference, though, is that the bank enters into a fixed relation 
with the borrower of capital and expects a fixed share of the surplus-value for its advance. As 
soon as the bank’s capital and its share of the surplus-value have been handed over, the relation 
dissolves. That portion of the circuit which flowed through the bank closes and, regardless of 
how much surplus-value has been produced, has to be negotiated anew in order to form part of m 
again. Bank capital can, therefore, be subsumed under individual capital and be denoted as simply 
m. While the bank capital formed part of m, there was no reason intrinsic to the circuit for why 
M' would not re -e n te r the circuit as m to start it anew.
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uncertainty as to the return on the capital invested is thus built-in.
W e return to this uncertainty in a moment.
Once the transformation c ' - m '  has occurred, m' again splits into its 
two original components of m* and m; , now enhanced as m5 and m ..
-  c . . .  P... c -  (m7. + m5 )
That portion of the surplus-value which would, in the case of private 
capital, constitute the profit, must here be divided between return to 
the individual money ( m, ) ,  and return to social money ( m 5). Whether 
M'  re-enters the circuit at m depends upon the magnitude of m5 in 
comparison to other magnitudes of m5 revealed on the stock market. 
Small dividends would tend to cause a redirection of capital (m) to 
those circuits yielding a higher m5 . The controller of the enterprise 
therefore has to see to it that m5 is sufficiently large to ensure the
re-entry of m s into the circuit as ms. If m ;. is greater than zero, one
may assum e that it will re -e n te r  the circuit as if it were m  '
returning as m. The case of m5 is different. W hen the amount of
surp lus-value is relatively small (usually during the development 
phase of a company) in relation to the size of the subscription share 
value, it could occur that virtually the entire available surplus-value  
is given over to m s , resulting in Manchesterism. Should m 5 be
reduced even further or even withheld, difficulties with the re-entry  
of m s as m  may be encountered. Dividends are not paid and the share 
price drops, necessitating extraordinary measures, such as financing 
from internal sources. It is generally the companies which pay the 
highest dividends for the lowest subscriptions which attract the 
most new capital. This is reflected in an increase in the share price 
which in itself tends to attract even more capital.
Alongside the capital from which m * has emerged at the end of a 
circuit, there are other capitals also seeking the return of m5 as m5 
to start the circuit anew. Once ms leaves the circuit it returns to the 
undifferentiated body of social capital whence it first emerged.
M5 —> [social capital] —> M5
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It is then available for re-extraction by w h ic h e v e r  capital promises 
the greatest enhancement of m* into m5 in the shortest possible 
time. The m , which it joins to form a subsequent capital will not 
necessarily be that with which it formed the previous capital. A 
particular capital, therefore, has no guarantee of its existence from 
one circuit to the next, while, at the same time, capital in general 
becomes infinitely flexible.
This infinite flexibility is the positive side of social capital. The
negative side is that of the uncertainty of the reproduction of a
particular productive capital. Both of these attributes are reinforced 
by the fact that a more rapid circulation of capital can be had by 
avoiding production altogether, and simply trading in claims to future 
shares of surplus-value (the circuit m  -  m ' directly). In other words, 
in response to supply and demand for rights to portions of surplus- 
value still in the process of production, the magnitude of that very 
surplus-value can be altered. Although the circuit of productive joint 
stock capital may be given as:
M'J -  C . . .  P . . .  C -  M sr  ,
the entire capital is not concentrated at one point along the circuit, 
but at any one time is spread along the entire circuit. Part of it 
exists as money waiting to be transformed into commodity, another 
part has already been so transformed while another is locked into
production. A further part lies in the warehouse as finished goods 
awaiting sale, while still another portion the firm must decide how 
it divides between what it keeps and what it puts back into social 
capital. Then, of course, there is the portion actually extant as social 
capital. Assuming a smooth circulation process, portions of the
capital will regularly vacate one moment in the circuit for the next 
moment.
Any interruption in the circulation process means that only that 
portion of the capital existing in the form m '  (or m * ) will have been
realised. The normal threat to the reproduction of productive capital, 
the failure to secure a complementary circuit at C ' -  m ' , and to a 
lesser extent m - c  and during ... p ..., is here magnified by a dynamic
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beyond the bounds of its own competition and hence beyond its ability 
to influence, viz., speculation. While a joint stock company has some 
control (through the competitive process) over the size of its own 
dividends, it has no control over the price of its shares. What is more, 
these are often traded even b e f o r e  subscriptions have opened, 
meaning that the company loses control over even the issue price of 
its own shares .144 In the early days of joint stock capital, prior to 
the regulation of the financial markets, vast amounts of productive 
capital, including go ld -m in ing  capital, was laid w aste  through 
speculation.
There is no mechanism intrinsic to economics for solving the problem 
of speculation. This has to be done from outside, by the state. Insofar 
as this problem has been brought under control, the contradiction of 
jo int stock capita l, of being sim ultaneously  constra ined  and  
liberated, has been solved for gold-mining capital by the lack of 
competition in the disposal of the product. This could be more easily 
illustrated if, for the moment, we confine ourselves to individual, as 
opposed to social, gold-mining capital. The circuit of individual go ld -  
mining capital145 may be given as:
m -  c . . .  P. . .  m'
Formally (as well as formerly), the price of gold merely allocated a 
m o n e y -n a m e  to a given quantity of gold and facilitated the  
differentiation of national levels of labour productivity and hence the 
relative value of gold in the different economies. The “sale” of gold 
was therefore but a formal requirement of exchange economy in a 
certain context, rather than a change of form of va lue  from 
commodity into money, as in c - m . Since the material removed from 
the ground is s im u l ta n e o u s ly  an ordinary commodity (a particular 
u se-va lu e ) and a universal commodity, it does not require the 
m eta m o rp h o s is  c - m  for its value to attain the form of money. It
1 4 4 ln the City of London this is known as “the grey market".
1 4 5 Based on Marx. K. (1977a), p331.
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emerges out of the production process directly as money. Hence the 
absence of c '  in the production circuit.146
The absence of the closing transformation of the circuit means that 
the com petition  asso c ia ted  with it is s im ilarly  absent. No 
complementary capital is required and the circuit can be started 
anew immediately. At the opening of the circuit (m - c ), though, go ld-  
mining capital finds itself in the same position as any other capital: 
it needs to com pete for its inputs. It will attempt, like all other 
capitals, to reduce the competition associated with m - c  as much as 
possible if it cannot actually eliminate it.
This applies as much to joint stock, as to individual capital. South 
African gold-mining capital is no exception. But given the lack of 
incentive for monopoly at the closing end of the circuit, there is no 
such incentive at the opening end. The incentive is to co-operate  in 
pursuit of scientific production and yet preserve their discretion as 
capitals. The individual companies c o - o p e r a t e  to establish a body 
separate  from them selves to serve as their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
m onopsony .  From its inception the individual mining companies have 
sought to co-operate in the area of especially labour procurement, but 
also in all other factors of production. And for this purpose was the 
Chamber of Mines established.
But the real lessons to be derived from South African gold-mining  
capital, lie in its nature as joint stock capital. The circuit of joint 
stock gold-mining capital may be given as:
M* -  C. . .  P. . .  M *
As has been suggested above, the crucial distinction between joint 
stock capital and private capital lies o u t s i d e  of the circuit of 
capital, in the undifferentiated body of social capital. W hat is crucial 
is not what lies between m, -  m* , but between m s -> m, between
the close of one circuit and the opening of another. Capital must here 
pass from the particular to the general and back to the particular.
1 4 6 Strictly speaking, this should read M -C... P ...C 7M ’, but to express it thus at this point 
would serve no explanatory purpose.
98.
While it sojourns in the general, two conditions obtain: the circuit of 
which it had formed a part is in danger of not being reproduced; and, 
it is now free to enter any other circuit it chooses.
The absence of c ' -  m' means that the second interface between  
particular capital and general social capital is brought right back 
into the circuit to coincide with the first interface, m - c . The  
entire production process, therefore, already, lies within the domain 
of social capital. The attribute of particular capita l, that of 
vulnerability to abandonment is largely banished from the circuit, and 
the attribute of social capital, that of infinite flexibility and  
applicability, is extended into and over almost the entire circuit of 
gold-mining capital. A contradiction, nevertheless, persists, in that 
the attributes of social capital is brought into the circuit of what 
remains pa r t ic u la r  capital. The contradiction must express itself by 
periodic attempts on the part of particular capita! to reassert its 
control over its own circuit against that of capital in general. This is 
clearly demonstrated in the early history of South African g o ld -  
mining, both in attempts at collusion, and in the control structure of 
the Groups. Section III is given over to an examination of this.
Williams’ Theory of Gold, A Critique
The beginnings of a political economy of gold, based on a theory of 
luxuries, rather than a theory of money, is offered by Williams. 
Drawing on Marx's discussion of the cost of circulation in Volume II 
of C a p i ta l  and of luxury production in Part III of Theories of  Surplus 
V a l u e d 1 Williams fuses  these two discussions in order to present 
gold (and diamonds) as luxuries.
In order to show that, “the gold mining industry is unable to produce 
surplus-value in its specifically relative form ”,148 Williams has to 
make money assume some of the attributes of luxuries, and luxuries 
some of the attributes of money. When Marx observes, in respect of 
m o n e t a r y  circulation, that, “Th ese  com m odities performing the 
function of money enter into neither individual nor productive
1 4 7 See Marx, K. (1977a), pp138-9 and Marx, K. (1972), pp245-52. 349-50.
14 8 Williams, M. (1975), p6.
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consum ption”,149 Williams deduces that the gold-mining industry (and 
now he quotes Marx on luxury production),  “cannot produce any 
relative surplus-value and, in general, cannot produce that form of 
surplus-value which results from the growing productivity  of labour 
as such" . '50 He dismisses increases in the organic composition of 
gold-mining capital as having not, “the slightest influence on wages, 
on the value  of labour-pow er”, (again quoting Marx on luxuries) the 
reason for this being, “since gold, in its capacity as money does not 
enter, either directly or indirectly, into the consumption of the 
w o rk e rs ”.
This is w here  W illiam s ’ creativ ity  becom es its own undoing. 
Consumption, in contradistinction to production, is conflated with 
necessary-va lue consumption of labour-power in contradistinction to 
surplus-value consumption of the non-producers. When Marx speaks of 
money entering into, “neither individual nor productive consumption”, 
it simply means that the commodities which form money are not 
a v a ila b le  for consum ption while they rem ain  in circulation.  
Differentiation within  consumption is not made. Such commodities 
must, in the first instance, be articles for consumption else: (i) they 
would never become money; and (ii) the point becomes a tautology.151 
Marx's statement is not as emphatic as its rendering by Williams 
suggests when he says that the m oney-m ateria l “in no way” enters 
into consumption.
In the case of luxuries, Marx distinguishes between consumption by 
the w ag e-lab o u rers , and into which luxuries do not enter, and 
consumption by those who do consume luxuries. Here the distinction 
between consumption and circulation is not at issue. The implications 
of the conflation by Williams are: (i) luxury items constitute money;
14 9 Marx, K. (1977a), p139.
1 5 9 Quoted in Williams, M., op cit., p6. The emphasis is M arx’ and is from Marx, K. (1972), 
p350.
151 In societies where more directly consumable articles serve as the money-commodity, such 
articles are usually withdrawn from circulation and consumed before their use-value as ordinary 
commodities expires. It was prime cattle, and not old and sickly beasts, which represented 
abstract wealth in Xhosa society.
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(ii) the material of money, e .g ., gold, enters into the direct
consumption of the non-producers.152
The discussion of the peculiarities of surplus-value production in the
luxury industries becomes directly transferable  to that industry
which produces the commodity which serves as money. Williams is 
now in a position to deduce that the gold-mining industry, therefore, 
“cannot produce any relative surplus-value and, in general, cannot 
produce that form of surplus-value which results from the g r o w in g  
p rod uct iv i ty  of labour as such”. The productivity of labour in go ld-
production, Williams concludes, cannot have, “the slightest influence 
on wages, on the value of labour-power”, since gold, “does not enter 
into the consumption of the workers".
Williams’ associating the m oney-com modity with luxuries is entirely 
arbitrary. Our own theory stands as critique of it. But the weakness  
of W illiam s’ theory is even empirically obvious. W hat are the
workers’ wedding rings and tooth—fillings made of?153 Consumption, 
in its most elementary natural determination, means eating. At one 
point in early South African gold-mining history, the mines made 
advanced payments in cattle to entice especially Pondo tribesmen to 
the mines. This particular form of money had the advantage that after 
it has been excessively consum ed, that fact registers in the 
distension of the belly. A wealthy man, therefore, was a man with a 
big s tom ach .154 It has already been shown that an increase in the 
productivity of gold-producing labour has a very direct effect on the 
value of labour-power. In conclusion Williams claims that, “It is for 
this reason, Marx notes, that the producer of gold will seek, in
152 Williams does appreciate that problems of this kind do underlie his theory, which is, perhaps, 
why the following extraordinary statement appears in a footnote:
“Although the m oney-m aterial and luxuries have a number of characteristics in common, 
...this does not mean that they always share the same characteristics. On the contrary, in 
its capacity as the m oney-m ateria l gold confronts the entire world of ordinary
commodities, including luxuries, as the one exclusive commodity with the properties of
money. This makes it all the more necessary when dealing with capitalist development in 
South Africa, to pay careful attention to the roles played by the different commodities in 
the reproduction process. Without making such rigorous distinction much in our analysis 
would remain blurred and obscured", op. cit., p33n10.
1 53Amongst a section of the working class in Cape Town, it is considered beautiful to have slits 
of gold between the teeth. Sometimes perfectly healthy teeth are even capped in gold.
154 In plays put on by unionised African workers in South Africa, the boss is often caricatured 
as a man with an outrageously large paunch.
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practice, ‘to depress wages of labour below its value, below its
minimum’”, when Marx notes nothing of the kind. Marx refers to the 
producer of luxuries, and not to the producer of the m o n e y -  
commodity. This dissertation has argued that the determination of
the value of gold-producing labour-pow er expresses a relationship 
between gold as use-value, gold as money and gold as capital. The 
question of luxuries does not enter into that determination.
W illiam s’ theory reaches its nadir when his inadequate study of
money leads him to conclude from Marx's observation about the 
circulating medium condemning “a part of the social w ea lth” to 
“assume this unproductive form”, that, “this means that the diamond 
and gold industries in South Africa must secure their necessary  
materials from the surplus-products of Departm ents I and I la . . . 
without their products entering into the production process of 
e ith e r”.155 One needs merely point to the existence of glass cutters 
and d iam ond-tipped drills, or electronics and insulating glass, to
empirically show William s’ weakness. “Regarding the production of 
luxuries”, says Williams, “— and this would apply to the diamond  
industry in South Africa— Marx emphasises", (and now he quotes Marx 
directly) “their [the workers’] product, in the form in which it exists, 
cannot be transform ed into capital, e ither constant or variable  
capital". Not only is this wrong because Marx is referring to luxury 
items, but also because gold-producing workers (in the period in 
question) had a product which was immediately in the form of their 
wages, i.e., variable capital— not only their own, but that of all 
workers. D iam ond-digging workers have a product which forms an 
important part of the constant capital of many industries, not to 
mention mining itself. Not only does Williams have a weak theory, he 
clearly has not done a proper empirical investigation.
155Williams, M. op. cit., p8.
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II
Gold Production, Capital and the 




The value of a commodity is the amount of labour-time necessary, on 
the average, for its production. This holds equally for labour-power  
and for other commodities. The value of commodities rise and fall 
with the fall and rise of the productivity of labour. It is possible for 
the productivity of labour in the production of just one commodity to 
rise while that in all others remain the same. It is also possible for 
the productivity of labour to rise for some commodities while it 
drops for others, and that the degree of rise or fall can vary from 
commodity to commodity. When a major change in the productivity 
with which the money-commodity is produced comes about, without 
any change in the general productivity of labour, then a revolution in 
the standard of price has occurred. This has happened, e.g., with the 
flood of the commercial economies with plundered New World gold. 
H ow ever, when such a rise or fall in labour-productiv ity  is 
generalised across the economy, we may speak of a value revolution. 
The so-ca lled  Second Industrial Revolution, which started around 
1850 and lasted until the turn of the century, may be characterised 
as such a revolution. No commodity, including labour-pow er and the 
money-commodity, escaped its influence. And it the influence on the 
latter two which interests us in this Section.
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Chapter Four
The Changeover from Placers to Lodes
The technological revolutions of the nineteenth century affected gold 
production in three distinct and critical ways. The first was in the 
development of communications and transport. The invention of the 
telegraph, steamship and railway allowed, firstly, for news of a gold 
strike to be disseminated much more rapidly and widely than had ever 
been possible before, and, secondly, for gold seekers to rush in more 
speedily, in greater numbers and from further afield than had 
previously been the case.
Gold rushes have occurred throughout history, but prior to the period 
under review, these tended to be local affairs. The E n c y c lo p a e d ia  
Bri tannica  identifies three great eras of expansion in gold production. 
The first was the exploitation of the gold of the Americas (both by 
mining and by plunder); the second, being the period 1 8 5 0 -1 8 7 5 ,  
which includes the Californian and Australian rushes; and the third is 
the period 1 8 90 -1 9 15 , which includes both the last great placer rush 
(Klondike) and the first setting of gold-mining onto a scientific basis 
( W i t w a t e r s r a n d ) . 156 The rush to exploit American gold after 
Columbus’ discoveries can hardly be described as a ‘local affair’, but 
we exclude this from our definition of a gold rush since extracting 
this gold remained outside the reach of the single individual. The  
mass of people who would form the dramatis  personae  of later gold 
rushes had an insurmountable barrier between themselves and the 
gold, the Atlantic Ocean.
By the third period (1 8 9 0 -1 9 1 5 ),  one is talking as much of a rush of 
capital, as of a rush of people. But already by the time of the 
California gold rush, ‘rushing’ involved an enormous capital outlay.
1 ^Encyclopaedia Britannica (1982), Vol. V III, p237.
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Gold seekers cam e from all over the world, many having sold 
everything they had and spent their life savings to get there. The gold 
digger had every incentive to, at the very least, recoup his 
investment. Gold mining was beginning to hear the distant roll of 
capital. The storm was to break in the 1890s.
During the Middle Ages, the principal source of new gold for Europe 
was known to be west Africa— the gold being shipped north across the 
Sahara and exchanged in the markets of the Maghreb157— yet there was 
no flood of fortune seekers to west Africa. It would be interesting to 
explore how general social relations of personal bondage, as opposed 
to free individuals, were able to respond to the known presence of a 
source of treasure within geographical reach. The exploits of the 
Conquistadors  may be said to stand as a precursor of the nineteenth- 
century-type gold rush.
The literature tends to be somewhat overawed at the scale and 
intensity of the nineteenth century gold ru s h e s .158 From the 
nineteenth century159 on, gold sources were inundated with people 
from around the globe almost as soon as knowledge of them became  
public. Assuming no revolution in gold-mining technology— and none 
had yet occurred by the time of the Californian and Australian  
discoveries— the sheer volume of people alone would bring about two 
unprecedented developments: (i) a vast increase in world gold supply 
from p ro d u c t io n , rather than from plunder; and, (ii) a rapid depletion 
of the sources.
1 5 7 “The Venetian traveller Cadamosto, who visited Western Africa about 1454, alludes to the 
gold-field of Timbuctoo..., and declares that the gold coinage of Portugal, Spain and Italy, in the 
14th and 15th centuries, was entirely supported by supplies from this region. Most of the gold 
then exported from the Soudan [contempoary western sahel region—  FS] would seem to have 
found its way by the slave and ivory caravans to the Mediterranean ports of Tunis, Fez and 
Morocco. The large unwalled town of Gyni, in the kingdom of Melli, is specified as a headquarters 
for the exchange of gold and salt", Lock, A. (1882), p37.
15 8 See, e.g., Richardson, P. and Van Helten, J -J . (1984); Green, T. (1968), (1985) or Fordyce, 
W. (1924).
1 5 9 Although Russia was the world’s principal gold producer from 1823 to 1837, its 
contribution, from the point of view of political economy, belongs properly to the pre-industrial 
era. On these grounds Russia is excluded from this study. Others have grouped Russia along with 
California, Australia and South Africa, for the simple reason that they were all important in the 
nineteenth century. See. e.g., Richardson, P. and Van Helten, J-J. (1982).
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The Depletion of the Placers
Up to the 1850s, whether from placer or lode sources, gold was still 
extracted everywhere, as in Georgia, “mostly by rude and primitive 
a p p l ia n c e s ”. 160 The most sophisticated of these were in placer 
mining: the long-Tom , the sluice and the riffle box represented the 
height of placer mining technology. The labour-process of placer 
mining continued around the world much as follows: “The miner 
loosened the auriferous soil with a pick, and shovelled it into a pan 
from which, by skilful manipulation in water, the clay, sand, and 
pebbles were removed, and the heavier particles of go ld-dust left 
b e h in d ”. 161 The first machinery to appear in surface work was 
confined to crushing hard ores, later to be extended to metal 
extraction. The crudity of these devices, even as late as the 1860s, 
may be gleaned from the following description of central American 
mining:
“The silver and gold ores are crushed in a basin of masonry, in which rises a 
vertical shaft, driven generally by a horizontal w ater-w heel. This shaft has two 
arms, from each of which is suspended a large stone or boulder. These are the 
crushers. After the ore is reduced to sufficient fineness, the metal is separated by 
mercury: ‘a long and expensive process, which is now beginning to be facilitated and 
cheapened by the introduction of the German or "barrel process". The machines for 
crushing the ore have, however, as yet, undergone but slight improvement’".162
World gold production stood at an annual average of 650 000 ozs. for 
the decade 1 8 3 1 -4 0 .  The years 1849 and 1850 witnessed the 
Californian and Australian discoveries. A verage  annual world  
production for the decade 1 8 5 1 -6 0  stood at 6 300 000 ozs., which 
then gradually fell back to 5 200 000 ozs. between 1881 and 1890 .163 
An examination of the output figures for these two areas will show 
that production reached its peak very shortly after the fields were  
declared, then tapered off to eventual depletion. In former times, 
gold-mining provided a more steady output with a less volatile effect 
upon the economy in general. The drop in average annual output from
1 6 0 Lock, A. (1882), p171.
1 6 1 /b/d., p125.
1 6 2 /b/cf., p121. An attempt was made in the 1860s to introduce a traction engine to the Tati 
field.
1 6 3 Viiar, P. (1976), p328.
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the decade 1 8 61 -1 8 7 0  to the decade 1871 -1 880  was greater than the 
average annual production for the whole period 1 7 8 1 -1 8 3 0 .  (See  
Table 1, below).
Table 1: Total W orld Precious Metals Production, 1741-1910
x 1000 ounces
Period Gold S ilv e r
1 741 --1 7 6 0 791 17 100
1 7 6 1 --1 7 8 0 6 6 5 21 000
1 7 8 1 --1 8 0 0 5 7 2 28 300
1 801 -1 8 1 0 5 7 2 28 700
1 8 1 1 --1 8 2 0 3 6 8 17 400
1 8 2 1 --1 8 3 0 4 5 7 14 800
1 8 3 1 --1 840 6 5 2 19 200
1 8 4 1 --1 8 5 0 1 762 25 000
1 8 5 1 --1 8 6 0 6 313 26 500
1 8 6 1 --1 8 7 0 6 108 39 000
1 8 7 1 --1 8 8 0 5 472 66 800
1 8 8 1 --1 8 9 0 5 200 97 200
1 8 9 1 --1 9 0 0 10 165 161 400
1 9 0 0 --1 9 1 0 18 279 182 600
Source: Vilar, P. (1976), p331.
The experience of Alaska and the Klondike illustrates the point even 
more strongly. The new placer-mining technology which was being 
developed during the course of the exploitation of the Californian and 
Australian placers, was applied in full force to A laska and the 
Klondike from the start. Alaskan gold, discovered in 1898, reached  
peak output between 1900  and 1906 , then dropped off very  
dramatically. The extraordinarily rich Klondike, delivering more than 
half an ounce of gold to the pan, was opened in 1896, peaked in 1900  
with 1 350 000 ozs. and then dropped, forcing a changeover to lode 
mining. The presence of cutting-edge technology does not change the 
basic nature of placer mining. 30 000 prospectors, having risked 
everything to cross an Arctic mountain range, descended upon Dawson 
City, where, “absurdly primitive individual prospecting went on side 
by side with fairly modern establishments”.164
1 6 4 /b/d.I p328.
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If we consider placer mining from the time of the opening of the 
California fields in 1849 to the turn of the century, then this type of 
mining has itself undergone a number of changes. These relate to the 
depletion of one variety of placers (shallow placers), and the 
changeover to another variety (deep placers). When we said earlier 
that the placers had set the average socially necessary labour-time  
for gold production through the ages, this was still somewhat broad. 
It was the s h a l lo w  placers which served as the standard for all gold 
production. In the production of gold from shallow placers, gold 
presents itself as a measure of value in the most direct way. It is 
immediately obvious how much gold was produced by one labourer in a 
given time because this gold was producable by the single individual 
producer. Essentially, no co-operation was necessary and no further 
processing of the material was necessary, while production could 
proceed on the basis of the meagre aids which a miner could carry on 
his back. Thus was by far the greater portion of the world’s gold won 
for all time prior to the developments discussed here.
It must be kept in mind that in gold-m ining, as in all extractive 
industry, the substance extracted is not renewed. Every location 
holds only a finite quantity of gold, so that for every ounce produced, 
an ounce less remains. When a goldfield is inundated with independent 
producers, each producer must attempt to secure for himself access 
to as great a portion of that fixed quantity as possible. This may be 
done in one of two ways: (i) by claiming and holding a larger portion 
of the ground area to be mined; or (ii) by processing larger quantities 
of ore in a given time.
This second alternative does not in and of itself lend access to more 
gold, but does allow the miner to more rapidly exhaust his claim and 
move on to another. By the time he abandons a claim, he must be 
fairly certain that no (extractable) gold remains. But the one-m an  
digger can never be certain whether his next panfull of dirt contains 
Nirvana, or whether he should abandon the claim and start on another. 
By producing faster, he reaches a point where he comes up against the 
limits of his own necessary labour-time sooner than do other diggers 
around him, all else being equal. He is thus both forced and enabled to
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move on to another claim. His own necessary labo ur-t im e  is, 
therefore, both a blessing and a curse to him. But this is only the 
objective limit. It must not be forgotten that this production  
d em o n stra tes  the e q u iva len t of g reed  in consum ption and  
accumulation in circulation. The moment a free miner’s output drops 
below the average for the area, abandoning his claim and starting a 
new one presents itself as more efficacious. Hence do we read in 
reference to,
“Lachlan District [New South Wales] -  Warden Dalton, in the Annual Report of the 
Department of Mines for 1877, refers to the neglected deep leads on the Lachlan 
gold-fields, around Forbes, the gutters of the several leads having been hastily 
worked to the deep and wet ground, and there abandoned. The smallness of the claims 
prevented the application of the machinery and plant necessary to enable the holders 
to contend with water, quicksands and swelling schists with any prospect of success. 
With such imperfect appliances as were used in shallow and sound ground, the 
miners had not thought of reef-wash or benches, and when they had broken into the 
adjoining claim and sent up the last bucket of wash from the gutter, they abandoned 
the holding. Besides miners in those days, who knew that they had wash before them 
that would yield j  oz. to 1 oz. of gold to the bucket, would not willingly lose time by
sending stuff to the surface that would not return more than 1 oz. to the load. In 
every instance, there was a strenuous effort made by each party to get their share 
of the gutter worked out before that of the adjoining shareholders, fearing that if 
these men were worked out, and abandoned the lead before they had secured the best 
of their wash-stuff, they would lose it, as they knew that single-handed {sic) they 
could not cope with the water and other obstacles that overlay the auriferous drift. 
These difficulties, in an aggravated form, present themselves to small co-operative 
companies without capital at the present day. The leads are not exhausted— the reef- 
wash, benches, and tributaries are still virgin ground... Knowing all this, men 
hesitate to face ordinary mining difficulties that are of common occurrence in other 
parts of the world, and are invariably overcome by skilful engineers and the 
application of capital...
...Not a single lead has been traced to its termination, not farther than could be done 
by unassisted manual labour".165
Under the influence of such competition,166 technology to make placer 
mining more efficient began to be introduced. These operated on the 
same principle as the pan, indeed, were mere developments out of it. 
They all involved the movement of ore across various obstructions by 
means of water through a controlled channel. Deeper down the water 
would flow more slowly than closer to the surface. The heavier 
particles, gold being one of the heaviest, would only sluggishly be
16 5 Lock, A, (1882), pp511-3.
1 6 6 Competition in gold-mining takes a form very different to that in other areas of production, 
given the lack of competition in disposal of the product. Competition here manifests itself as 
rivalry in a contest against nature. See Sections I and III.
110.
conveyed by the slow-moving water and thus be trapped in the 
obstructions.
“The first improvement on the pan was the rocker; afterwards the T o m ’ was 
introduced from Georgia, and with it the sluice. In 1850 and 1851, the two latter 
devices began to be generally employed, in consequence of the greater convenience of 
water-supply afforded by the mining ditches. The first ditch of importance was 
made in 1850; and its success so stimulated imitation that in the course of 8 years, 
6000 miles of mining canals had been constructed, at a cost of more than $15 000 
000 (£3 000 000), in California alone".167
While some of the new devices, such as the cradle (also called the 
box) could be operated by one man, the others involved some kind of 
co-operation between the miners. Not only was a certain amount of 
capital now required (small as this might have been when compared  
to later requirements), but to operate most of them called for the co­
operation of at least two, usually five or six, and sometimes more 
men, working as a team.
New social relations of production began to emerge. Sometimes these 
teams were partners working co-operatively, at other times we see 
the beginnings of a capita l-labour relation in gold-m ining. In the 
latter case the earliest form appears to be one where one miner owns 
the equipment while five or six others, operating the equipment 
alongside him, do so for a wage. Where a large number of claims was 
worked as one, this tended to be by a constituted company, either 
private or joint stock. At the same time the individual gold-digger  
persisted. It is conceivable that these relations were fairly fluid, 
with easy interchange for many between the state of lone gold digger 
and the state of wage-labourer.
Naturally, the shallow placers, which declare their presence to all
passers-by , were the first to be discovered and the first to be
depleted, but the exploitation of deep placers, too, have a long 
history. The mines in the mountains of ancient Egypt were of this 
variety. And that was the point about them. Deep mining could proceed 
in mountains well before the development of deep mining technology, 
because the rockwalls of the mountain itself serve as natural props
and shuttering. The depletion of the shallow placers forced a closer
1 6 7 op. cit., p125.
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concentration on the mining of deep placers. But while, consistent 
with placers, the gold was native and quite discrete from its matrix, 
there were now the additional problems normally associated with 
conventional mining: uncertainty as to the location, extent and 
quality of the ore; the inaccessibility of the ore; the need for 
equipment greater in quantity and complexity than that commanded by 
the one-m an digger; the need for capital; and the relative growth of 
prospecting as an integral part of mining operations.
Access to the deep placers was effected in two ways: (i) the digging 
of shafts, inclines or adits and their development into galleries and 
stopes, as in conventional mining. This was the first response to the 
depletion of the shallow placers. Now, within placer production  
itself, the value of gold was changing, as more labour now had to be 
expended on the production of a unit of gold than would be the case 
with shallow placers. “[As] ...the first gold discoveries were virtually 
free, cost of production therefore increased rapidly. The impact on 
the ratio of the values of gold and commodities was instantaneous, 
while the more general effects made themselves felt gradually”.168
(ii) Deep placers were also responded to by the washing away of 
overburden by a technique called ground sluicing or hydraulicing.  This 
particularly destructive technique involved the application of a 
powerful jet of water to the walls of a valley, thereby literally 
scouring out the entire valley and washing it down through a control 
point to an area located at a lower level and capable of receiving the 
tailings. Gold was captured at the control point by the washings being 
directed through a system of sluices. By 1877, an observer could 
declare  that, “The placer mines of Goochland county are now 
successfully  w orked by the Hydrau lic  process, which is so 
extensively and profitably carried on in California”.169
Neither deep mining (deep digging), nor ground sluicing could proceed 
without the investment of relatively large amounts of capital. As
16 8 Vilar, P. (1976), p326. “It may safely be held that no gold has yet been produced in Alaska 
or the Klondike at a lower wage than $10 and much at $15 to $20 a day. In some instances $40 a 
day were paid", Del Mar, A. (1969), p443. “For every dollar extracted from the sands of the 
extreme North more than a dollar has been expended", ibid. p443n3.
189Quote in Lock, A. (1882), p185.
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well as capital, large amounts of labour-pow er now had to be 
expended before the first ounce of gold saw the light of day. W a g e -  
labour now became the dominant form of labour, while the joint stock 
company became the dominant form of capital. There was still room, 
though, for the private company. The social relations of gold 
production became a great deal more complex, and the connection 
between the value of gold and its role as measure of value was no 
longer immediate. Not only was the ruler re -ca lib ra ted , but the 
calibrations were fuzzy. In the case of the one-m an miner, the cradle 
introduced a simple decline  in the value of gold. But at the same time, 
devices such as the sluice and the long-Tom, made the value-relation  
more complex. By the introduction of ground sluicing, a handful of 
gold dust produced no longer indicates to the miner whether or not he 
will reproduce his labour-power. The capital-labour relation removes 
him from his product. While he will continue to be exhorted to 
produce more— though now by capital rather than by money— he will 
never know the extent to which he has exceeded his necessary labour­
time requirements. The emergence of w ag e-lab o u r in gold-mining, 
therefore, itself obscures the value of gold. Gold being the measure of 
value of all other commodities, it would appear that one may here 
speak of the secularisation of value.
But most important of all, is the depletion of placer deposits, and the 
technical and financial inability of the mining industry to make the 
transition to quartz reef or lode mining. It was in California and 
Virginia in the 1870s and 80s and in Australia in the 1880s, that this 
threshold was first reached, and in its South African theatre in the 
1890s, for unique local reasons, that this threshold was first 
systematically broken through. The rapid diffusion of technology that 
came to characterise the nineteenth century played a large part in the 
simultaneous depletion of placers around the world. According to 
Lock,
“The enormous, easily-worked alluvial deposits of Australia, California, and 
Siberia, have been exhausted over large areas, though many similar deposits must 
yet remain undiscovered. In the more difficult operations of extracting gold from 
mineral lodes and complex ores, reliable evidence from all parts of the world shows 
that most of the processes at present in use, or the methods of carrying them out,
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are far from satisfactory, as they entail the loss, on the average, of one quarter to 
one third of the gold present in the material operated upon"170;
“In the mountains between Pretoria and Potchefstroom, the gold hitherto found has 
been, for the most part, in quartz, and cannot be extracted without more machinery 
and cheaper fuel than the miners have as yet been able to command”171;
"It [the mines in Gavilanes, Mexico] ...was found to produce very rich ores from the 
surface to the depth of 60 varas (167 ft.), where a kind of black ore was 
discovered, which resisted all attempts to reduce it to advantage. By smelting, it 
yielded little or nothing, and by amalgamation, although the quantity of silver 
produced was very considerable, the loss of quicksilver was so great as to leave no 
p ro fit”1 7 2 ;
“These lodes ...at Major’s Creek [New South Wales] ...have been proved to contain a 
large quantity of gold. So far the only process by which the gold can be extracted
from these lodes is a chlorine process in use in Victoria; but the cost of carriage of
the material to the works is so great that the margin left barely covers the cost of 
raising the stone”173.
This implies that gold-mining would henceforth have to be pursued on 
a vast scale, and already by 1865, when the Tati-fie ld  was being
rushed, “several joint-stock companies and private associations were
formed to test its richness”174, thereby relegating the heyday of the 
ro u g h -a n d -re a d y  one man gold digger to the annals of romantic 
nostalgia. Placer, and especially alluvial gold had a certain certainty 
about it. The miner always knew where to look and had a fairly good
idea of the general extent of the source. The level of technical
developm ent at the time the placers started running out (in the 
1870s) was such that detection of a lode or reef could only be done by 
sight. The thickness of an underground ore body, its yield, its 
direction and continuation could not be known unless it was actually
physically exposed. Even test drilling for samples was a more or less
h it -a n d -m is s  operation.175 The investment of huge amounts of capital 
just to get to the lode therefore had considerable risk attached to it. 
Gold mining would, henceforth, require much more than the mere
1 7 0 Lock, A. (1882), p v.
171 ibid., p23.
1 7 2 /b/d. p107. This was, in fact, a gold mine. Mexican gold almost always occurred alloyed with 
silver, necessitating some separation process. Thus, despite the “considerable” amount of 
silver retrieved, its object, liberation of the gold, had not been attained, hence the failure.
1 7 3 /'b/d., p486. “Up to 1871, only alluvial washings were carried on, and the wealth lying in 
quartz reefs was comparatively neglected”, ibid., p479.
1 7 4 /'d/d., p16.
1 7 5 Eaton, L. (1948), p43.
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value of labour-pow er of the actual gold m iners.176 Hence Lock’s 
concern:
“Much will depend upon the systematic development of such reefs. Their variable 
thickness and extent suggest the precaution of providing in many instances a reserve 
fund for occasional prospecting, and the advantage of the management of the mining 
operations being under interested and local directors. These and other considerations 
should not be disregarded, for by mismanagement, either of a company’s mine or of 
its funds, a good mine may be brought to a standstill, many incautious investors 
ruined, and the development of the mining industry retarded. Most of the mines are 
at present held and satisfactorily worked by bon£ fide miners, aided sometimes by 
others who are represented by waged men. In such private companies as these, 
where the labour and capital employed are mutually interested, the first 
development of a mine is generally attended by the most satisfactory results”177 .
By 1876, even what remained of the placers had begun to reach the 
limits of the most advanced placer technology. Its problems, once the 
ore was “at grass”, were the same as that of lode mining. These  
relate to extracting the gold from the ore. So fine and light had the 
gold particles become that the age-o ld  method of panning, or any 
variation on it, would simply wash the gold away. An observer at a 
mine in Virginia saw the problem thus: “Should this [the Lightning 
Amalgamator] process prove a success at the Bankroft Mine, it will at
once create a revolution in gold mining in the South, as well as
elsewhere. Low grade ores can be worked at a profit, where with any
other method, they would not pay expenses”.178 He says further that,
"Much of the gold in Virginia is very fine, and cannot be saved by amalgamation. 
Wet crushing is used generally. What we want is a better saving process than yet 
known to me, unless chlorination shall serve that purpose. To my mind its chief 
objection is that it is expensive. I should also advocate dry crushing. Upon a good 
many properties the gold is lamellated, and so thin and delicate that it will be 
readily carried off by water".179
This is the situation which confronted the gold-m ining world from 
around 1870. The depletion of the placers does not mean that 
individuals will never again be able to dig for gold. W here  gold
accessible to human hands will again be discovered, there will human
1 7 6 The geologist thus becom es a highly-prized specialist, whose “considerations are of 
importance to the miner, as showing that the thickness of the reefs cannot be relied upon for 
continuance in either length or depth, and that some reefs may even thin out altogether", Lock, 
A. (1882) p.497. Only large mining companies could employ geologists.
177 ibid..
1 78Pollard to Lock, quoted in ibid., pp186-7 .
' 7 9 ibid., p188.
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hands again dig for gold.180 Mining was now more than ready for the 
industrial revolution.
180 The name Sierra Palada will probably forever be associated with grotesque images of human 
ants jostling one another for a toe-hold as they krie w e l their way up and down vertical mud 
cliffs, toying with death. In Bourkina Fasso, the Sahara swallows many a gold digger who dares 
to dislodge one grain of sand too many.
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Chapter Five
Universal Industrialisation and the Rise of Social 
Capital
Much has been written on the so-called ‘second industrial revolution’ 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century.181 The real significance 
of this series of developments lies neither in the unquestioned  
expansion in the scale and concentration of production, nor in the 
vastly increased m e ch an is a tio n 182 and improved productivity of 
la b o u r ,183 but in the revolution in the capacity of society to allocate 
its resources. Up to the first industrial revolution, resources, 
whether in the form of objectified or of living labour, were l o c u s  
spec if ic  in their application. Particular capital (in the widest sense) 
engaged particular labour at a particular site for the production of 
particular products. The conscious intention, both on the part of such 
capital and on the part of such labour, was to remain so engaged by 
each other at that place producing that product. Both labour and 
capital thus developed attributes particular to the particular locus, 
differing from those of capital and labour in other loci. Levels of 
skill, earnings, productivity, intensity of labour, profitability, etc., 
were all locus specific.
This locus specificity is, of course, another w ay of saying  
‘insularity’. This insularity was preserved over centuries in that 
wealth (whether the estate, the farm or the firm) was handed down
181 See, e.g., Chandler, A. (1990), Clapham, J. (1961), Dunning, J. (1988), Kemp, T. (1969), 
Landes, D. (1981), Payne, P. (1967), Pollard, S. (1988), Trebilcock, C. (1986), Trewhela, P. 
(1 9 7 0 ) .
1 8 2 -|t was in this period that mechanisation first becam e characteristic of industry in 
general", quoted in Trewhela, P. (1970), p2.
1 8 3 “[O ne]... decisive consequence... [which] followed from the amassing of vast sums in the 
production of capital goods[,]... was an abrupt reduction in costs of production. In the 1880s the 
price of iron fell by over 60 percent or even more. The price of coal fell by over 40 percent. 
...The amount of labour required for the production of a ton of rails had fallen by half since the 
middle of the century". Trewhela, P. (1970), p2.
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from father to son; and skill (in the form of a particular artisanal 
trade), similarly, was handed down in this way. In this way a 
particular capital was associated with a particu lar labour for 
generations without either interruption or dilution.
If the historic significance of the first industrial revolution was to 
break the bounds of particularity, the role of the second was to 
formalise universality. “South Sea Bubble”, societe  a n o n y m e , the 
stock exchange, multinational corporation, W e r t p a p i e r ,  currency  
speculation, etc. are all terms illustrating the freedom  of capital 
from particular applications— terms which rose to full prominence in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The specific mechanism  
which gives effect to this universality of capital is the rise of social 
capital, i.e., the commoditisation of capital. Capital itself becomes  
an object of capital: it is bought and sold on the stock exchange.
Labour is, similarly freed from particular app lications  by its 
com m oditisation , i.e., its transform ation into w a g e - la b o u r .  It 
becomes effectively universalised by the increasing convergence of 
the attributes of all labour towards a social average. This tendency 
is, of course, countered by the tendency of industry to specialise, 
having the effect of partially shifting the common attributes of 
labour out of production, and into the general social environment. 
Thus does a defin ite level of literacy, num eracy, punctuality, 
cleanliness and health, and technical proficiency becom e associated 
with labour in general, rather than with any particular group of 
workers. Convergence towards an average occurs more rapidly for 
som e industries than for others, depend ing partia lly  on the 
peculiarities of production, e.g., the extent to which mechanisation is 
possible, the peculiarities of capital, e.g., a predisposition to keep  
money ‘in the family’, or the peculiarities of labour, e.g., an inherited 
caste system.
The changeover from predominantly placer mining to large-scale  lode 
production necessitated the investm ent of hitherto unheard of 
amounts of capital in mining. This turn of events, as it would happen, 
coincided with the generalisation of the joint stock company. Capital, 
in whatever size required, would henceforth be available for any
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investment, nay, would be seeking opportunities for investment. 
“Joint-stock enterprise... has swept up all... available resources. Like 
a gigantic system of irrigation it first collects and then pours them 
through innumerable conduit pipes right over the face of the country, 
making capital accessible in every form at every point”.184 A form of 
capital adequate to the new dem ands of gold-m ining thus arose 
precisely when it was needed.
But the development of social capital was a tw o-edged  sword. While 
huge amounts of capital becomes available, this capital, like all 
social capital, was flexible and fluid. It could therefore be applied as 
quickly and easily as it could be withdrawn. Gold mining required 
capital not only in enormous amounts, but also for very long periods 
of time. The fluidity of capital subjugates gold mining to the 
realisation demands of capital, so that whereas it at first appears as 
if capita! is utilised by gold mining, it turns out that gold mining is 
utilised by capital. Gold mining becomes an application of capital like 
any other, and most other applications have shorter time horizons. 
Production is now determined not by the technical development of the 
mine, but by the need to pay dividends in order to hold onto capital. 
Speculation, especially prior to the imposition of stricter regulations 
on stock exchange activity, was the undoing of otherwise promising 
gold-mining industries in Virginia, Colorado, and elsewhere in the 
United States.
“The gold interests of Virginia has suffered much from speculation. A party secures 
specimens, hurries to Northern cities, gets up a company of speculators, who 
develop the mine enough to sell to another company of speculators, and so the 
business has been conducted. In California and other new countries, men who go 
there to mine have to depend on their daily work for support, and are forced to work 
systematically and industriously, or fail in supplying themselves in food and 
clothing. If this had been the case in Virginia, instead of buying and selling mines on 
speculation, the gold interest would have been in a very different condition. In 
Virginia the deepest mining for gold has been not over 150 ft., while in California 
shafts have been opened 1000 to 1400 ft. ...W e have gold-mines in Virginia which 
will pay liberally if properly worked and managed. The many speculating schemes 
which have been inaugurated and failed, have made people adverse to believing in the 
gold belt of Virginia; but now that the gold yield of California is falling off, and 
capital there invested is not yielding so satisfactorily, capitalists are turning their
184Quoted in ibid., pll/1.
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attention to Virginia, and a fresh impetus has been given to this industry in our 
state".185
Towards the end of the century share-hold ing for the sake of 
dividends became more representative. By then, though, and despite 
the destructive speculative activity of the ’60s and ’70s, mining was 
making steady headway in its transformation into a modern industry, 
some metals, e.g., copper and iron, receiving a boost from their 
central role in the general process of industrialisation.
The Industrial Revolution in M ining186
As discussed in Part III of the Introduction, it is inherent in the 
technical nature of mining that it admits mechanisation much more 
tardily than do other industries. W hen, by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, virtually all production had been set on an 
industrial footing, mining remained pre-industrial. Only in the final 
third of the nineteenth century did mining become mechanised. This 
means that whereas for most other industries the first and second 
industrial revolutions occurred more or less a century apart, for 
mining these two industrial revolutions coincided. The mining work­
force, now, too, became an industrial work-force, but one which had 
skipped the manufacturing stage altogether.
“Mining reached its most dynamic innovation period towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Prior to 1850, mining had not changed for hundreds of years. 
Beginning in about 1850 industry as a whole began to expand with the extension of 
railroads. The demand for metals and minerals grew enormously with increasing 
use of machinery and new inventions and innovations in industry as a whole. The 
mineral industries expanded at double digit annual compound growth rates. During
1 8 5 Pollard to Lock, 1881, quoted in Lock, op. cit., p183. And further, from same letter, “Many 
gold-mines have been worked in Virginia from time to time. W ant of experience and of proper 
machinery, want of sufficient depth, speculative investments with no expectation of working 
them, except enough to get up a company and sell out, with a repetition of this by another 
company or individuals, have caused failures and suspensions of many of the mines”, ibid., 
p184. For the fate of the Colorado gold-mining industry at the hands of speculators, see King, J. 
(1 9 7 7 ) .
186The discussion here draws heavily on Eaton, L. (1948) and the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 
XII, pp245-56. The concern is with underground lode mining as distinct from deep placer mining 
(see Introduction, Part III).
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the last fifty years of the nineteenth century the industry attracted talent and risk 
capital (as opposed to debt capital).”187
By the final third of the nineteenth century, that great invention 
which revolutionised all industry, the steam engine, was also in use 
in mining. Its underground application, though, was confined to 
pumping and hoisting, the engine itself remaining on the surface,188 
all other work underground was still being performed manually. 
Drilling was done almost entirely by hand. Cocopans were pushed by 
men or hauled by mules. In any case, these were small, being based on 
hand drilling and s m all-sc a le  production. Hoisting was done in 
buckets, and (at larger shafts) on cages. Skips were used on incline 
shafts .
The more extensive and intensive use of steam power, together with 
improved engineering, the increasing substitution of planning and 
p re lim in ary  in vestig ation  for g u essw o rk  and t r ia l - a n d -e r r o r  
procedures, resulted in improved productivity. These improvements  
were forced onto mining by the progressive exhaustion of ores close 
to the surface, necessitating deeper, more complicated and more 
expensive mining. But it was also facilitated by the greater amounts 
of social capital available.
Exploration was very primitive, consisting of panning, trenching, 
test-pitting and the digging of shafts and tunnels (these last two 
were often crooked). The dial compass and the dip needle were the 
first scientific instruments introduced. Their use was perfected in 
the 1890s. Drills were also used in exploration. Accurate mine maps 
were a rarity in the ’70s. Mine mapping made a major advance with 
the  in troduction  of uniform  prop ortiona l s c a le s 189 on the 
W itw a ters ran d .
18 7 Douglas, H. (1987), pp268-9.
18 8 ln open-cast mining, steam power had, of course, a wider application than in underground 
mining. From 1877, steam shovels running on tracks did the actual digging, bulldozers working in 
the parts which could not be reached by the shovels. Prior to the introduction of steam, all this 
work was done by hand. Churn drills were used in most open-cast mines, their application here 
following that for prospecting for deep placer deposits. Although draglines were used in loading 
and shifting placer ores, they were seldom used in open-cast mining.
1 8 9 1:100; 1:500; 1:1000, etc., as opposed to the then prevalent system in the English- 
speaking world of 1 foot to 1 inch; 40 feet to 1 inch, etc.
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From its first application in mining in 1865, explosives underwent a 
long, slow and hazardous process of development. By 1915, the ideal 
mining explosive had not yet been invented. Many of the changes in 
mining practice introduced in the 1870s , resulted from the  
introduction of dynamite.
In the 1870s, shafts were small, closely spaced, sunk directly on the 
vein and frequently crooked. This was because exploration had not yet 
sufficiently separated  from exploitation to constitute an art in 
itself. Digging horizontally (drifting) was slow, meaning that shafts 
had a restricted operating radius of about 100 m. This necessitated 
shafts close to the ore and closely spaced. Thus has it been for a very 
long time. New technology and technique in horizontal development, 
especially the introduction of the jackham m er190, greatly increased 
the speed of this work. Ore could now be reached more easily by 
digging horizontally from an existing shaft than by sinking another 
shaft from the surface. This allowed shafts to be constructed further 
apart and their size and capacity to be increased. They could have 
more compartments each of larger size. Shaft linings changed from 
timber to steel and concrete.191
This achievement conceals the fact that shaft-sinking itself was one 
of the most difficult phases of mining operations to m echanise.192 
Prior to the introduction of the jackham mer to mining, shafts were  
sunk by hand drilling, which typically gave a sinking rate of 10 m. per 
month in “reasonably hard ground”. Jackhammers increased this to 
130 m. per month. Double-decker work platforms allowed a group of 
men on the lower deck to drill, while another group above built the
1 " F ir s t  introduced in the United States in 1897, Douglas, H. (1987), p128. Although mechanical 
drills were first introduced in mining 1871 (piston drills driven by compressed air), neither 
these, nor their successors over the next 25 years, were really practical for mining. The  
jackhammer was followed by a hand-held self-rotating drill the material of which took advantage 
of the latest developments in steel metallurgy. Heavier models of these were used for sinking 
shafts.
191 So rapid was the development in shaft design and construction, that by the mid-twentieth  
century, shafts were being sunk 3 Km apart, giving each shaft an operating radius of 1 500 m.
19 2 Eaton, L. (1948), p53.
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lining. Improved fans (first introduced in 1 835 )193 and pumps meant 
that the dust after a blast could be cleared much more rapidly and 
sinking resumed.
These developments meant that mining could proceed on a larger 
scale than had hitherto been possible. Certain new techniques, in 
them selves  more costly than their older equiva lents , proved  
economical in the context of large-scale  production.194 Mechanised  
system s began to a p p e a r  underground in 1 9 1 8  with the  
revolutionisation of tramming. Tramming is the operation whereby  
rock broken or blasted from the face is collected, cleared away and 
conveyed to the shaft for hoisting to the surface. Up to this time, 
tramming was an extremely labour-intensive part of the operations, 
accounting for much of the value of the eventual product. It must be 
kept in mind that the productivity of labour in drifting and stoping 
had been very greatly increased after the introduction of dynamite in 
1865, and various ingenious ways of taking advantage of gravity 
u n d e rg ro u n d .195 By the teens of the twentieth century, tramming had 
already developed to where ore and rubble was shovelled or chuted196 
into cocopans running on tracks, these pushed by men or hauled by 
beasts (or, as in the coal mines of Victorian England, by children).197 
A scraper system was now introduced by which large boxes lying on 
their sides and tied in series to chains were dragged along the floor 
scraping up broken-off material. The scrapers were capable of being 
hoisted to a point were most convenient connection might be made 
with the shaft. This resulted in a one hundred percent increase in
1 9 3 By the late nineteenth century, ventilation was still by natural means, although assisted by 
fans and shut-off doors.
19 4 “The greatest improvement in development has been in large ore bodies in preparation for 
sublevel stoping and undercut caving. In these systems of mining the cost of development may be 
greater than that of stoping, but the overall cost is lower than in the older simpler systems, and 
production per unit area and per man employed is greater. Such systems would not be possible if 
we had to depend on old methods of drifting and raising", op. cit., p55.
1 9 5 lnstead of approaching the ore from above, as has traditionally been done, the mine is 
developed to the underside of the ore. Stoping (removing the ore body) therefore proceeds 
upwards and the broken material falls into position ready for removal. This obviates the need for 
a great deal of shovelling and hoisting work. There are many variations of the same principle.
1 9 8 Up to this time, though, most loading still continued to be done by hand. “Loading by hand is 
the greatest drudgery in mining", says Eaton, L. (1948), p66. Power loaders were first 
introduced at about the same time as scrapers.
19 7 Mechanical haulage in the form of the continuous rope system already started appearing in 
mines early in the nineteenth century. Electric mine locomotives were introduced in about 1879.
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productivity. Shafts becam e more efficient in that the area they 
served could be anything from doubled to quadrupled, meaning an even 
greater distance between shafts. Repair work was much reduced in 
consequence of the more rapid extraction.
At this point, w here  the ore was transferred from horizontal 
conveyance through the galleries to vertical conveyance up the shaft, 
labour expenditure was particularly high. At the more sophisticated 
mines in the 1870s, cocopans were directly tipped into skips, while 
at the more basic mines this was done by hand. In either case, the 
cocopans were pushed up to, and back away from the skip (which was 
on the cage in the shaft) by hand.198 Where hoisting was controlled 
with push-buttons, “one man can load and hoist several thousand tons 
of ore per shift without overexertion”.199
Of course, this presupposes the use of electricity as a power source. 
Electricity began to radically alter the nature of mining when  
electric locomotives were applied to underground haulage from 1883, 
although the two forms of power, steam and electricity, were used 
side by side for decades. The internal combustion engine was first 
used in 1886. The old system of candles held in place on the brims of 
miners’ hats by balls of clay, and which later gave way to various 
kinds of oil-burning lamps, was superseded by floodlighting in many 
parts of the mine, taking advantage of the presence of powerlines to 
feed the trolley locomotives. The use of electricity underground  
became generalised after 1910 .200
Repair work itself was set onto a scientific footing. Up to about the 
turn of the century, e.g., drill steel was sharpened by hand, and “every 
blacksmith had his own ideas about the proper shape of bits”.201 The  
cutting angle and shape of bits, now scientifically determined, both 
reduced wear and increased cutting speed.202 By as late as the early
1 9 8 By the mid-twentieth century, this procedure had been mechanised to the extent that a skip 
was being filled in three to four seconds.
1 " E a to n , L. (1948), p75.
2 0 0 Douglas, H. (1987), p182.
201 Eaton. L. (1948), p65.
2 0 2 From the mid-nineteenth century, metal-working, an art almost as old as production itself, 
gave way to metallurgy. This had many dramatic effects on mining. The quality of steel made
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1870s, the backwardness of pumping technology still caused mining 
operations to be shut down. The problem encountered at Lightning 
Creek [British Columbia] was not untypical. It is reported that, “so 
much water is frequently met with that the pumps are mastered, 
rendering necessary a cessation of work till the driest part of the 
season, or the application of more powerful machinery.... In October 
of 1876, the quantity of water being raised amounted to about 13,870  
gal. a minute”.203 The 3.5 Kg/cm2 managed by pneumatics when it was 
first introduced to mining in the 1870s, made it not yet practical for 
many applications. Over the next few decades, this pressure was 
trebled. Together with the improvements in transmission line design 
and manufacture, the concentration of great power on a small area  
became available ever deeper into the mine 204
Improved transportation and the spread of the m etal-working and 
metallurgical engineering industries with large commercial machine  
shops, meant a reduction in in -house repair facilities. Standardised  
m ach ines  and parts provided by the m etal industry further  
contributed to this development. Improvements were made both in 
steel and its treatment.
This overlap with industry in general manifested itself also in other 
important areas: power supply and labour. Steam, a universal source 
of power, lent greater freedom of site of production than did earlier 
sources, e.g., water. It also permitted the application of great force 
at a concentra ted  point. But this source of pow er still had 
limitations: fuel had to be brought to the site of generation; the 
storage potential of this power was limited (flywheels); and so was 
its transmission. Its application in mining was constrained by the
phenomenal improvements in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Mining was able to move 
from soft iron and cast-steel ropes in the early 1870s, to steel of much higher tensile strength 
within a few decades. Ropes of stronger steel meant that shafts could go much deeper as ropes 
could be much longer before they snapped under their own weight (before the introduction of 
intermediate underground hoisting stations). Hoisting engines therefore increased greatly in size 
and power, though these remained steam-powered well into the twentieth century.
2 0 3 Lock, A. (1882), pp42-3 . Fifty years earlier, even this would have been impossible.
2 0 4 Improvements in steam transmission line design and manufacture (especially improvements 
in insulation) enabled the then rapidly developing steam pumps to lift water to a height of 900  
metres in a single action. Electric pumps superseded these, starting with lifts of 1 100 m per
action. These developments in drainage put previously inaccessible bodies of ore within reach of
exploitation.
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steam engines having to be located on the surface, so that while it 
proved very successful in hoisting, it did not in drilling, tramming, 
hau lage , ventilation, etc. Its application in pumping was only 
partially successful. But most significant of all, each user of steam 
power generated his own supply. Electricity was regionally generated 
and supplied, its transmission potential being infinite. At one level 
this m eant that power could now be brought into the furthest 
recesses of any mine, but at another, it meant that mining became  
integrated with industry in general, as would be any other industry.
This integration into industry in general was not only in respect of 
power. Mining came to rely on the new and rapidly developing  
chemical industry for one of its most crucial means of production, 
dynamite. According to one source, “Improvements in explosives were 
another innovation that pushed mining costs down; however, the 
research and development was undertaken by chemical companies, not 
mining com panies”.205 Mining was taking its place in the developing 
general symbiosis between industry in general as units of production, 
and industry in general as units of consumption.
“Important ...was the deployment of genuine industrial techniques. Ore was 
extracted with dynamite, shafts 500 m deep were sunk, and above all, in 1890 
MacArthur and Forrest developed the cyanide process which replaced mercury and 
which made it possible to extract all the gold present in ore" 206
This integration went even further in that m in e -w o rkers  were  
becoming general industrial workers, capable of working in almost 
any industry. The technical requirements of mining (machinery, fuel, 
operating practices, etc.) had to move closer to those of industry in 
general. The workers were free wage-labourers, and hence the mines 
com peted for the same labour with all other industries. Its labour 
requirements had to increasingly approximate those addressable by 
the average industrial worker.
Up until the last third of the nineteenth century, “knowledge of 
mining and skill in its performance were handed down from father to
2 0 5 Douglas, H. (1987), p183.
2 0 8 Vilar, P. (1976), p330. It is not quite true that cyanide replaced mercury. It rather came to 
complement it. Certainly by the outbreak of the South African War, both processes were being 
run in tandem. The substantial point, though, remains valid.
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son by the apprentice system, and the son learned to do things in the 
way that his father and grandfather had done.”207 This constancy was 
reinforced by the extremely hazardous character of underground work. 
An ideology of anti-innovation and superstition pervaded mining 
c ir c le s .208 This formed one of the stumbling blocks on the way to 
introducing industrial methods in mining. Having become part of a 
free w age-lab our force, the average standard for wage-labour (by all 
criteria) would also become the standard for gold-m ining labour. 
Requiring a w ork -force  of industrial standards of education and 
health, changerooms were, for the first time, built at mines to enable 
the workers to wash and change from their wet mining clothes into 
dry street clothes at the end of work. But the prevailing ideology of 
the w ork-force  holding that bodily filth was a sign of strength and 
virility, these facilities were shunned and, in some cases, burnt 
down.209
The vastly increased scales of mining operations required more men 
than the apprentice system could provide. The steam engine as a 
universal source of power necessitated new equipm ent and new  
working m ethods. For the first time, training institutions were  
founded through which, in addition, new ideas were disseminated.210 
The rate at which new ideas were introduced into mining once the 
ideological stranglehold of ‘it is safer to do as has always been done’ 
had been broken, may be likened to that of water dammed up behind a 
wall suddenly breaking through.
Even its capital requirements threw it into the same scramble as all 
other industries seeking capital. Mining capital therefore had to begin 
to approximate the attributes of the average capital in the market. 
Under the driving force of social capital, all capital and all labour 
strive towards universal applicability. “By the end of the nineteenth
2 0 7 Eaton, L. (1948), p40.
2 0 8 In English coal-mining communities it was considered bad luck for a woman to go down a 
mine.
209  op. cit., p80.
21 0 This does not mean that the art of mining did not receive scholarly attention before. Georgius 
Agricola’s D e re Metallica, is not only famous for the detail of its content and the beauty of its 
manuscript, but also for its being out of character for many centuries on either side of its 
publication in 1556.
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century”, according to one source, “the structure of the mining 
industry was developing along lines similar to other industrial 
enterprises of the period".211 Mining, as an industry, was well on its 
way to losing the special character it had held onto for centuries. 
This last point becomes particularly strong in the light of the higher 
standard of refining which has become the accepted average.
Refining
Above we have described the process of ore reduction as distinct 
from gold extraction. A further differentiation is now introduced: 
that between extraction and refinement. Gold occurs in nature in 
association with a number of other metals, notably silver, copper and 
lead. The relative concentration of gold v i s - a - v i s  other metals varies 
considerably from ore body to ore body. When gold is extracted from 
the non-metallic ore, other metals are usually extracted along with 
it. Some processes require that the gold first bind to an extraction 
agent to assist the process. In both cases the gold emerges in an 
impure state. The removal of associated metals and added chemical 
agents is the purification or refinement of the gold.
Fineness is expressed in parts gold per thousand parts or in carat, the 
former convention allowing for more accurate assaying, is current in 
official and serious circles. Generally the minimum gold content for 
an article still to be regarded as made of gold is one third (8 carat or 
333.3  fine). Historically, ‘pure’ gold has been 916  fine (22 carat). 
This was the gold of the international monetary system in the 
nineteenth century. At 1000 fine gold becomes brittle. W here  the 
highest purity is strived for, therefore, the object is to add the 
minimum impurities that would prevent the onset of brittleness.212
Fineness has its own value implications. To extract gold which 
naturally occurs at 875 and gold which naturally occurs at 975 might 
cost the same amount of labour-time per unit weight. One Kilogram
211 Douglas, H. (1987), p269.
2 1 2 ln the region of 99 and above, refining costs rise exponentially. There are enormous 
technical difficulties involved in purifying gold from .996 to .9999 fine. Both South Africa and 
the former Soviet Union went to extraordinary expense to purify their gold beyond .996 fine.
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containing less gold (875) might therefore have the sam e amount of 
value as one Kilogram containing more gold (975). Either one, or both, 
of two things can result: (i) The value of 975 gold is simply reduced 
to that of 875 gold. 975 will go out of circulation, be adulterated, and 
re-enter circulation as 875. The new 875 gold will now have a higher 
value than the old 875 gold, since labour will have gone into the 
adulteration process. In the first instance this additional labour is 
wasted, since the socially necessary labour for the extraction of 875  
is already established. However, a portion of this additional labour is 
salvaged in that the baser metals used in adulterating 975  gold to 
875, now circulate as gold. The weight will now be slightly higher 
than one Kilogram, necessitating the removal of some material which 
would, of course, give a surfeit of 875 gold;
(ii) On the other hand, should 975 gold be that which legally 
circulates as money, 875 gold will be refined to 975, This, too, would 
involve an additional labour input. The new 975 would therefore have 
a higher value than the old 975. Since the value of 9 75  is already 
determined, this additional labour, too, is wasted. This is, however, 
partially compensated for in that all the 875 gold in the one Kilogram 
unit is now acceptable at 975 value whereas previously none of it 
was so accepted. The weight would now, of course, be slightly less 
than one Kilogram, necessitating the addition of more 975 gold.
Table. 2: Gold Finenesses and their Uses
carat fineness expressed comment
as..
24 1 0 0 0 100% pure, uneconomical to achieve, brittle
9 9 9 . 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 electronics
9 9 9 . 9 . 9 9 9 9 purest monetary gold-20th century
9 9 5 "good delivery" (minimum) purity for London market
2 2 9 1 6 most coin, investment jewellery, mon. gold-19th century
1 8 7 5 0 high quality jewellery
1 4 5 8 3 . 3
1 0 4 1 7 . 7
9 3 7 5
8 3 3 3 . 3 minimum acceptable purity for jewellery
Sources: Various.
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The value of gold, by the turn of the century, came to fluctuate in 
response to the following forces: (i) labour input; (ii) technical input;
(iii) grade (iv) fineness (every time it becomes technically possible 
to improve the fineness, the value is increased). Improved fineness, 
and greater precision at attaining it, are achieved through complex 
chemical processes carried out in industrial plants on the surface.
The general tendency for the value of commodities to decline as an 
expression of the increase in the productivity of labour appears, in 
the case of extractive industry, as a c o u n t e r - t e n d e n c y .  As the  
resource becomes increasingly depleted, so must the productivity of 
the labour producing it decline. Unless technology can be applied to 
counter this tendency, the intensity of labour has to increase. W e  
already know from the nature of the m oney-com m odity  that the 
labour involved in its production is applied at its maximum intensity.
Although it might seem as though the value of the products of 
extractive industry is determined by different rules from these of 
other industry, this is but a perceptual trick resulting from the 
phenom enon being viewed from a different vantage point. The  
e le m en tary  m ovem ent is for labour to becom e increasingly  
e f f i c ie n t .213 The unavoidable objective condition in extractive  
industry is that every application of labour immediately renders its 
successive application less efficient because the resource extracted  
becomes more thinly spread. This does not, of course, happen in an 
even and linear fashion. New discoveries of sources can and do 
dram atically  reverse this trend. So, too, do major technological 
revolutions. Though a resource may be fairly evenly spread on a global 
scale, this does not mean that it is evenly spread at its actual site. A 
resource may occur more richly near the surface than it does at 
depth; one type of ore may yield it more readily than does another; 
etc.
The best of scientific predictive capabilities notwithstanding, labour 
in extractive industry only knows its efficiency a f te r  the production
2 1 3 “Economy of time, to this all economy ultimately reduces itself”, Marx, K. (1973), pp173.
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process has been completed. But then one must ask, “what, exactly, 
does this labour do?”. Let us consider the case of gold in particular, 
although the same principle would apply in any extractive industry. 
Strictly speaking, such labour cannot be said merely to be producing 
gold. Two distinct productive activities are taking place: reduction 
and extraction. Reduction involves everything from the first assault 
on the ore body, be it with ham m ers and chisels, dynam ite,  
jackham m ers  or com puter-contro lled  m u lt ip le -h ea d  drilling rigs, 
through bringing the material to the surface, to pulverisation to the 
point where no further mechanical action upon the ore will serve any 
purpose. Extraction involves a sequence (usually) of processes—  
mechanical, chemical and/or electro-mechanical— of segregat-ing the 
gold from everything else. The richness with which the gold occurs in 
the ore, and the evenness of its distribution within it can only be 
accurately known between the end of the reduction process and the 
start of the extraction process. The point is that this richness 
(grade) is given by nature. Production, therefore, is more a business 
of e x p o s i n g  the material than of bringing it into ex is tence . The  
question of the efficiency of labour has a d ifferent meaning  
depending on whether one is dealing with reduction or extraction.
Although overall efficiency can be expressed as x amount of labour­
time to produce y amount of gold, to express it simply like this is 
deceptive. The two components of the production process must be 
considered separately, since the objective constraint that there is 
only so much gold in a given body of ore affects neither the efficiency 
in reduction, nor that in extraction in and of themselves. There is a 
difference between one thousand men reducing one hundred tonnes in 
ten weeks, one thousand men reducing ten tonnes in ten weeks, and 
one thousand men reducing a thousand tonnes in ten weeks. No matter 
how efficient or inefficient ore-reducing labour, there is never any 
gold at the end of the process, just pulverised ore. Efficiency thus 
reduces itself to either how rapidly a definite quantity of ore can be 
reduced to this state by a definite number of workers; or how much 
ore can be reduced to this state by a definite number of workers in a 
stipulated time; or how small a number of workers can reduce a 
definite amount of ore to this state in a definite time. Clearly, the 
application of ore-reducing technology has a positive effect on the
131
productivity of ore-reducing labour, and so, on overall labour. The  
efficiency with which the ore is r e d u c e d  responds proportionately  
(positively) to the general movement of the productivity of labour in 
the economy as a whole, since it does not produce gold, but reduces 
ore. But, the overall  volume  of ore processed in a given time may be 
increased not only by making the labour more efficient, but also by 
increasing the number of labourers at a given level of efficiency. This 
amounts to an expansion of the scale of production.
Extraction, on the other hand, begins from an altogether different 
premise. The process receives pulverised ore from the reduction 
process in such condition that the gold may now be extracted from it. 
Here, too, of course, can the productivity of labour be improved by the 
introduction of improved technology. But it only has so much gold as 
is contained in the ore handed over to it. Assuming the gold to be 
100%  extractable, improvement in productivity may be expressed  
either as a reduction in the number of labourers required to extract 
the gold in a definite time, or as a reduction in the time needed to 
extract the gold. But never as an increase in the amount of gold 
extracted by a definite number of workers in a definite time. Of 
course, it can also be expressed as a definite quantity of reduced ore 
processed in a stipulated time, but this would tell us nothing of the 
gold yield, which is the whole point of extraction. Paradoxically, 
independently of technological improvements, the total volume of 
reduced ore processed increases the total amount of gold extractable, 
but this tells us only about either the intensity of labour or about its 
e ff ic ien c y .
The 1890s saw a complete revolution in refining, especially with the 
introduction of the MacArthur-Forrest cyanidation process in South 
Africa. By the turn of the century, the product of the milling process, 
a gold-bearing suspension, was put through mercury amalgamation, 
chlorination and cyanidation. Each of these was a distinct chemical 
process requiring a complete plant. W hen Douglas says that the 
MacArthur-Forrest process made Wits gold economic to mine, he 
confuses a technical problem with a value problem.214 Without the
2 1 4 Douglas, H. (1987), p214.
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M a c A rth u r-F o rre s t  process, the gold would simply have been  
irretrievable, regardless of how much money was thrown at it. The 
profitability or otherwise of the W itw atersrand goldfields was a 
value, rather than a technical question, which is the subject of 
section III. The point here is that by the turn of the century, actual 
mining, as traditionally understood, had been reduced to a fraction of 
the total productive activity. More on this in a moment.
Generalised W age-Labour
One of the many landmarks in social evolution to which the 
nineteenth century may lay claim is the abolition, of slavery. Although 
the coherent campaign known as the ‘abolitionist movement’ can be 
traced back to the eighteenth century, the process of abolition was 
uneven, riddled with counter-campaigns, often reversed and most of 
the time some way from altruistic. It is generally recognised in the 
literature that by 1850, slavery had been, for all intents and 
purposes, eliminated as an economic factor in the global economy, 
although it persisted as law in the United S tates until the 
Constitutional Amendment of 1865. It continued in some peripheral 
areas well into the twentieth century. To venture into this vast and, 
apparently, under-explored question is beyond the purpose of this 
thesis. In terested  readers are directed to the large body of 
l i te ra tu re .215 W e are interested in this question only in so far as it 
has a bearing on the production of gold.
There is debate over the precise manner in which the rising industrial 
capitalism dovetails with the declining slavery and slave trade. 
Those who have sought a simple on e -to -o n e  relationship between the 
dem and for a universal population of w age-lab ourers  and s ta te -  
sponsored abolit ion-ism , at least in the context of the British
2 1 5 The discussion here draws on Davis, D. (1984); Eltis, D. and Walvin, J. (eds)(1981); 
Mathieson, W. (1967); Asiegbu, J. (1969), who suggests that, “the W est African slave trade 
lingered on for many decades after 1841", p 119; Williams, E. (1944), who is by far the most 
interesting since he examines the various diverse ways in which different capitals benefited 
from the m aintenance of slavery or would benefit from its abolition; Hobson, J. (1938); 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.Vol. XVI, pp853-866.
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Empire, have invariably found the situation far more complex than 
they had supposed. Either way, the end result was the universal 
demise of slave forms of labour, and its replacement by proletarian 
form s.
While this changeover was profound, it was by no means rapid. While 
western slavery was a major social force in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, it was nevertheless a form of labour existing in 
the service of capital. The slave trade and slavery were themselves a 
great boom to capitalism. The abolition of slavery was not so much a 
social revolution as a social adjustment. Neither were great classes 
wiped out, nor did new ones spring to life. A process which had been 
underway for more than one hundred years was merely being pushed 
to its logical conclusion.216 This adjustment could not be immediate 
for all capitals. Plantation owners, e.g., howled about the certain 
collapse of the British Empire (or, at least, its sugar-growing  
sector), if they could not continue production on the basis of 
s lavery .217
In order to ease  the transition from slavery to w age-labour,  
intermediate forms of labour were introduced. The most important of 
these were ‘apprenticeship’ and indenture. The former was used 
especially to bind nominally free ex -s laves  to their former masters 
purportedly in order to provide ‘training’ in the ways of wage-labour; 
while the latter involved essentially a long-term  labour contract 
with the colonial state (breach of contract was a criminal, rather 
than a civil offence) and strict control over the value of the 
labourer’s labour-pow er. These transitional forms were introduced 
as, where and for as long as required, hence apprenticeships in the
2 1 6 Social changes appear to have been more profound in the slave supplying areas that in the 
receiving areas.
2 1 7 Those who sought to preserve slavery found that they did not have a monopoly on concern 
for the well-being of Empire. As one source reports,
“The West Indian [sugar] monopoly was not only unsound in theory, it was unprofitable in 
practice. ...England was paying for its sugar five millions more a year than the Continent. 
Three and a half million pounds of British exports to the W est Indies in 1838 ...purchased 
less than half as much sugar and coffee as they would have purchased if carried to Cuba 
and Brazil. ...The  capitalists, eager to lower wages, [argued that] ...m onopoly was 
unsound, costly to all, and had destroyed the great colonial empires of the past", 
Williams, E. (1944), pp138-9.
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Caribbean and the mass migration of indentured labourers both into 
and across the British E m p ire .218 The transitional nature of 
indentured labour as a form lies not only in the fact of the freedom of 
the indentured labourer ranking somewhere between that of the slave 
and that of the wage-labourer as a consequence of which the value of 
his labour-power, too, lies between that of the slave and that of the 
free wage-labourer. Indentured labour is transitional also in that the
indentured labourer, while bound to a particular employer for a given
length of time, was neverth e less  sc ientif ica lly  a llo cated  to 
production areas around the globe according to a colonial central plan. 
“They [the imperial nations— JH] induce an ever-growing stream of 
labour to flow between different parts of the subject portions of this 
E m pire”.219
The important point, though, is that henceforth, the labour of the 
world would become an increasingly integrated mass. The prominence
of local attributes would gradually give way to average  world
attributes, though the process would be uneven and non-linear. This 
unevenness appears most starkly in the rapidity with which labour in 
different sectors begins to approximate its average, as against the 
sluggishness with which this levelling occurs between different 
countries. Thus does labour, through the process of universal 
proletarianisation, come to compliment the fluidity and flexibility of 
capital attained by social capital. No sector can any longer isolate its 
capital from capital in general, neither can it its labour. The same  
applies to gold production. This is, of course, the question of the 
influence of abstract labour on concrete labour.
This is a question which much exercises T icktin ’s mind.220 For 
Ticktin, abstract labour works its way back into concrete labour in a 
different way. Capital seeks the most advantageous conditions for its 
realisation, and to this end continually shifts from investment to 
investment. For productive capital, this m eans from industry to
2 1 8 See, e.g., Hobson, J. (1938), p250. “One capitalist device for keeping wages low at least 
for a time is to bind immigrants to contracts before they leave the old economy. The Indian 
indenture system, for example, rests on such an arrangement", Bonacich, E. (1972), p550.
2 1 9 /'b/d. It would be interesting to know whether this was the first consciously p lanned  global 
allocation of labour.
2 2 0 Ticktin, H. (1991), passim .
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industry. While capitals in direct competition with one another (such 
as in the same industry) and under the influence of that competition 
drive towards a homogenisation of their la b o u r-p o w e r  and its 
exercise, this occurs only indirectly across the entire productive 
landscape. Within an industry, therefore, the capacity of a unit of 
labour-power to yield surplus-value tends towards an average for the 
industry. There is a tendency for the statistical ‘m an-hou r’ to take on 
a fixed meaning for the industry.
Industrialisation allows for the drawing of all industries into such 
single universal determination. This occurs through the increasing 
standardisation of the factors of production. Each industry providing 
m eans of production to others is e ither subject to similar  
competitive pressures and hence, too, operating with labour-power of 
standardised attributes, or operating as a private or public sector 
monopoly in which case, of course, all users receive a product 
produced under the same conditions. Labour-power, similarly, tends 
towards an average across the economy. Industrialisation demands a 
free flow of labour across industries. The result is, “the social 
homogenisation of labour. Its consequence is that a fluid, competitive 
and flexible work-force is created and maintained”.221 This means 
that labour-pow er must have such attributes and be of such a 
standard as to be universally applicable. The need to measure social 
labour devolves away from money and, under the influence of 
industrial capital, back to labour itself. Labour-power then becomes  
directly its own unit of account across the economy. Or, as Ticktin 
puts it, “abstract labour produces the abstract labourer”.222
One may see, “the social reduction of labour to a common form”,223 
as doing for living labour what, more elem entarily , it does for 
objectified labour. The qualita tive ly  d ifferent concre te  labours  
objectified in commodities are rendered com m ensurable  by their 
social form of abstract labour. Abstract labour tries to render living 
labour similarly commensurable. Indeed, from the point of view of 
econom y in general, commensurability of l iv ing  labour suddenly
221 ibid., p56.
2 2 2 Personal communication, 2. vii. 93.
2 2 3 Ticktin, H. (1991), p5.
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springs to the fore as the original object of abstract labour, since it 
is living labour which an economy has to apportion to its various 
productive tasks. The continual correcting and overcorrecting of 
social labour allocation which is the m arket is a necessary  
imperfection in the evolution of that allocation process. Industrial
capital itself strives to correct this imperfection.
The value of gold, like the value of everything else, is always  
determ ined by the value of the labo ur-pow er expended on its
production. But gold is a homogeneous commodity, meaning that all 
gold has the same use-value, regardless of whether a particular body 
of gold has been produced from placers or from lodes. All gold, 
regard less of the quantity of la b o u r-p o w e r  expended  on its
production, will only have the socially necessary component of that
la b o u r-p o w e r  recognised as va lue. Most of the w orld ’s gold 
production, up to the second third of the nineteenth century, was  
from placer sources. Indeed, it is from placer sources that this 
material was first introduced to mankind.
The average socially necessary labour-time for gold production was, 
thus, set by placer production. But from the m om ent the role of 
money-commodity settled upon this commodity, its accumulation, and 
hence its production, became an end in itself. All gold resources 
technically exploitable were exploited. But from none of these  
sources could gold be retrieved at the value of the necessary average, 
save, perhaps, that of plunder from hoards.224 Thus was the second 
most important source of gold, lodes mines, always characterised by 
labour unable to reproduce itself. As an instance of production, it was 
the complete negation of the purpose of production: consumption.225 
Lode gold was simply not producable at the value of placer gold, 
hence the consistent working to death (while placer gold was not 
producable at a lower value since it was inconsistent with working 
to death).
2 2 4 The history of the value of gold is partially considered in Jastram, R. (1977), (1981), Lock, 
A. (1882), Del Mar, A. (1969), Jacob, W. (1968a), (1968b) and Vilar, P. (1976). According to 
Jastram , R. (1981), the “treasure” brought from the Americas consisted largely of silver. 
Silver circulated alongside gold as money and the stability of the value-ratio  between then was 
of importance to economists at the time.
2 2 5 For an elaboration of the Production-Consumption duality, see Marx, K. (1973), pp90-94.
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"Out of the 6,500 and odd millions acquired by the European world down to ...1810, 
less than 500 millions were obtained through commerce; the remaining 6,000 
millions were the fruits of conquest, plunder and slavery. [7.5% by equivalent 
exchange; 92.5% by unfree labour — FS]
...Between 1810 and the present time [1900] there have been produced from the 
mines, chiefly those of America, Russia, Australasia, British India and South 
Africa, about 13,000 million dollars, that is to say, in a single century twice as 
much as in the three centuries previously. Of this amount, about 4,500 millions 
were obtained by means of slave, serf, peon, or ‘contract’ labour; while the 
remainder was mainly the product of free labour, chiefly in North America and 
Australasia, a small proportion having been derived from commerce with Asia and 
Africa. The product of Asia, outside of British India (the Mysore mines) is a 
negligible quantity, because it has nearly all been consumed in Asia, and in addition 
thereto 4,000 millions of western metal. [ |  by free labour; j  by unfree labour
-F S ]
Taking the two periods together, the general results are as follows: from the 
Discovery of America to the present time the European world has acquired 19,500 
and odd millions, of which 1,000 millions were obtained by conquest, 9,500  
millions by slavery, and 9,000 millions chiefly by free mining labour”.226
One of the problems with the fixed gold price, is that it was fixed at 
a level far lower than the value of the labour-pow er needed to 
produce it under la te -n in e teen th  century conditions. This is a 
consequence of the average social labour-tim e necessary for the 
production of a unit of gold having risen with the changeover from
mainly placer to mainly lode mining on a world scale. For reasons
internal to the workings of the international monetary system at the 
time, this change could not be allowed to feed through to the gold 
price. Henceforth, gold would have to be alienated below its value.
Producing below value is not a self-reproducing condition. Labouring 
below value, w hatever the particular production engaged in and
whatever the form of economy, must necessarily be premised upon 
unfree forms of labour. Such unfree forms were incompatible with
the development of free w age-labour, the general movement of the 
time. Commoditised labour operates on the principle of exchange of 
equivalence. Around the world gold-mining operations were either 
discontinued or not even started on account of the value of the 
labour-power being higher than that represented by the fixed price of 
the gold to be retrieved by that labour-power. If the price was not
2 2 6 Del Mar, A. (1969), pp447-8.
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going to be adjusted to reflect the value of the material, its 
continued production depended upon one of two developments: (i) 
either the technological basis of gold production was revolutionised; 
or (ii) a source of labour-power is found the value of which would be 
lower than that represented by the price of the gold it is to produce.
“While that portion of the precious metals (about one half of the existing stock), 
which was obtained through conquest and slavery, practically cost nothing, the 
portion obtained through free labour cost more than it is worth: a fact long familiar 
to mining men and now admitted by numerous publicists. Such is the penalty which 
nations must pay for indulgence in violence and crime: their fruits lower the value 
of the products of free labour. Not until the precious metals have entirely ceased to 
be acquired through conquest and slavery can free mining labour hope to obtain an 
equitable reward in the value of its product”.227
With a revolution in the value of labour-pow er, a complete re­
adjustment of all value relations takes place.
New Value-Conditions
To distinguish placer surface work from placer deep mining is useful 
in that placer gold production, in the latter case, assumes all of the 
technica l constraints  associa ted  with mining in g en era l.  To 
distinguish p lacer mining in genera l from lode mining and 
conglom erate mining, is to distinguish between (i) relatively very 
high yield production and relatively very low yield production; (ii) the 
individual miner as unit of production and a company as unit of 
production; (iii) labour-power being the largest factor of production 
and equipment being the largest factor of production; (iv) production 
possible on the basis of labour alone and production impossible 
without capital. But there is a further critical distinction to be made, 
and that is between the emergence of a finished product (native gold) 
after the m i n i n g  process, and the need for further n o n - m i n i n g  
production processes to secure the finished product.
The value of lode gold has not only been higher than placer gold on 
account of its need for digging and tunnelling before the gold is
2 2 7 Del Mar, A. (1969), p237n23.
139.
reached, but also on account of its need for the extraction of the gold 
from the ore, after the ore had been reached (the ore, of course, also 
has to be brought to the surface). The standard process for centuries 
has been that of amalgamation. This involves exposing the ore to 
mercury, to which the gold particles adhere. To ensure adequate  
contact, the ore had first to be pulverised. Much gold was lost in this 
way, and, since the value of gold had always been set by surface 
placers, any gold production involving even a small amount of 
amalgamation necessarily never repaid the labour-power that went 
into the total production process. At some placer sites approaching 
exhaustion, amalgamation was even applied to the ore because the 
remaining particles were so minute and light that they could not be 
segregated by the same crud physical processes.228 Amalgamation is 
a refining process. The depletion of the placers means that, on a
world scale, this process became an integral part of the production
process which delivered the bulk of the world’s gold. Native gold
produced by digging alone has shrunk to an insignificant portion of 
world output. For the remainder of output, “the concrete labour of 
gold-digging” produced no gold at all.
This means that for all time up to the last third of the nineteenth 
century, one may speak of a placer period, followed by an
am alg am atio n  period, in go ld -p ro d u ctio n .229 Finley identifies a 
further, “cyanide and smelting period” starting in 1890. This further 
identification, though important in the developm ent of extraction  
technique, is not important in political economy, as it continues the 
same development as that brought about by the rise to prominence of 
a m a lg a m a tio n , ra ther than in troducing a fu rther production  
revo lu tion .230
The relative importance of post-mining production operations in gold 
mining by the late nineteenth century may be gleaned from the fact 
that of the total Witwatersrand gold production in 1898, 47%  of the 
gold emerged after mercury amalgamation and 53%  from a further
2 2 8 This was the case in, e.g., California, according to Vilar, P. (1976), p326.
2 2 9 A similar periodisation is offered in Findlay, J. (1910), pp324-5.
2 3 0 Trew hela, P. (1986b) ascribes rather more significance to the introduction of the 
MacArthur-Forrest cyanidation process than we do. See p45.
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series of chem ical extraction processes, viz. chlorination and  
c y a n id a t io n .231 Native gold was coaxed from the ore in plants on the 
surface ,  i.e., under technical conditions comparable to those in any 
industrial plant. The value-relation is even further complicated by 
the fact that the workers down the mine, who, at the end of their 
digging, produced only broken rocks and dust, made up 70%  of the 
work-force, while those in the chemical plants actually winning the 
gold made up only 8 .67%  of that work-force.232
The importance of this point is that “the concrete labour of gold- 
digging” has, in theory, become superfluous to gold production, since 
it is, as concrete labour, identical to what goes on in a quarry. The 
increasing miniaturisation of industrial equipment, infantile as this 
tendency may have been at the end of the nineteenth century, meant 
that, inexorably, mechanisation would edge its way ever deeper into 
the mines, eventually bringing high-efficiency machinery right up to 
the fa ce . The es tab lishm ent of com ple te  processing plants  
underground, with only the finished product sent up to the surface, is 
therefore not only a theoretical, but also a practical possibility, 
albeit distant. The value of gold, like the value of everything else 
produced under industrial conditions, becomes a very complicated  
m a tte r .
Only after the completion of eighteen months of empirical research 
to substantiate this thesis, did we discover, quite by chance upon a 
rereading of the relevant chapters in Volume I of Marx’s C a p i ta l , that 
these developments are, indeed, mentioned in this work— not by its 
author, but by the editor of its fourth German edition, Engels. In the 
latter edition, published in 1890 (seven years after M arx ’s death), 
Engels adds a lengthy passage to Chapter Three in which he describes 
precisely that series of developments in gold production which we 
have submitted to examination in this dissertation. It is necessary to 
quote the passage in full:
“W e find ourselves once more on a period of serious change in the relative values of
gold and silver. About 25 years ago the ratio expressing the relative value of silver
231 Computed from W CM  (1897), Tbl. “Monthly Returns and Averages for the Year 1897", (no 
page number).
2 3 2 Computed from ibid.. Tbl. “Labour Returns", (no page number).
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and gold* was 15^:1; now it is approximately 22:1, and silver is still constantly
falling as against gold. This is essentially the result of a revolution in the mode of 
production of both metals. Formerly gold was obtained almost exclusively by 
washing it out from gold-bearing alluvial deposits, products of the weathering of 
auriferous rocks. Now this method has become inadequate and has been forced into 
the background by the processing of the quartz lodes themselves, a way of extraction 
which formerly was only of secondary importance, although well known to the 
ancients. Moreover, not only were new huge silver deposits discovered in North 
America, ...but these and the Mexican silver mines were really opened up by the 
laying of railways, which made possible the shipment of modern machinery and fuel 
and in consequence the mining of silver on a very large scale at a low cost. However, 
there is a great difference in the way the two metals occur in the quartz lodes. The 
gold is mostly native, but disseminated throughout the quartz in minute quantities. 
The whole mass of the vein must therefor be crushed and the gold either be washed 
out or extracted by means of mercury. Often 1,000,000 grammes of quartz barely 
yield 1 -3  and very seldom 30-60 grammes of gold. Silver is seldom found native; 
however, it occurs in special quartz that is separated from the lode with 
comparative ease and contains mostly 4 0 -90%  silver; or it is contained, in smaller 
quantities, in silver, lead and other ores which in themselves are worthwhile 
working. From this alone it is apparent that the labour expended on the production 
of gold is rather increasing while that expended on silver productionkas decidedly 
decreased, which quite naturally explains the drop in the value of the latter. This 
fall in value would express itself in a still greater fall in price if the price of silver 
were not pegged even to-day by artificial means. But America's rich silver deposits 
have so far barely been tapped, and thus the prospects are that the value of this 
metal will keep on dropping for rather a long time to come. A still greater 
contributing factor here is the relative decrease in the requirement of silver for 
articles of general use and for luxuries, that is[,] its replacement by plated goods, 
aluminium, etc. One may thus gauge the utopianism of the bimetallist idea that 
compulsory international quotation will raise silver again the old value ratio of
15^:1.** It is more likely that silver will forfeit its money function more and
more in the markets of the world".233
This is the earliest mention of these developments in Capita l,  which 
confirms us in our view that Marx was unaware of them. Marx over­
concentrates on the re la t iv e  values of gold and silver in terms of 
each other, at the expense of the actual value of each in terms of its 
own necessary labour-tim e.234 His emphasis is on the circulation of 
the precious metals, rather than on their production. Their production 
is not entirely ignored, but such examination is merely ancillary to a 
discussion of the Reproduction and  Circulation of  Social Capital  in 
Volume II of Capita l .235 While an analysis of silver does not form part
The original reads, “gold and silver”, which is the wrong way round.
The original reads, “1:15j", which is the wrong way round.
2 3 3 Passage added by Engels to the fourth German edition of Marx, K. (1983), p142.
2 3 4 See Marx. K. (1973), pp173-85 and (1977b), pp75-6, 156-7.
2 3 5 Marx, K. (1977a), pp474-8.
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of this study,236 it has to be said that a concentration on the value 
ratios between the two metals must invariably relegate the question 
of their own intrinsic values to the background. It is most unlikely 
that an astute scholar like Marx should fall foul of such an 
overs ight.237 It was rather the case, as we suggested elsewhere, that 
his object was to study capital, and not the precious metals. He was 
therefore only interested in the precious metals in so far as they 
elucidated capital. Indeed, he explains that, “we take it that the gold 
mines are in a country with capitalist production whose annual 
reproduction we are here analysing”.238
Having thus set the parameters of his investigation, the production of
gold and the reproduction of the gold producers only comes under
scrutiny to the extent that these form “direct elements of annual 
reproduction” in a go ld -producing , fu lly -industria lised , capitalist 
country. This means that, both historically and geographically, gold 
production outside of the nineteenth century United States and, to an 
extent, C anada and Australia (which were colonies), have to be
excluded. This is a restriction consciously elected by Marx, who 
concludes that, “consequently, gold too is to be treated here as a 
direct e lem ent of annual reproduction and not as a commodity  
element imported from abroad by means of exchange”.239
The annual reproduction of the capitalist economy as a whole is not 
the subject of our thesis, but Marx's point of departure appears to 
stand in direct contradiction to his trea tm ent of gold in A
2 3 6 For a discussion of the monetary role of silver in nineteenth century Europe, see Clapham, J. 
(1961), Ch. 13; for the United States in the same period, see US Govt (1870) and Friedman, M. 
and Schwartz, A. (1963), Ch. 3; and for a general study, see Jastram, R. (1981).
237 Even a scholar subscribing to the misconceived quantity theory of money was able to ask,
“How could it happen that silver, depreciated by excessive production, should not fall in 
value in the very country where it is produced? ...For the simple reason, gentlemen, that 
silver has nothing to do with the result. It is the other train which is moving in the 
opposite direction. It is gold, your money of circulation in Europe, which you have made 
scarce, and which has therefore risen in value. It is in Europe alone that you have a crisis, 
due to a fall in prices", HMSO, (1893), p33.
2 3 8 Marx, K. (1977a), p474. Trewhela strongly argues that Marx was very late in his life, 
"very specifically studying the relation of gold production to the total circulation process", 
pointing out Marx’ use of Soetbeer, A. (1879) and a British Parliamentary report dealing with 
gold bullion and issued in May 1879. See Trewhela. P. (1986b), p27. Emph. orig.
2 3 9 ibid., p474.
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Contribution to the Critique of Polit ical Economy.  In Volume II of 
C a p i t a l  he says that, “the production of gold, like that of metals 
generally, belongs in class I, the category which em braces the 
production of means of production”.240 In the Contr ibut ion . . . ,  though, 
gold is expressly excluded from means of production:
“Metals in general owe their great importance in the direct process of production to 
their use as instruments of production. Gold and silver... cannot be utilised in this 
way because ...they are very soft and, therefore, to a large extent lack the quality on 
which the use-value of metals in general depends. ...The precious metals are useless 
in the direct process of production”.241
It is difficult not to describe la te -n in e teen th  century economic  
writing on silver as confused, and the reasons for the confusion are 
clear. While the mint acceptance ratio stood constant at 1:14.15 from 
1873 to 1906,242 free market gold remained, on average, 40%  above 
the mint ratio,243 while the actual ratio of quantities of s i lv e r :g o ld  
produced increased from 1:48.8 in 1873 to 1 :71.25 ,244 contradicting 
the oft-advanced conception that the trading ratios of these metals 
are determined by the quantities in which they appear on the market. 
Economic historians, e.g., Clapham, often ignore the fact that after 
1873 the matter is both simplified and further complicated by the 
effective demonetisation of silver through the establishment of the 
In ternational Gold S tandard  and the fact that the industrial 
consumption of silver in the United States alone increased from 2.5 
million ozs. in 1880 to 21 million ozs. in 1906.245 The matter was not 
helped by William Jennings-Bryant's dramatic phrase, “Mankind shall 
not be crucified on a cross of gold", which to this day mesmerises  
many who ought to know that it was intended to win Jennings-Bryant 
the United States presidency, not explain the monetary system. It is
2 4 0 ibid., p474.
241 Marx, K. (1977b), p154. This could b© the subject of a very interesting inquiry, especially 
since Engels could not find the study promised by Marx, and in which he would almost certainly 
have explained his reasoning. “Supposing the annual production of gold is equal to 30. ...Let this 
value be divisible into 20c+5v+5s; 20c is to be exchanged for other elements of Ic and this is to 
be studied la te r...”, ibid., pp474-5, at which point Engels adds the following footnote: “The 
study of the exchange of newly produced gold within the constant capital of department I is not 
contained in the manuscript", ibid., p477.
2 4 2 Jastram , R., (1981), pp175-8.
2 4 3 HMSO, (1893), Appendix D.
2 4 4 M ineral Industry, Vol. XVI, p472.
2 4 3 Jastram, R. (1981), p138.
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questionable whether Jennings-Bryant knew more about the value  
relationship between gold and silver, than he did about the
aspirations of the political constituency he intended to represent. As 
Engels expected, the demand for silver as Use-value II, i.e., limitless 
demand, only persisted in those societies which still continued to 
employ silver as money, e.g., China.246
Engels could not, of course, rework the affected sections of C a p i ta l  
on the basis of this new information, but he could have said
something about its importance and that such rewriting might be 
necessary. That he did not mention this suggests to us that he did not 
fully appreciate the significance of his own insertion, apparently
believing that it required only that Marx’s facts be brought up to date.
Despite having the benefit of this very important information, Engels 
restricts his theoretica l exploitation of it to the theoretica l  
concerns of Marx: the silver:gold value ratio. Engels talks of the
distinction between placers and lodes, the historical predominance of 
placers over lodes; the reversal of this relation in the la te -  
nineteenth century, the arrival of machine production in mining, the 
decline of the value of silver simultaneous to, but independently of, 
the rise in the value of gold and the expulsion of silver from the 
monetary role. None of these is addressed by Marx. The form of 
ancient mining described by Diodorus Siculus, and which serves to 
underpin part of Marx's theory, is described by Engels as having been, 
“only of secondary importance”. At the very least this should have 
alerted Engels to the possibility that Marx's conception of the m oney-  
commodity in general, and the measure of value in particular, might 
benefit from a reassessm ent. Instead, he directs his energies  
outwards, towards the bimetallist advocates, whom he criticises for 
seeking to maintain a fixed silver:gold value-ratio.
Del Mar, who is rather unkind to those whom he sees as blindly 
peddling the “formula” of cost of production, here, and throughout his 
book, finds it impossible not to resort to it himself. At one point, e.g., 
he explains that:
2 4 6 “Brazil, China, Spain and Turkey never made it [onto the international gold standard]”, 
Kemmerer, D. (1975), p 110.
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“The present cost per foot of driving a gallery in the Wynaad mines of Mysore— this 
means blasting out and removing to the surface 7 x 4 = 28 cubic feet of rock— with 
‘native and Eurasian labour’, is only 4s. or $1. It is against this system of peonage
that the free labourers of California, Australia, and British Columbia have to
contend in producing gold at £4 4s. 1 1 jd  or $20.67 per ounce fine for the London,
Philadelphia, and San Francisco Mints’’.247
He clearly feels very passionately about the value question, but he 
does not recognise it as such. Almost never, then, is gold 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  exam ined in terms of the am ount of labo ur-t im e  
necessary to produce it or in terms of its role as money-commodity. 
Detailed empirical  studies have been done on this question (Lock, Del 
Mar, Jacob). Hirson, in a slight study, does correctly identify the 
parameters of the question. Seeking to explain the basis of the low 
wages of South African black mine workers in this early time, he 
suggests that gold produced by them came “onto the market” at a, 
“price set ...far below its value”, as a result of which, “every means 
was employed to ensure that workers were paid the lowest possible 
w a g e s ” .248 This is to view the problem from the wrong end, for 
Hirson suggests competit ion,  a relation between capital and capital, 
as the appropriate category for examining a relation between money 
and capital. Given that this is but a slight study, and that the focus of
his attention was elsewhere, it is perhaps not fair to point to the
many theoretical (and factual) problems wrapped up in Hirson’s 
conception. For almost all who write on early South African gold 
mining, the ‘fixed gold price’ is the first cause uncaused of South 
African gold-mining economics.
2 4 7 Del Mar, A. (1969), p430.
2 4 8 Hirson. B. (1993), p56.
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The Value of Labour-Power in Early 
South African Gold Production
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Introduction
While Section I explores the nature of gold in its three aspects as 
use-value, money and capital, and Section II examines the detailed 
empirical developments which allowed the processes described in 
Section I to em erge, Section III will look at all of these as a 
complete process in a particular situation. The insights gained in 
Sections I and II will be tested in the context of early South African 
gold-mining economic history. The primary purpose is to show that 
the peculiarity of South African gold mining flows from the 
processes and developments discussed in the previous two Sections. 
The secondary purpose is to demonstrate the explanatory potential of 
the category of value of labour-power, and thereby propose it to 
South African scholarship. The Section offers a political economy of 
South African gold-producing labour-pow er structured around the 
category of value of labour-power.
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Chapter Six
Competition in Early Witwatersrand Gold Mining
The extent of co-operation and/or collusion in the South African go ld-  
mining industry invariably draws com m ent in the literature. The  
motivation for this co-operation/collusion is said to come from the 
need to control the cost of labour, while the opportunity for it is 
provided by the fact of all producers always selling the product at 
the same fixed price. One view holds that the collusion in gold-mining 
reflects a particu lar s tage of cap ita lism — that of “monopoly  
capitalism”. According to this view, since both diamond-digging and
gold-mining arose in this monopoly phase, they will demonstrate the
sam e de ve lo p m e n ts  tow ards m onopoly. This v iew  is most 
consistently represented by Duncan Innes. Another view holds that 
gold and diamonds have a “different relationship between price and 
output”, in the words of Frederick Johnstone. Either way, collusion is 
seen to find expression in the Group System of organisation by which
the industry is characterised.
One inadequacy of the literature is that the presence of this 
collusion/co-operation is merely described empirically, rather than 
seen as part of a relation. That collusion/co-operation denotes the 
absence of competition is only partially brought out. An analysis of 
go ld -m in ing  competition as such is not m ade. Capita l being 
inseparable from competition, a question arises as to the form  that 
competition assumes in this highly co-operative/collusive industry. 
Given the central role of competition in the apportioning of the total 
surplus-value between the different competitive capitals, how is this 
apportioning carried out for the gold-m ining industry— an industry 
which internally lacks competition. The form of competition in the 
South African gold-mining industry has not, either, therefore, been 
taken up for study.
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The object here is to attempt to uncover the particular form that 
competition has come to take in the South African gold-m ining  
industry, and to explain the manner in which the individual go ld -  
mining firms receive their portion of the total surplus-value. For this 
we shall be looking especially at two views of the nature of South 
African gold-mining in its formative years. The first, that of Duncan 
Innes, is selected because it expresses a widely held conception of 
the nature of modern capitalism as "monopoly capitalism”, which is 
taken to be directly reflected in South African gold-m in ing. The  
second is the view of Frederick Johnstone, selected because it is so 
often drawn on in the literature.
Duncan Innes’ book Anglo American and the Rise of  Modern South 
Africa,  which offers an exposition of the monopoly capitalism thesis, 
also, devotes some attention to the “conditions of competition”.249 
Innes’ material is well researched and his position seems to be 
better argued than many. But he does not escape the inadequacies 
mentioned above. Innes’ book, therefore, appears to be a useful 
starting point into the discussion.
The monopoly thesis rests on the theoretical conception that 
capitalism, by the late nineteenth century, had reached its “monopoly 
phase”. New industries starting up in the phase, it is argued, are by 
their nature “m onopolistic”. G o ld -m in ing  on the W itw atersrand, 
having started in 1886, does not escape this. The empirical side of 
the monopoly thesis rests on the fact that early gold-mining capital 
was, to a very great extent, based on capital operative on the diamond 
fields. Diamond digging was, by 1888, already under monopolistic 
control. Innes sees monopoly as having been transferred directly from 
Kimberley to the Rand in the persons of the diamond magnates, who 
expanded onto the Reef.250 The difference being that while monopoly 
e v o l v e d  at Kimberley, it was present on the gold fields right “from 
the very beginning”. At the same time, at the “very beginning” of the 
Rand, Innes says, “when the gold fields were first proclaimed in 1886 
there were some 3000 people active in the area. ...In most cases
2 4 9 lnnes, D. (1984). See esp. pp45-74 for gold-mining, and pp39-44 for diamond-digging.
2 5 0 /b/d., p47.
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mining was carried on by a lone digger employing two or three  
Africans to help crush and wash the gold-bearing rock”251.
It is true that large capitals which have cut their teeth on the 
diamond diggings moved onto the Rand at an early date, but it is 
incorrect to say, as we shall show, that they constituted a monopoly. 
Innes finds empirical evidence for monopoly in the existence of the 
Chamber of Mines and in the so-called Group System according to 
which the mines came to be organised.
The first problem with Innes is that he sees capital in diamond  
digging as forming a seamless continuum with capital in gold-mining. 
W e will show that these capitals are different by virtue of the 
different ways in which they interact with the market. The diamond 
market is a limited one while that for gold is unlimited. Innes 
himself acknowledges this. W hen describing an 8 0%  increase in 
diamond sales between 1883 and 1887, Innes asks, “how much longer 
could the market absorb the increase?”252. Later, when he describes 
the increase in gold production from 254Kg in 1886 to 10 915Kg in 
1889 (an increase of 4200% ), the question of market saturation does 
not arise.253
This difference between diam ond-digging capital and gold-m ining  
capital, in turn, can be shown to express the different social roles of 
their respective products. Diamonds, like all other commodities, 
stand as private use-values  opposite gold as universal use-value.  
Diamonds are a particular form of wealth, like tomatoes and, indeed, 
gold. But gold is also the general form of wealth. Diamonds, etc. are 
needed for particular consumptive purposes, while gold, in addition, 
is needed by exchange economy itself as one of the objective  
conditions of its existence. It is the material incarnation of exchange 
value as such, the universal commodity.
251 ibid., pp45-6.
2 5 2 ibid., p34.
2 5 3 ibid., p47.
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It was on account of its social role as universal commodity that 
there exists an unlimited market for gold.254 While Johnstone offers 
no explanation for the unlimited market for gold, Innes ascribes it to 
Britain’s role as, “the world’s leading economic and political power” 
in the nineteenth century. Taking advantage of its position, Britain, 
“bought up all the gold which was offered for sale on the 
international market", and was able to do so “at a fixed price”.255 It 
is true that London was the destination of virtually all Empire gold. 
But a question must then arise of what the other economic and 
political powers did to acquire the gold they, too, needed. If gold was 
the medium of international trade, and Britain was the “leading 
economic ...power”, others would buy more goods from Britain than 
Britain would buy goods from them. What purpose does the medium of 
exchange serve, if it is all concentrated into the hands of the seller 
of goods. Did Britain then resell the gold in order to then be able to 
sell its goods? Innes’ conception derives from his failure, as it is the 
failure of all scholars, to grasp the concept of u n iv e rs a l  commodity, 
and to distinguish it from part icu lar  commodity.
There was an unlimited market for gold, and hence no need for a 
struggle over market share, no need for monopoly. Inconsistently, 
however, Innes equates an unlimited market with a glutted one. For 
him, “conditions of competition similar to those which had prevailed 
in Kimberley in the late 1860s also characterised the earliest period 
of Witwatersrand gold production”256. This is flatly contradicted one 
page later:
“The specific nature of the international market for gold had contradictory 
implications for the future of the development of the industry. On the one hand, 
conditions of an unlimited market at a fixed price meant that the gold industry would 
not be hampered as others, and especially the diamond industry, had been by market 
fluctuations and restrictions: the market for gold was unlimited and therefore the 
threat of over-production did not exist, while the existence of a fixed price meant 
that capitalists could plan production on the basis of assured returns on the sale of 
the commodity"257.
2 5 4 With the extension of credit economy across the full landscape of economic relations, as in 
the post-1971 world, this role assumes a different form.
2 5 5 lnnes, D. (1984), p48.
2 5 6 /b/d., pp46-7.
2 5 7 /b/d. (1984), pp48-9.
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The tendency towards monopoly is capital’s way of coping with its 
own “inner necessity”— competition— and it is a way which, by 
undermining competition, undermines capital itself. But it needs only 
strive towards eliminating its competitors from the market once it 
becomes uncertain of its share of that market. This was the case  
with d iam onds, but never with gold. Eventually , all diam ond  
production did end up in the hands of one single producer, the De 
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. There, therefore, really was a monopoly 
in diam ond-m ining.258
Competition and Monopoly
The term “monopoly", which describes a condition of the presence in 
the market of a single seller, is antithetical to competition— the 
presence of one indicates the absence of the other.259 Monopoly, for 
Innes, appears to mean, “very large and powerful companies operating 
internationally". W hen referring to collusion am ongst the world’s 
largest diamond dealers, e.g., Innes talks of how, “the monopoly 
Rothschild group... secured the support of other major dealers” 260. 
The presence of such companies on a world scale also reflects a 
particular stage in the d eve lop m ent of cap ita lism , s o -c a lle d  
‘monopoly capita lism ’. Any number of “monopoly capitalists” can
therefore compete with one another under conditions of “monopoly 
forms of capitalist relations". The opposite condition of which is one 
of “p e tty -b o u rg e o is  relations of com petit io n”. Innes has not 
abstractly explored either the relationship between monopoly and 
competition, or, for that matter, the relationship between capital and 
com petition.
While competition has historically em erged out of monopoly— the 
monopoly of guild production— as a d e v e l o p m e n t  over the earlier
restricted forms, its return to monopoly in the present period
describes, once again, a development over the wasteful post factum
25&ibid. (1984), pp35-42. Our thesis is not concerned with the manner in which monopolies in 
general extract their share of the total surplus-value. W e do, however, offer some ideas on this 
for gold-mining capital.
2 5 9 For Marx on the historical development of competition out of monopoly, see Marx, K. 
(1973), pp649-52. Monopoly in relation to rent has been discussed in Section I, above.
2 6 0 lnnes, D. (1984), p36.
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allocation of resources through the market. There was no scientific 
basis, from the point of view of production itself, for the guild 
monopolies. Production was even more atomised than it is under free 
competition, which at least strives to integrate production, albeit in 
a contradictory fashion.
The drive of capital towards monopoly stems not only from the need  
to dispose of competitors in order to gain control over price, but 
from the need to rationalise its own production .251 This is best 
achieved where a capital controls all production for, and trade in, a 
particular market, i.e., under conditions of monopoly. In a sense, it 
can be said that society as a whole already exercises control over the 
rational allocation of resources in all production through the  
existence of social capital. Monopoly is, therefore, both a natural, and 
a progress ive  development out of competition. Having first appeared  
as guild monopoly, it has now gone through the full social 
development process of competition to re -em erg e  in a higher form, 
scientific monopoly.262
Monopolies certainly do exist in the world market and they do get 
their share of the total surplus-value. Innes does not explain how 
they could do this in the absence of competition in the market. 
Neither the question of surplus-value, nor that of monopoly rent are 
considered. Innes is able to reconcile competition and monopoly 
empirically by conceptually fusing them with oligopolistic rivalry. 
Hence he speaks of, “organized collusion among capitalists in the 
industry”263, or:
“This did not of course mean that competition disappeared from the [gold] fields: on 
the contrary, it continued on a larger and often more vicious scale as monopoly 
capitalists sought to out-manoeuvre each other to gain possession of the richest 
areas on the fields’’264.
2 6 1 A dramatic modern form of this is take-over for the purpose of asset-stripping, on the one 
side, and kanban , on the other.
2 6 2 “As soon as it begins to sense itself and become conscious of itself as a barrier to 
development, it seeks refuge in forms which, by restricting free competition, seem to make the 
rule of capital more perfect...", Marx, K. (1973), p651.
2 6 3 lnnes, D. (1984), p52.
2 6 4 /b/cf., p47.
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Innes might here legitimately have talked of oligopoly, in which case 
much becomes explicable. A small number of very large mining Groups 
(the ‘Group’ phenomenon is examined below) certainly competed very 
viciously on the fields, but not over disposal of the product, as was 
the case before monopolisation at Kimberley. Competition persisted 
at other points in the circuit of capital. These were in the areas of 
securing finance, and securing factors of production (m eans of 
production and labour-power).
The Fixed Price and the Unlimited Market
The oft-cited work of Frederick Johnstone, Race, Class and Gold, 
unlike that of Duncan Innes, finds the basis for its thesis in the 
economics of gold itself— to whit, in its fixed price.265 Although  
Johnstone discusses “the imperatives of gold-mining on the Rand" in 
terms of three specific factors— these comprising, “the low average  
grade of gold, the internationally fixed price of gold, and the high 
level of development and overhead costs”— two of these, the grade of 
ore and the development costs, would find their equivalent in any 
other industry. The differentiating factor must, therefore, be that 
which is unique to the go ld -m in ing  industry: the fixed price. 
Johnstone himself clarifies it thus:
“The differentiating issue for the gold-mining industry is not the relationship 
between the price of its product and the general level of costs with which it has to 
contend; in this respect, it differs in no way from other industries. What does 
differentiate it is that for long periods of time the price of its product has remained
constant, though the cost level may have gone up".266
For Johnstone, “the fixed and stationary price of gold had two 
significant consequences for the industry”. From the fixed price, 
Johnstone argues, follows: (i) “that the mining com panies were  
unable to transfer increases in production costs to consumers in the 
form of price increases"; and (ii) “that the gold-mining industry was 
not subject to crises of o ver-p roductio n”.267 The first of these 
consequences is quite straightforward and requires no further
clarification. But what does need clarification is how a fixed price
2 6 5 Johnstone, F. (1976).
2 6 6 Quoted in ibid., p18.
2 6 7 /'b/d., p l8 .
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leads to a limitless market. Johnstone offers none for, indeed, there 
is none: the second is a non sequitur. As has already been shown 
elsewhere, the unlimited market for gold derives from its social role 
as money-commodity.
Few see any need to explain either the fixed-price situation, or why 
gold is always accepted on the market. Innes’ view is that, “the 
formation of the international gold standard ...formally established  
gold’s role as the m oney-com m odity”.268 He sees, “the international 
gold standard as the means by which currency exchange values could  
become accurately known in terms of  one a n o t h e r ,269 hence the 
fixing of the price. This, unfortunately, says nothing about gold and 
makes its roie dependent on the arbitrary whim of power politics. It 
immediately begs two questions: firstly, how is the central role of 
gold in international trade to be accounted for in the 5000 or so years 
prior to the establishment of the international gold standard?; and 
secondly, why did its value remain more or less constant for 
centuries before the establishing of the gold standard?
The dramatic increase in the value  of gold consequent upon the world 
supply changing its source from predominantly placer deposits to 
lode gold in the period C .1 8 6 0 -C .1 8 8 0 ,  threatened complete disruption 
of world trade, the medium of exchange being gold. But more
fundamental still, the m e a s u r e  of value, which, by definition, is
required to be constant, has changed the calibration of its own unit. 
One hour’s labour-time no longer produced x amount of gold. Of what 
value, then, were those commodities the values of which were
expressed in terms of that x amount? A great revolution in money 
itself was taking place. This had a third consequence: the reliability 
of gold as v a lu e -fo r - i ts e lf ,  i.e., as store of va lue, was now
compromised. As value for itself, no value stored in this form any 
longer represented the sam e value as when they were first left 
circulation. The socially necessary labour-tim e for the production of 
a unit of gold has changed, thereby affecting the value of all existing 
units.
2 6 8 lnnes, D. (1984), p45.
2 5 5 ibid., p48: Emph. ours.
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The international gold standard, far from being the great institution 
of stability, as it is so often lauded in the literature, was a symptom 
of the instability which had befallen the unit of the value measure. 
Fixing the pr ice  of gold to a value reigning prior to this change, was 
an attempt to hold fast de ju re  that which had already been  
overturned de facto. Gold now had to be produced at the earlier, much 
lower, value, or not be produced at all.
The fixed price and the limitless market stand as two equal and 
mutually independent conditions of gold economics. Neither the fixed 
price, nor the limitless market, are explained. Johnstone’s approach 
is, therefore, empiricist. But Johnstone is, nevertheless, superior to 
Innes in that instead of trying to merge gold-mining capital and other 
(specifically diam ond-digging) capital into a single kind of capital 
(Innes’ “monopoly capital”), he does recognise that monopoly, which 
did develop on the diggings, did not  replicate itself on the Rand:
“the different market conditions of gold compared with those of diamonds—  
specifically the different relationship between price and output— determined that 
the structure of ownership of the gold mines was to be less monopolistic than that of 
the diamond industry"270.
The problem lies only in Johnstone’s accounting for this distinction. 
For him, the specific m arket price of d iam onds was directly 
responsive to the relationship between supply and demand. Since 
realisation depended directly on market share, competition, under 
capital’s own machinations, would tend to give way to monopoly. One 
capitalist, having thus captured control of supply, thus captures  
control of price. “But this kind of control was not necessary in the 
gold industry”, says Johnstone, “because the price of gold was  
internationally fixed”.271
Here firstly, Johnstone confuses a controlled price with a fixed price. 
Monopoly in the diamond market stems not from the price being f ixed , 
but from the price being controlled.  He who controls the price can fix 
it at whatever level he wants. The gold-m ining capitalist had no 
control whatsoever over the gold price. Indeed, the fixed price
2 7 0 Johnstone, F. (1976), p14.
2 7 1 /b/'cf., p14.
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controlled him, as Johnstone himself acknowledges above, “the 
mining companies were unable to transfer increases in production 
costs to consumers in the form of price increases”. Put another way, 
when Johnstone talks of “the different relationship between price 
and output” for diamonds and for gold, what is obscured is that for 
diamonds there was such a relationship, whereas for gold there was 
none.
Secondly, Johnstone again conflates the issue of a limited/unlimited 
market with that of a fixed price when he speaks of, “the absence of 
any need to restrict output”, in the context of a fixed price. This 
echoes his thinking on diamonds, where there was no need to restrict 
output in the context of a c o n t r o l le d  price. While it is empirically 
true that “what developed in the go ld-m in ing  industry was an 
oligopolist but highly centra lised structure of ownership and 
control”, this does not follow from Johnstone’s reasoning. Johnstone 
does not explain either why monopoly did not develop, nor why 
oligopoly did develop in the gold-mining industry.
Johnstone, like Innes, lacks a theory. Neither of them are able to 
account for their observations. Johnstone’s position as a scholar, 
however, is somewhat stronger than that of Innes. The former allows 
his material to suggest its own thesis, the latter imposes one from 
o u ts id e . W h e re  Innes sees  “m onopoly ten d en c y  tow ards  
‘co llus ion ’”,272 Johnstone describes the goldfields as being under the 
control of “several large corporations” who,
"came to establish common central organisations and to implement common 
measures in order to eliminate competition between the mining companies for 
factors of production, especially labour, and to rationalise the process of 
production"273.
This introduces the question of the form of competition in g o ld -  
mining capital and the way in which this is manifested in the circuit 
of such capital.
2 7 2 lnnes, D. (1984), p53.
2 7 3 Johnstone, F. (1976), p14.
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Competition and the Group System
The existence of the Group System is generally understood in terms 
of three issues: firstly, collusion; secondly, rationalisation; and  
thirdly, promotion. The first embraces especially the procurement of 
the factors of production (means of production and labour-power); the 
s eco nd  en ta ils  s tream lin in g  of o p era tio n s , a m a lg a m a t io n s ,  
centralisation of facilities and sharing of expertise; and the third 
involves competing for capital on the financial markets, reducing the 
risk to investments and representing the industry in dealings with 
the state.
W hile go ld-m in ing capitals do not com pete to dispose of their 
product, they nevertheless do compete to procure the factors of 
production, and they do compete to secure capital on the financial 
markets. In the competition for the factors of production, there  
would clearly be a tendency towards monopsony. In the competition 
for finance, however, the role of monopoly/monopsony is different.
In the buying and selling of commodities in the market, monopoly/- 
monopsony relates to attempts to gain control over price. In the 
financial m arkets, how ever, w hat is being pedd led  are not 
commodities, but rights to future shares of surplus-value in the form 
of money. The ‘item’ being offered for sale is therefore homogeneous 
across the entire landscape of the financial markets, regardless of 
the particular use-value from which the surplus-value is captured or 
to be captured.
“In the money-market only lenders and borrowers face one another. The commodity 
has the same form— money. All specific forms of capital in accordance with its 
investment in particular spheres of production or circulation are here obliterated. 
It exists in the undifferentiated homogeneous form of independent value— money. The 
competition of individual spheres does not affect it”274.
A monopoly in the stock market implies the control over al l  listed 
companies, regardless of the particularities of the commodities they 
respectively produce. This is impossible since it would quickly have 
to extend across all financial markets in pursuit of capital seeking
2 7 4 Marx, K. (1984), p368.
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outlets elsewhere. Such a situation would describe the sublation of 
all competition, and hence, capital.
But this does not mean that there are no benefits to be derived from
the various capitals appearing on the financial markets as a single
entity, or as a small number of highly co llud ing /co -operating  
entities. To begin with, they would enjoy greater prominence than 
were they to present themselves as single companies, thereby both 
attracting more capital, but also adding to the security of the 
investor. Secondly, any risk to the capital invested in them is spread 
across a number of productive units. This also works the other way in 
that the individual company needs not fear the withdrawal of its 
capital on account of not being able to extract sufficient surplus-  
value.
So, although there would be no point in striving to attain monopoly 
(or monopsony), there is distinct advantage to be had from some form 
of collective representation. Such collective representation would be 
relatively free from internal strain since no competitive advantage  
attaches to dissension. This does, however, assum e that such 
com panies are all competing for capital in the sam e financial 
markets. The paradox is that, on the one hand, when gold-mining
capitals compete for the same social capital, i.e., when their market 
share should be under threat, they stand more to gain from co­
operating with, rather than undermining, one another. On the other 
hand, when they do not compete for the same social capital, when 
they pose no threat to one another's finance, they benefit from 
undermining one another without restraint.
Although there was a great deal of movement of capital around the 
world in the late nineteenth century, the financial markets were,
nevertheless, relatively far less integrated than they are today, 
retaining much of a nationalist character. This was both in terms of 
their listings, and in terms of their ‘reputations’. Although the City 
of London was the world’s most developed financial centre, it was 
not necessarily the most secure. Berlin, e.g., with its jo int-stock  
banks directly integrated with productive capita l, did have a
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reputation for being very secure.275 This, too, would be reflected in 
the competition between the Witwatersrand gold-mining companies, 
based, as they were, in both centres.
Both benefits of putting up a united front on the financial markets—  
the attractiveness of large-scale  representation and that of reduced 
risk— can be seen to be present in the Group System operating in the 
South African gold-m ining industry. These  are discussed in the 
literature. Johnstone sees the significance of the Groups as lying in 
the provision of capital, the stabilisation of investment and in the 
ra tiona lisation  of p rod uction .276 “They... were able to provide 
amounts of capital and a continuity of investment which would have 
been beyond the resources of the average  single go ld-m ining  
company”. But at the same time:
“Given such factors as the Groups’ large assets, their extensive involvement in the 
industry in terms of both investment and production, and their established position 
in the international capital markets, these shares were easily dealt with in these 
m arkets"277 .
The stabilisation of investment, which is synonymous with the 
minimisation of risk, again, worked both from the side of the 
investor, and from the side of the mine. Observes Johnstone, “there 
was an improved chance that poor areas will be offset by good, and 
that even development will be maintained”.278 To this end serves also 
the pursuit of rational production, under which falls the active  
promotion of company amalgamations, “which the Groups were able 
to implement as they wished since they controlled the companies”. 
Large-scale  production was, “also the means of equalising the output 
of gold and preventing violent fluctuations in the price of the 
com pany’s shares”.279 Innes sees it similarly:
“Investment in gold-mining had to be made as attractive as possible to the overseas 
investor which meant, in the final analysis, promising high returns at low risk. 
The former could be achieved by maintaining a low cost structure and the latter
2 7 5 The weight of German capital was sufficiently important for even Lionel Phillips to be 
concerned over its possible withdrawal. See letter to FitzPatrick, 12 June 1897, quoted in 
Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. (1977), p105.
2 7 6 Johnstone, F. (1976), pp14-17.
2 7 7 /'b/cf., p15.
2 7 8 Quoted in ibid., p15.
2 7 9 Quoted in ibid., p16.
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through spreading the risk over a number of ventures. The group system emerged as 
the organizational form through which both of these objectives could be achieved. By 
merging a number of mining-finance houses together into distinctive ‘groups’ and 
thus bringing a large number of producing mines... under a single control, the Rand 
capitalists were able to spread the risk of investment in mining considerably”280.
It is clear that, even if not monopoly/monopsony, then oligopoly/-  
oligopsony did develop in those areas w here  the go ld-m in ing  
com panies did find them selves subject to com petition. Neither  
Johnstone nor Innes, though, explain why the organisation of the 
industry should have stopped short of outright monopoly, as in 
Kimberley, and stabilised at oligopsony. W e have already shown that 
it is inappropriate to talk of monopoly in gold-m ining, whether in 
selling the product or selling the shares, even if Innes insists on 
calling it that. Wheatcroft does make this distinction:
"the problem was diametrically opposed to Kimberley’s. The magnates, however, 
very quickly saw that in the case of diamonds the price was variable and had 
fluctuated wildly in the two decades before amalgamation. The price of gold by 
contrast was fixed, and the problem was to control variable costs. In each case the 
answer was combination or cartelisation with opposite ends in view. In Kimberley 
the object was monopoly in the strict sense, a market condition with a single seller 
who can then dictate the price: upwards. On the Rand the object was monopsony, the 
market condition when there is a single buyer who can dictate the price: downwards. 
This was the aim towards which the magnates conspired in the critical matter of 
la b o u r .. . ’,
and then proceeds to makes the crucial observation that:
“It was not necessary to amalgamate the mining companies if there was another 
institution. What De Beers Consolidated was to Kimberley, the Chamber of Mines 
was to Johannesburg"281.
But the very existence of the Chamber of Mines requires explanation. 
This organ directly undermined the opportunities for the mining 
com panies to com pete with one another in the one area where  
classical competition remained possible: competition for factors of 
production. Gold-m ining capital might have been a peculiar kind of 
capital, but it was nevertheless still capital. As has been shown 
above, the product is always sold. It is only a matter of actually 
getting the material out of the ground. Any company unable to do so 
loses its capital and must dispose of its mining claim. Neighbouring 
capitals would be waiting for just such eventuality in the hope that
2 8 0 lnnes, D. (1984), p54.
281 Wheatcroft. G. (1986). p132.
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they might be able to extract the gold themselves. There is, after all, 
only so much gold beneath each claim. This is exactly what underlies 
the reluctance of, e.g., J. B. Robinson & Co., to co-operate  with the 
Chamber of Mines.
Numerous attempts were made to standardise the wages for black 
miners, each time derailed by some mines, in particular those of 
Robinson, breaking ranks by paying more, “as a means of cutting their 
com petitors’ throats”282 and Albu, who, says Wheatcroft, “was doing 
his best to raise black wages by not adhering to the scale already 
agreed upon; not of course from charitable motives, but to beggar his 
neighbours”.283 In terms of the agreement which the Chamber reached 
with the mine managers in August 1890, that black wages be set at a 
maximum of £2 per month, wages were by October 1891 only reduced 
to £2 8s. 10d. The severe labour shortage of 1891, though, “much as 
companies and mine managers wanted to reduce costs”, led to several 
companies breaking ranks from the agreement as, “they still more 
wanted to keep their mines milling”.284 Robinson eventually left the 
Chamber to form a rival organisation, the Association of Mines, which 
held back even oligopoly. Innes describes the events:
“When the Chamber was formed in 1889 all the leading mining-finance houses, 
with the exception of J. B. Robinson and Co., joined it. Robinson held out alone
against the Chamber until 1895 when, supported by two other large companies
which had previously been members of the Chamber (Ad[olf] Goerz and Co. and G. 
and L. Albu and Co.), he formed a rival combination, the Association of Mines. In 
1898, however, Goerz and Albu were enticed back into the Chamber and the 
subsequent collapse of the Association forced Robinson into the Chamber shortly 
afterw ards"285 .
Although this information is provided by Innes, he skims lightly over 
it, failing to draw out its significance. He o ve r-s tre s s e s  the
‘monopoly’ character at the expense of the competition between
capitals. This is sometimes done at the expense of factual accuracy. 
Although, e.g., the Chamber of Mines was formed in 1889, before the 
c hange-over to d eep -leve l mining (1 8 9 0 -9 5 ) ,  Innes could still say
2 8 2  ibid., p131.
2 8 3 ibid., p186.
2 8 4 ibid., p131.
2 8 5 lnnes, D. (1984), p72n9. In 1892 this monopoly consisted of 67 separate companies, ibid., 
p 72n12.
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that “the various groups had combined to form the Chamber of Mines” 
in response to the wage increases consequent upon the increased  
labour demands of deep-level mining. In the light of the abandonment 
of the Chamber by some of its most powerful members, as described 
by Innes above, it is strange to then read that although the mining 
companies “had to abandon their wage determination, ...they did not 
abandon the organisation they had established (the Chamber of Mines) 
to defend the ir  com bined in terests”.286 The a priori  thesis of 
“monopoly capitalism " stands between its protagonist and the 
obvious competition between capitals. Where such competition cannot 
be ignored, we read that monopoly capital, “lacked the means of 
e n fo rc in g  a common policy in the industry”, and of, “the difficulties 
monopoly capital faced in integrating itself”.287 What, then, is the 
substance of monopoly?
Although Robinson, Albu, Goerz, etc. were not competing against other 
gold-mining capital for disposal of their product, neither were they 
altogether competing in the same financial markets. The advantages  
of a single unified representation in the City of London was of less 
importance to those capitals partially based in continental markets, 
and of no importance to those based entirely elsewhere. Wernher Beit, 
Adolf Goerz, and G. and L. Albu were such companies. In addition to 
the idiosyncratic Robinson, these were the very companies in a 
position to defend their independence from the Chamber.
"The capital needs and structures of the several financial groups engaged in gold 
mining operations on the Rand varied considerably. The Werner, Beit complex had 
already access to a variety of dependable sources of continental capital which it used 
carefully and very successfully ...Unlike ...all the other financial groups, it [Gold 
Fields] was dependent on the small British investor. But neither it nor Werner Beit 
were in 1895 as vulnerable financially as their main competitors. ...The Albu and 
Goerz interests, backed by German banks, and therefore possessed of a more secure
capital base, were in 1895 just in the process of becoming firmly
established...”288.
It must im m ediate ly  be said, though, that W e rn h e r -B e it ,  their
“dependable  sources of continental capital" notwithstanding, was
2 8 6 ibid., p58.
2 8 7 ibid., p59.
2 8 8 Kubicek, R. (1972), pp101 -2.
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nevertheless a London-based company.289 When the great split came, 
in April 1896 in the aftermath of the disastrous Jameson Raid in 
which Beit was implicated, W ernher-B e it  remained in the Chamber  
while the twenty-two companies led by Robinson, the Albu brothers 
and Goerz seceded to form the Association of Mines.290 One area of 
competition, though, viz., that for factors of production, remained. 
And it was in order to com pete in this a rea  that, in particular, 
Robinson inter alia kept his distance from the Chamber.
The general evening-out of strengths and weaknesses amongst the 
different mining companies which stems from their membership of 
the Groups, and, in particular, of the Chamber of Mines, has the effect 
of integrating them more closely together. S im ultaneously , the 
presence of competition in the procurement of labour-pow er and 
means of production has the effect of rigidifying them in their 
autonomy. The one tendency directly undermines the other. The more 
they cohere, the more they atomise, and vice versa. The good of 
capital in general and that of capital in particular, which are  
mutually exclusive under conditions of competition, are here both 
present in each particular capital. They are each and every one torn 
between answering each of these contradictory calls— to cohere, and 
to atomise.
This can be seen as a particular expression of a general contradiction 
in all productive capital: that of the tendency towards proportionate 
production, i.e ., the scientific  and rational d istribution and  
application of resources (as made explicit in social capital) against 
the tendency to override proportional production in the quest for 
surplus-value. In the Grundrisse, Marx puts it thus:
“Proportionate production ...only when it is capital’s tendency to distribute itself 
in correct proportions, but equally its necessary tendency— since it strives 
limitlessly for surplus labour, surplus productivity, surplus consumption, etc.— to 
drive beyond the proportion. (In competition this inner tendency of capital appears
2 8 9 “By 1895 the most important financial group on the Rand ...traded under the modest name of
H. Eckstein & Co.........but was always known as the Corner House. The company was controlled
from London, where the name of the firm was ...W ernher, Beit & Co.", (quoted in Wheatcroft, 
G., 1986, p8).
2 9 0 ibid., p196.
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as a compulsion exercised over it by alien capital, which drives it forward beyond 
the correct proportion..."291.
Albu, Goetz, etc., partly facilitated by the non-coincidence of their 
financial markets with that of the rest, represent the rise to 
prominence of the atomising tendency. The control which the Groups 
exercise over the individual mines, and the way in which the central 
organisations came to be indispensable to those mines, meant that 
the e lim ination of com petition betw een  them  for factors of 
production, represents the eventual dom inance of the unifying 
tendency. “It is found in practice that the real power is vested in the 
hands of that Group which has a sufficiently large share-holding to 
permit of its assuming control of the company. ...[The Groups were] 
.. .form ed for the purpose of financing, directing and controlling 
mining companies”.292
The gold mines remain individually listed companies in their own 
right, but each “contracts to one of the mining houses to provide 
various services to the com pany”, the most important of these  
services being finance. But these also include consulting engineers, 
technicians, research laboratories, bulk purchase, legal support and 
s e c re ta r ia l  s e rv ic e s .293 Their character as particular capital is 
constrained by their relation to the Group. As Johnstone puts it, “they 
w ere  owned by share-ho lders , and effectively controlled by the 
groups through majority share-holding”.294
The Companies, the Groups and the Shareholders
It has been argued throughout that the condition of a fixed-price  
commodity provides the incentive to set up production on a rational 
basis: elimination of uncertainty, flexible allocation of resources and 
integrated production. This is reinforced by the assurance that the 
product will be disposed of. This same point is made by Innes:
291 Marx, K. (1973), p413; Emph. orig.
2 9 2 Quoted in Johnstone, F. (1976), p15.
2 9 3 Wilson, F. (1972), pp22-3.
2 9 4 Johnstone, F. (1976), p15.
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“The specific nature of the international market for gold had contradictory 
implications for the future of the development of the industry. On the one hand, 
conditions of an unlimited market at a fixed price meant that the gold industry would 
not be hampered as others, and especially the diamond industry, had been by market 
fluctuations and restrictions: the market for gold was unlimited and therefore the 
threat of over-production did not exist, while the existence of a fixed price meant 
that capitalists could plan production on the basis of assured returns on the sale of 
the commodity’’295.
But this can only be pursued in so far as it remains compatible with 
capital. It is not that, “the specific nature of the international 
market for gold had contradictory implications for the future of the 
developm ent of the industry”, but that the contradiction which 
normally posits itself as a relation b e t w e e n  particular capitals, as 
competition, here manifests itself w ith in  particular capital. The  
device contrived by capital to try to resolve this contradiction is 
what came to be known as the Group System.
Uncertainty in the gold-mining industry obtains in three areas: (i) 
factors of production; (ii) finance; and (iii) production itself. 
Although the particular strategy in each area had to be different, they 
could, nonetheless all be addressed by the device of the Group  
System. In order for uncertainty to be eliminated, competition itself 
had to be eliminated. Note also that this is more than merely a 
question of reducing the costs, although cost-reduction can and will 
be discussed in respect of all three of these areas. Cost-reduction is, 
of itself, but a particular form of the rational a llocation of 
resources. For capital, though, their coincidence is not automatic. 
Cost-reduction and planned production will therefore be discussed  
separate ly .
Cost-Reduction
(i) Factors of Production
Here the problem was both the extraordinarily high cost of the means 
of production, and the high cost of labour-power. The early g o ld -  
mining industry had a curious overlap between the two. The high cost 
of means of production reflected the backwardness of South African 
economic conditions at the time. This same economic backwardness
2 9 5 lnnes, D. (1984), pp48-9: emph. ours.
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also accounted for the high value of white labour-pow er when  
compared, say, to the United Kingdom. This is taken up in detail 
below.
This condition did not apply to the value of black labour-power since 
(i) this was reproduced independently of the mainstream South  
African economy, and (ii) the value of black labour-power was, in any 
case, a great deal lower than that of white labour-power. But further, 
the mines did provide food and accommodation to black workers. 
These items, in company books, came under “stores”, and as such, 
formed part of the means of production.
As far as the high cost of means of production was concerned, the 
mines therefore had to address themselves to costs in the South 
African economy in general. Whatever advantage the mines might have 
gained from the relatively low value of black labour-pow er at the 
time quickly came to naught as this labour was also in extremely  
short supply. The market price of black labour, thus, ended up being 
extremely high, driven hence by competition between the mining 
companies. In respect of labour, it had to solve the problem of supply.
The Chamber of Mines served for both these purposes. The Chamber  
campaigned vigorously and endlessly to get the cost of means of 
production reduced. Its chief headaches in this a rea  were the  
dynamite monopoly and the extortionate railway rates. The Annual 
Reports of the Cham ber at the time are replete with letter after 
letter to the Governm ent pleading for an end to the dynam ite  
monopoly. So serious was the Chamber about getting the railway 
rates reduced that it repeatedly urged the state to expropriate the 
Netherlands South Africa Railway Company. W henever Commissions of 
Enquiry were appointed, the Cham ber prepared lavish studies to 
demonstrate the deleterious effect of South African costs generally  
on the conduct of its operations. The C ham ber also purchased  
materials, stores and equipment in bulk for its members, thereby  
reducing the cost.
In respect of labour the strategy was two-fold: firstly, to encourage  
labour onto the market; secondly, to discourage competition for
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labour. The first involved setting up its own recruiting organisation 
in order to by-pass the exorbitant private recruiters, and to urge the 
state to more rigorously enforce the pass law in the rural areas. The 
pass law, indeed, was introduced on the initiative of the Chamber. 
Accommodating black workers in compounds and providing them with 
food allowed for both of these to enter the worker’s consumption 
cheaper than had the mines to pay workers to buy these items 
ind iv idually .
The second part of the strategy called on all employers to agree on 
the sam e maximum wage. This was attempted several times but 
success eluded the Chamber until into the twentieth century. The  
Chamber also deprecated the practice of mines poaching properly-  
contracted labour from one another, which was so widespread on the 
Rand at the time. To this end the Chamber campaigned for and got a 
special pass system for the Witwatersrand, according to which 
workers were individually identified by a metal tag and hence, at 
least theoretically, traceable to their contracted employers.
(ii) Finance:
The surplus-value produced in jo int-s tock com panies has to be 
divided between that accruing to the ‘individual’ who initiated the 
company, and the dividends to outside shareholders. The greater the 
ratio of public shares to those of directors, etc., the greater must be 
the portion of the surplus-value leaving the company. Dividends, 
together with interest payable on bank loans, constitute the cost of 
capital to the company. The more it can draw on internal sources of 
capital, the less would be its total capital cost.
The Group system of share-ownership has done much to reduce the 
cost of capital to the gold mines, by internalising what would 
otherwise have been external sources of capital. With reference to 
Figure — , instead of the individual companies trading all their shares 
on the stock market, a portion (sufficiently large to ensure control) 
is subscribed by the Finance/Mining House. The latter then issues its 
own shares to the public alongside the company now doing so with 
those of its shares not subscribed by the Finance/Mining House. The 
Finance/Mining House may establish its own new companies in which
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case shares in these companies would first be offered internally to 
its own member companies before these are issued to the public. The 
companies themselves, therefore, also hold shares in each other.
The Finance/Mining House also came to offer loans to its associated 
c o m p a n ie s .296 One Finance/Mining House together with its associated 
companies constitute a ‘Group’. Interface with the financial markets, 
and hence the cost of capital, is thus kept to a minimum. Even though 
this d e s crib es  the ow nership  re la tionsh ips  which cam e to 
characterise the gold-m ining industry, these were less developed  
during the period considered by our thesis. Direct issues of shares to 
the public was more prevalent, or shares were issued simultaneously 
to the vendor and the public 297
Figure: 2 THE SHARE-OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE









2 9 6 Frankel, S. (1967), pp18, 21. 
2 9 7 ibid., p21.
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(iii) Production Process:
Here the principal contributor to cost was the existence of a 
disaggregated multitude of autonomous production units, the mining 
companies. Not only did this mean the duplication of costly equipment 
and services, but it also made actual production operations less 
economical than they might otherwise have been. The Groups, through 
their control of the mining companies, could and did force through 
am algam ations which reduced overall working costs. The British 
investing public always found observers ready to extol the virtues of 
scale to them. The In v e s to r 's  G u a r d ia n ,  under the heading, 
“Advantages of Am algam ation”, describes the following immediate  
benefits :
“With larger areas of mining ground larger bodies of ore can be developed, thus 
avoiding the necessity of the constant removals of the labour force from one portion 
of the mine to the other for the purposes of equalisation of yield. By the 
concentration of working underground, costs are reduced as to stoping, shovelling 
and tramming to the lowest limit consistent with efficiency. Large blocks of low 
grade ore are thus brought within the limit of profitable treatment, thereby 
prolonging the life of the mines. These amalgamations, too, warrant the erection and 
running of additional and heavier stamps, and thus enhance the profit-earning 
capacity of the properties.
...Then as to the economy which amalgamation will secure in the saving of salaries of 
various mine employes, this will always be considerable even when duplication only 
is avoided”298
The Groups have established various specialist central organisations 
which perform otherwise expensive tasks for all the associated  
companies. These specialists are engaged in a relentless pursuit of 
cheaper ways of doing things.
Towards Planned Production
(i) Factors of Production:
In order to set the procurement of the factors of production on a 
scientific basis, this has to be, firstly, centrally organised, secondly, 
of stable cost and thirdly, of stable supply. The  centralised  
organisation of buying has already been mentioned. Centralised buying 
also has the effect of stabilising demand, both in terms of its
2 9 8 lnvestor’s Guardian (1910), p13.
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volume, and in terms of its regularity. The stabilisation of costs 
proved to be a more intractable problem.
(ii) Finance:
Finance in general, as already discussed above, is notorious for its 
unreliability. This is much more so the case with mining in 
particular. Frankel describes the problem thus:
“All mining enterprises display a considerable number of economic factors which 
particularly affect the mobility of capital investment. Mining enterprises are 
usually required to comply with fiscal and legal provisions (often subject to 
unpredictable changes) which determine the right of access to the mineral deposits 
and the conditions under which they may be worked. Some of these may lead to near 
monopoly conditions. Knowledge concerning the nature of the deposits, their value, 
and the prospective returns they may yield is often very imperfect. Such knowledge 
as may exist may not always be available to investors. Investment of capital on 
mineral exploration or development may be spread over long periods before any 
return at all can be contemplated. Once so embarked capital cannot be withdrawn 
without considerable or even total loss. There may be calls for additional capital 
investment without which the original investment cannot be made productive; such 
further capital investment may not at terms be forthcoming on suitable terms, 
owing to a change in political or economic circumstances which could not have been 
foreseen"299.
But in terms of mining in general, gold-mining finance (and especially 
Witwatersrand gold-m ining finance) tends to be more stable. This 
notwithstanding, it is in finance that the real power of the Groups as 
rational allocators of resources emerge. The individual companies do 
not in any significant way interface with the financial markets at all 
(Fig. 2). As absorbers of capital they loose their stand as individuals 
for part of a larger whole, “a complex of capital-raising and risk- 
s pread ing  in s titu tio n s”.300 The Group is free to allocate Capital 
invested by the public in the Finance/Mining House wherever in the 
complex it is most needed, thereby evening out the unevennesses  
within the Group. Companies can weather production shortfalls since 
there is no direct link between the company’s performance and the 
market. Whomsoever invests in a Finance/Mining House will find his 
capital spread across a number of enterprises.
This reduces the risk to the investment and makes the investment 
more stable. On the basis of this more stable investment the Group is
2 9 9 Frankel, S. (1967), p17.
3 0 0 ibid., p18.
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better able to plan its production and make longer time-horizons. This 
became even more effective with the amalgamation of whole groups 
into larger groups, allowing one Finance/Mining House out of each of 
the new agglomerations to emerge as the ‘parent’ company. “The  
group system itself has undergone a steady process of integration, in 
as much as the number of groups has declined, their scope has become 
larger and their interrelations have become closer”.301 Thus did the 
mining companies come to be represented in the financial markets by 
fewer groups, each with vastly increased resources at its disposal. 
Rationalisation of production could thereby be that more effectively 
pursued.302
(iii) Production Process:
Amalgamation, as discussed above, was not only a cost-saving device, 
but also a rationalising one. This took the form of integrating  
production. Most of the cadastral boundaries on the Witwatersrand  
cut the Reef, causing the ore body to lie partly under one property and 
partly under another. With mines becoming increasingly deep a point 
must be reached beyond which it would simply be cheaper to dig 
horizontally underground (galleries), than to dig two shafts from the 
surface. Similarly, new mines can be planned in terms of the 
attributes of the ore body, rather than in terms of cadastral 
considerations.
To an extent these am algam ations were forced onto the mining 
companies by the revolutions in gold processing taking place in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century. Mining was no longer simply a 
hole in the ground. An increasingly large portion of the production 
operations were beginning to take place above ground, first in the 
physical pulverisation of the ore (milling), but also, and more 
importantly, in the chem ical processing of the millings. Huge  
cyanidation plants became an essential part of the production process 
after the pyretic ores were struck in 1 8 90 -1 .
301 Quoted in Innes, D. (1984), p57.
3 0 2 lnnes, D. (1984), p56.
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Figure: 3 COMPETITION AND THE GROUP SYSTEM
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Few individual mines could either afford, or had the scale of 
operations to warrant such an installation. But this, again, is not so 
straightforward, as Frankel points out:
“At any given time the life of a mine is determined by the capacity of its plant in 
relation to the total ore which can be economically mined. The size of the plant will, 
in turn, depend on the capital invested. There can be an increase in both life and 
scale of operations only if the grade is lowered”.303
Every single cheapening device, every rationalising measure, in 
whatever area of gold-mining expenditure, had a direct bearing on 
how much of the proven gold was payable. The mines were therefore 
not only concerned with the cheapening of labour costs and the 
rationalisation of the supply, they were concerned with lowering a ll  
costs and rationalising a l l  operations. It is, of course, true that 
labour-costs made up about fifty percent of total costs,304 but the 
object was to attain both lower costs and planned production, and not 
just lower labour costs. It is an error to see the Group System as 
merely a connivance against labour, as is so often the case in the 
l i te ra tu re .
Such company amalgamations also allowed a rationalisation of labour 
allocation within the new Group. Sudden increases and drops in labour 
dem ands at particular sites could be responded to by physically 
shifting gangs of workers to where they were needed, rather than by 
modifying output.
Once an expansion in the scale of operations has been embarked upon, 
it was hardly possible for the mines to avoid their evolution into a 
t ig h tly -in tegra ted , a l l -s e e in g , a ll-kno w in g , entity. Upgrading the 
scale of production involves new capital investment which in turn 
involves new variables for the investor— a new range of uncertainties. 
Frankel again:
“An increase in the scale of operations requiring new capital investment for 
additional plant, etc., really involves the creation of a new mine in place of the old. 
Any change in the expectations which have led to such capital investment creates a 
new situation— either there will have been over-investment of capital and capital
3 0 3 Frankel, S. (1967), p10. By, “if the grade is lowered", he means, “if the payability 
threshold of the grade is lowered”.
304See any W CM  or TCM Annual Report.
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losses will result, or the calculations will again have to be revised and further new 
capital investment take place, resulting in a different relation between the life, 
scale of operations and grade".305
W hat then remains is that the difference between the different 
mining companies reduces itself to the bounty bestowed on it by 
nature. They all have roughly the same technology and expertise and 
capital available to extract their gold. Of course, unevenness must 
exist since, i.a., some mines are older than others, or the physical 
conditions within the mines do not always allow for the application 
of the same technology. All competition between them is, for all 
intents and purposes, eliminated. What matters between them is their 
respective contributions to the Group. What matters to the financial 
markets, is the production of the Group as a whole. In the financial 
markets, and, indeed, in the labour and equipment and stores, etc., 
markets the Groups, at this level an oligopoly, compete against all 
outs ide  the industry. The competition and atomisation which would 
have existed at the level of the individual gold-mining companies is 
transferred to that of the Groups together, while the rationality and 
balancing of needs with resources of the financial markets, i.e., of 
social capital, is extended to the individual companies.
But the mining com panies were never w holly -ow ned subsidiaries 
either, for the finance houses themselves needed to maintain their 
position as intermediaries between the financial markets and the 
mining companies themselves, which is how they claim their share of 
the total surplus-value. The example of Corner House illustrates the 
general principle:
“Each mine was floated as a joint-stock company with its own directors and its own 
manager. The Corner House kept control through share ownership but more 
importantly by dominating the board of directors. These mining companies were 
never what would later be called wholly-owned subsidiaries. That, indeed, would 
defeat the whole object of the exercise which was to raise capital by flotation, by the 
sale of vendor’s interest, in some cases by ‘booming’ the stock".306
The Group System of organisation is gold-mining capital’s way of 
keeping one step ahead of its investors, but by the same token, it 
keeps ahead of its own inner nature as capital.
3 0 5 Frankel, S. (1936), p552.
3 0 6 Wheatcroft, G. (1986), p133.
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Competition for Factors of Production
From the fact that the price of gold on the world market had, during 
the period under review, been fixed, most of the literature on the 
political economy of South African gold-mining deduce nothing more 
than that high production costs could not be passed on to the 
consumer and hence, somehow, had to be reduced. The conditions of 
W itw atersrand mining allowed very few options for achieving this 
and the only real opening for cost-reduction lay in the cost of labour. 
Hence the need for an extra-cheap labour supply. Some take this a bit 
further by saying that labour costs could be reduced in one of a 
number of ways: either by making the supply so large that it bids 
itself down; by reducing the demand to a single buyer thus able to 
dictate the price; or by rapidly developing the productivity of labour 
through a massive mechanisation programme. Of those writers who 
get this far, most argue that the first two were implemented and the 
third not. The point here is that most writers ascribe some kind of 
special significance to the fact that gold could only be disposed of at 
a fixed price, but usually that significance is taken to extend no 
further than the need for a cheap labour force.
G o ld -m in in g  capital, with the exchange value of its commodity  
constant, would want the value of its c , too, to be constant. It 
therefore puts in place an industry planned down to the worker’s 
butcher’s account. The need or constancy in wage costs is obscured by 
a number of other constraints. The first was the high m a r k e t  pr ice  of 
black labour against its value and the high v a lu e  of white labour. 
Black wages had to be reduced to be more consistent with its value 
and the value of white labour had to be reduced in order that white 
wages, too, could be reduced. This important problematic is obscured 
in the literature by the excessive concentration on wage struggles 
and strikes in the industry at the expense of examining the question 
of value.
The mining industry did not entirely have its way with white labour, 
but it did with black labour, reflecting the different relationships 
which capital had with the two components of its labour force. For a
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whole host of reasons which lie partly outs ide  of the capital-labour  
relation, the cost of white labour could not be kept constant. With 
black labour, though, the Chamber had great success. Indeed, black 
mine wages did not only draw comment for their extremely low level, 
but also for their c o n s ta n c y .  This is confirmed by different writers. 
Hence, e.g., Katzen:
“Besides being low, the wages of African miners are extremely stable. ‘Nothing has 
changed so little in South Africa as the black man's rate of pay’. Nowhere is this 
more true than in the gold mining industry. African miners' wages display almost no 
cyclical sensitivity at all"3 0 7 ,
or Wilson, “during the first eighty years of their [the gold mines’] 
existence the real wages of black miners did not increase at all; 
indeed, over the period 1889 to 1969, they seem actually to have 
fa l le n ’’ .308
Keeping the value of labour-pow er c o n s t a n t  is quite a different 
matter to that of keeping the value of labour-power low. The first has 
to do with proportional production; the second with surplus-value  
extraction. Th ese  contradictory tendencies  are present in all 
productive capital, but it is the competitive market which constantly 
shifts capital’s attention from one to the other, as the imbalance  
becomes clear to it from its failure to effectively compete. Where  
the product is not disposed of through competition, both of these 
tendencies come to fall within the conscious domain of capital.
The Chamber of Mines, as collective representative of gold-mining  
capital, did not escape these contradictory tendencies now existing 
s id e -b y -s id e  within all of its members. Indeed, the contradiction 
became explicit in the Chamber in that its members came to express 
the drive for surplus-value, hence the threat of competition, while 
the Cham ber itself cam e to express the drive for proportional 
production. Although the Chamber of Mines was established as early 
as 1889, it can be seen from the following description of its brief 
that opportunities for disunity were many:
3 0 7 Katzen, L. (1964), p22.
3 0 8 Wilson, F. (1972), p141.
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“Since its formation in 1889 the Chamber has been mainly engaged in endeavouring 
to secure the mines relief from the heavy burdens imposed on them. The cost of 
living, and hence the rate of wages of the white employees, has been rendered unduly 
high by the duties on the necessaries of life and on all articles of ordinary 
requirement, while heavy railway tariffs and the dynamite monopoly, and the 
difficulty of obtaining an adequate supply of native labour at reasonable pay, have 
militated against the profitable working and development of the industry as a 
w hole”309 .
Most of the competition, in fact, occurred in the area of wages. This 
led not only to the frequent breaking of ranks by members after every 
agreement for uniform wages, but the eventual imposition of a pass 
law to deter members from encouraging each others’ labourers to 
‘desert’. Contrary to the view often expressed in the literature, the 
pass law in early gold-mining had as much to do with controlling 
capital, as it had to do with controlling labour. The Chamber collected 
e x trem ely  de ta iled  b reakd o w n s  of every  c o m p a n y ’s labour  
requirem ents  and utilisation on a m o n th -b y -m o n th  basis. It 
approached governments, not only in southern Africa, but as far afield 
as Hungary and Japan, with proposals for labour importation.
By setting up its central recruiting organisation, the Witwatersrand  
Native Labour Association, the Cham ber took the task of recruiting 
out of the hands of the individual companies. It thereby assumed  
centralised control over the actual p ro letarian isation  process  
(although it was reluctant to do so and tried throughout to get the 
state to assume this task). The point, though, is that the actual 
proletarianisation process was then set on a scientific basis. The  
drive towards rational production drove capital all the way to 
creating its own labour force to its own specifications. Or, to use 
modern informal parlance, the black mine work-force was a ‘designer 
w ork-force’. The mines clearly showed that abstract labour was not 
in the interests of the mining industry. Its labour-allocation system 
approaches that of planning. But it was planning within the confines 
of capital: it was bound to be contradictory.
3 0 9 Industrial Commission of Enquiry (1897), Report, p iii. On occasion the Chamber was split 
into two rival associations, later again to reunite.
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Competition for Finance
It is clear from the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines Annual Reports 
(W C M ), that the question of dividends and the m ines’ difficulty in 
paying them did not weigh lightly on m anagem ents ’ minds.310 The  
mines, of course, had all the normal problems of jo in t-s tock  
companies: competition for shares; size of dividends; proportion of 
preference to ordinary shares; pressure from the securities markets 
(currency markets as such did not yet exist, although gold and 
currency speculation was already a problem for capital by 1873)311; 
the balancing of internally-financed expansion with, on the one hand, 
the magnitude/regularity of dividends, and with, on the other hand, 
new issues; etc.
The Witwatersrand gold mines had two advantages over ordinary 
joint-stock companies: (i) they dealt in a product for which there was 
always a demand, and although the price was fixed, i.e., it could not 
be raised, it could also not be lowered. The security of v a lu e - fo r -  
itself is thereby extended into fictitious capital riding on its back. 
Serious shareholders would be inclined to exercise greater patience 
with g o ld -m in in g  com panies  than with others; and (ii) the
31 0 W CM  (1889) to W CM (1899). E.g., “...Sooner than pay thousands of pounds in wages, and be 
unable to make a return to our shareholders, we will close down the mines", Evidence of George 
Albu, mine owner, to the Commission, ICE (1897), p14. The Report of the Industrial Commission 
of Enquiry into the Gold-mining Industry (otherwise known as the Burger Report) of 1897 is a 
remarkable document. It was commissioned by the ZAR Government to report on the then 
depression in the gold-mining industry and was published by the Cham ber of Mines. It provides 
meticulous details of every aspect of Witwatersrand gold mining at the time, including a detailed 
comparison with gold-mining around the world. W e could find the Report mentioned only half a 
dozen times in the literature. That this critical document remains virtually unknown, and where 
known so little-explored, is one of the most remarkable things about it. W C M  and TCM  refer to 
the Annual Reports of the Witwatersrand Cham ber of Mines and the later-renam ed Transvaal 
Chamber of Mines.
311 Speculation, as a capitalist’s principal activity, was at this stage still strongly distasteful to 
‘respectable’ international bankers, who, during the difficult year of 1873, watched the 
movement of the gold premium with some trepidation. See, e.g., the correspondence of August 
Belmont and Company of New York to N. M. Rothschild and Sons of London (virtually all letters of 
1873, but especially between 2 January 1873 and 27 March 1873). See Rothschild, Doc. 
XI/62/23A. The monetary panic of 1873 was at its height between early Septem ber and early 
October. During the panic the free market price of gold consistently declined in New York. In 
other words, gold was not called upon to play its role as money as it was already capital and, at 
that juncture, less lucrative than other forms of capital. Investments flowed into Greenbacks, 
banks special loans, etc.
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Witwatersrand gold-mining companies made a dramatic entry onto 
the London Stock Exchange in the midst of the huge number of 
flotations in 1 8 9 5 -6 ,312 of which an extraordinarily large number 
were mining companies.313 A cursory glance through the list of newly 
registered mining companies shows the overwhelming number of 
them to have been gold-mining companies, and of these, by far the 
larger number to be located on the Witwatersrand.314
This helped to ensure for the mines a collective reputation which 
tended to obscure the performance of the individual mining company. 
This was further reinforced from 1887 with the appearance in the 
City of London of the mining finance houses promoting their 
‘m em bers’ in the financial markets. “The first financial house was 
formed in 1887, to bring the Rand goldfields before the British 
p u b lic ”.315 Subsequently, even if the stock market was generally  
depressed, a good word could always be found for ‘Kaffirs’, as 
Witwatersrand gold shares were affectionately referred to:
"Since the passing of the deep depression which was for so many years the chief 
characteristic of the Kaffir market there have been many bright intervals but these 
have been no[t long] ...lasting. ...These varying moods of the market... do not at all 
reflect the nature of the management of the mines there. If it had been otherwise, I 
should have seen the control at Johannesburg listless and careless at one time and 
energetic and painstaking at another, whereas I have invariably found those in 
authority ever on the alert to procure the utmost production from their great 
undertakings at the lowest cost".316
Gold-mining shares in general and ‘Kaffirs’ in particular tended to be 
more secure than they otherwise might have been. This does not mean 
that they were immune to the general vicissitudes of the stock 
market. Indeed, the Rand had its shares of disastrous speculative 
ventures, and paid dearly for them. According to one account, The 
Coronation Syndicate, “was a speculative venture. The collapse of the 
Syndicate, shares in which were ‘boom ed’ in Europe, did much to
3 1 2 “Moreover, 1896 is entered upon with such large stores of capital seeking employment that 
no improvement in the money market is yet in sight", this lack of improvement “in the money 
market” refering to the relatively depressed years of 1894-5. See Preface to the London Stock 
Exchange Yearbook, 1896.
3 1 3 “As regards the expansion of both 1894 and 1895, it is noticeable that the majority of the 
companies have been for the purpose of acquiring and working mining properties”, Ibid.
31 4 See London Stock Exchange Yearbooks, 1896, 1897 and 1898.
3 1 5 Wilson, F. (1972), p23.
31 in v e s to r ’s Guardian. (1910), p5.
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discredit Rand mining shares generally”.317 Neither does it mean that 
gold-mining shares could not collapse, as, indeed, they did in 1889 
and 1895 ,318 and again in 1902 319 It is merely being suggested that 
investors would tend to persevere longer with gold-m ining shares 
than they would with other shares, and that gold-mining shares would 
enjoy some cushioning in bad times from the abandonment of non­
gold-mining shares for gold-mining shares. The problem of dividend 
payments could therefore have been a lot worse for the mines than 
was actually the case.
H ow ever, am ongst them selves the individual had no particular  
advantage one over the other in the eyes of the shareholder. Most 
shareholders were not serious holders and did not have the time to 
concern themselves with the mechanics of gold-mining, so that the 
sound reasons for a delay in payment tended to be irrelevant.320 
Pressure was therefore on the ind iv idual  mining companies to pay 
quickly and pay well as share capital was less likely to redistribute 
itself amongst the companies than it was to leave the Witwatersrand 
altogether. The description of the mining com panies competing  
amongst themselves for their share of the ‘Kaffirs’ is therefore a 
doubly apt one.
The Technical Contest with Nature
In most of the literature on South African gold-mining the assertion 
is made that gold-mining is a backward sector unable to mechanise or 
take advantage of scientific or technical developments in general. For 
some, this would be on account of financial constraints while for 
others it would be because Marx said so. To those who have actually 
studied the gold-mining industry empirically the exact opposite is 
clearly the case.
3 1 7 Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. (1977), p137n27.
3 1 8 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (1979), p51.
31 ^Richardson, P. (1977), p88.
3 2 0 “lt may be said that three-quarters of all transactions in mining shares come under the 
heading of gambling, pure and simple. The average gambler in mines cares nothing for the 
intrinsic value of a property; he does not study its past history, he does not intend to hold the 
shares for dividends— in fact, he wants to know nothing about the mine. All he aks for is a large 
profit on his speculation in a minimum p e r i o d . C u r i e ,  J. (1902), p337.
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The fixed price of the product on the market is not the only 
constraint that gold-mining capital has to contend with. There are 
constraints of a more technical kind, the most important of which is 
the grade of the ore, i.e., the quantity of gold per unit weight of ore. 
The cost of production of a gram me of gold is clearly seriously 
affected by whether that gramme was retrieved from one or two 
tonnes of ore. In the latter case it would not only cost more to
retrieve it, but also take longer to do so. While both of these are 
critical, the literature discusses only the implications of cost but 
not that of time.
To deal with costs first: one gramme or even half a gramme per ton 
can make a difference as to whether a particular ore body can be 
profitably mined or not, i.e., whether it is payable. So much so that 
the term “payability” has become part of the gold-m ining lexicon, 
warranting whole studies on the subject.321 N on-payab ility  means
that the ore remains in the ground. It is therefore in the interest of 
gold-mining capital, firstly, to be able to know beforehand whether a 
particular ore body is payable, and if so, the extent of that payability. 
The higher the payability, the smaller can be the mass of the ore body 
which will yield the minimum quantity of gold which will pay for its 
own extraction. This can make the difference between whether a mine 
is developed or not. The mines have therefore made every effort to 
develop and apply the geo-sciences (geology, geo-chemistry and geo­
physics— especially the latter, for its remote-sensing capabilities).
Secondly, payability is not synonymous with grade. Grade indicates 
the quantity of gold p r e s e n t  in the ore, while payability states the 
quantity of gold re tr ievab le  from the ore. This is not the same thing. 
E.g., there might be quite a lot of gold in a particular body of ore, but 
the ore is of such a nature that it will either not yield the gold at all, 
or only yield it at prohibitive expense. In this case a process has to
be found, together with the necessary plant and equipment, which
will not only force the gold from the ore, but do so at a cost which
321 This may be exemplified by the title of a 1937 book by J. Gray on the Wits fields: P a y a b le  
Gold: An Intimate Record of the History of the Discovery of the Payable Witwatersrand Gold 
Fields and of Johannesburg in 1886 and 1887; Johannesburg.
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will still deliver the gold beneath the fixed market price. One  
situation like this, which almost brought the mining industry to its 
knees, was the encounter of pyretic ore in 1890. The invention of the 
MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process did not come a moment too soon 
and was adopted with great urgency by the industry.
The situation confronting competitive capital is that when the cost 
of producing the product is too high, it will not sell.  In the case of 
non-com petitive capital, the product will simply not be p r o d u c e d .  
Mines which do not produce do not pay dividends. Mines which do not 
pay dividends loose their capital. The pressure is therefore on every 
mine manager to bring every gramme of gold under his property 
within payability. For this reason he will pursue every technical 
device and every development in technique which promises to do this. 
One of the most striking features of Rand gold-mining right from the 
start, and attested to by many, is the enthusiasm with which the 
mines introduced new machinery. Hence, e.g.,:
"it can be said that in no other mining region has money been spent more lavishly 
on labour-saving devices than on the Rand. Many new forms of machinery for this 
purpose have been invented and developed here, and any new methods which have 
been invented abroad are not long allowed to remain untried in these fields"322,
and,
"The severe competition which have now been proceeding for many months in the 
mines of the various Witwatersrand companies, cannot fail to prove of marked 
advantage to the industry in bringing well to the front those machines which will 
thus have convincingly demonstrated their superiority over their rivals”323.
The mines also, through their organisation the Cham ber of Mines, 
right from inception followed patent applications very closely, not 
hesitating to challenge those which threaten to lumber them with 
royalty charges for processes already used by them.324 This does not 
mean that the mines sought to restrain innovation in general, quite 
the contrary. They were simply operating on extremely narrow cost 
margins.
3 2 2 Quoted in Richardson, P. and Van Helten, J.-J. (1982), p84, and referring to the turn of the 
century.
3 2 3 lnvestor’s Guardian (1910), p10.
3 2 4 See especially W CMs for the 1890s.
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The time constraint derives from two imperatives: one technical; the 
other financial. Mines have to take a decision as early on in the 
planning/development process on which ore bodies or sections of ore 
bodies are worth exploiting and which are not. The fundamental 
consideration, of course, is the grade of the ore, i.e., how much gold 
is actually present in it. The next question is then whether that ore 
can be profitably extracted. On the basis of this, such decisions are 
made as to where to sink the shaft, how many cross cuts to make and 
at which levels to make them, etc. Such developments are costly in 
themselves and often unalterable once carried through. If it then 
turns out that the ore is not as payable as anticipated on the surface, 
it must be left in place until technique allows for its payable  
extraction but the capital invested would then be idle. If technique  
develops to such an extent as to bring an ore body judged unpayable 
and by-passed by the superstructure into payability, such an ore body 
could be out of reach forever. It is therefore critical to the mines to 
know of new techniques and innovations as soon as they are  
announced, and to implement them as quickly as possible.
The second consideration of time is financial. A mine spending years 
digging its way past non-payable ore in order to reach payable ore is 
unable to pay dividends to its shareholders, who are all the time 
aware of neighbouring mines on the same listings which do pay 
dividends. In gold-mining, unlike in industries competing through the 
price of their products, backward technique cannot be concealed and 
protected behind price manipulation. The item is either produced or it 
is not produced.
Conclusion
What, then, remains of competition amongst mining capital? The  
mines do not compete for labour: this is provided to all the mines at a 
fixed cost. They do not outdo each other in labour-productivity, or in 
their ability to extract the gold from nature, since they pool 
technique and engineering services and constantly inform each other 
of more efficient methods of extraction. Competition such as there is
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in the financial markets is reduced to a minimum since the Rand 
attracts capital as a collectivity. Once the gold appears on the 
market, it is all of the sam e quality. The difference in their 
individual claims to their share of the profits, thus, reduces itself to 
the quantity  of gold which each has managed to produce. From each 
according to his product, to each according to his product.
Regardless of whether or not consciously motivated, the m u ch -  
remarked-on co-operation and sharing which characterises Rand go ld-  
mining must not only have helped to promote the conception of the 
Rand as a collectivity in the financial markets while blurring the
individuals, but also, and more importantly for this study, have had a 
dam pening effect on the competition for capital am ongst the
companies. But in addition to this, such co-operation and sharing was 
consciously motivated.
The whole thrust of the industry’s efforts during this period has been 
directed at the elimination of competition between its members,
which had the effect of enhancing the Rand gold mines as a
singularity in competition with all others in the financial markets.
It is not appreciated by scholarship that gold has a social role quite 
distinct from its role as an ordinary commodity. Of the works 
consulted, only Williams and Trewhela start from the particular
social role of gold. Both these scholars are taken up for critique
elsewhere in this dissertation. In his book, The Politics of R ac e , 
Hillel Ticktin denies any special role for gold as money-commodity in 
explaining South Africa, but nevertheless admits that “the main 
export of South Africa is gold” and that “it is the money-commodity  
itself”325. In saying that “South Africa cannot ...be explained only 
through the peculiarities of the money-commodity”, he does, though,
imply some role. It remains for Ticktin to show, or at least suggest,
just what this role might be and how it related to the remainder of 
the explanation of South Africa. But he does not say why this is so 
and offers no critique of those theses which argue the contrary. 
Ticktin does begin to suggest the direction of his thinking when he
3 2 5 Ticktin, H. (1991),  pp78-9.
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says that, “gold has ...been countercyclical and helped to stabilise the 
class which held the gold mines”. The “class which held the gold 
mines” happens to be the most powerful class in South Africa. 
Ticktin does not say whether the counter-cyclical character of gold 
derives from its role as money-com modity or from something else. 
Even if one saw the peculiarities of the m oney-com m o dity  in 
explaining South Africa as m erely subordinate to som e more 
fundamental explanation, then the nature of that subordination needs 
to be laid bare. A real political economy of gold still remains to be 
developed. The present essay, we hope, might contribute to such a 
theory.
G o ld-m in ing capital extracts surp lus-va lue  from labo ur-pow er in 
exactly the same way as do all other capitals. The profits, however, 
are not distributed by capturing surplus-value from each other at the 
point of sale of the product in the market, for they pay the same 
wages, employ the same technology, have, broadly speaking, the same 
productivity of labour and they all sell the product at the same price. 
The gold mines, in the period under investigation, paid a portion of 
the surplus-value out as dividends, and the remainder ended up 
divided amongst themselves according to the share of each in the 
total product.
Competition between them therefore took a form more akin to 
emulation, with each trying to extract more from nature than the 
other. The extent to which they could scientifically pursue this was 
constrained only by their relation to their shareholders. All other 
constraints they have continually striven to overcome, all chance and 
uncertainty they have sought to abolish, impelled by the lack of 
competition to dispose of the product. The picture which emerges is 
somewhat different to that offered by some authors, of the Randlords 
as uncontrollable gamblers, whose striving for unity was motivated 
by caprice:
"The behaviour of generations of miners, speculators and hoarders testifies to the 
peculiar fascination of gold, to which the flint-eyed captains of Rand finance were 
far from immune. The same individuals who might cheerfully have left tons of, say, 
uneconomic copper in a mine dedicated themselves on the Rand to the single minded 
pursuit of the last possible pennyweight of gold. Thus was the propensity to gamble 
intensified. Nevertheless, the mine owners sought to hedge their bets and so to
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protect themselves from the various uncertainties to which they were vulnerable.
The group system of control was one device for accomplishing this"326
Johnstone is correct when he says that there was no need for 
monopoly on the W itw atersrand. He further says that, “w hat  
developed in the gold-mining industry was an oligopolist but highly 
centralised structure of ownership and control”.327 One might also go 
so far as to say that this is the most scientific production attainable 
within the confines of capital. This is, however, quite different from 
describing the Group System as “a modern structure of capitalist 
enterpr ise”, as does Johnstone .328 If this were so then modern 
capitalism has had plenty of time to replicate it elsewhere. But this 
has not happened. W e  would argue that it is the most modern 
structure attainable for a capitalist enterprise, but only p r o v i d e d  
that it is a gold-producing enterprise, for this structure follows from 
conditions only applicable to gold-production.
3 2 6 Jeeves, A. (1985), p7.
32 7 Johnstone, F. (1976), p 14.
3 2 8 /'b/'d., p16.
188.
Chapter Seven
The Black Gold-Mining Work-Force and the ‘Fixed
Gold Price’
Introduction
The landscape of South African economic history is characterised by 
many extremely complex interrelationships. Ultimately, the situation 
reduces itself to the relationship between capital and labour, and 
most scholars accept this. However, the particular expression of this 
relationship in South Africa, as in any other particular situation, can 
only be grasped in its particularity by an “appropriation of the 
material in detail”, to use M arx ’s phrase. The complexity of this 
relationship, particularly as regards the black gold-m ining work­
force, is reflected in South African scholarship by the variety of 
positions defended, rather than by the depth and richness of 
explanation offered.
One of the questions which remains far from resolved is that of the 
genesis and nature of the South African proletariat. There is no 
argument that the South African working class is not the same kind 
of unitary entity as, say, the British working class. There  is, 
however, debate about whether it is one working class split in two, 
or two distinct working classes and whether the great divide lies 
between migrant and settled workers, black and white workers, 
skilled and unskilled workers, or gold-mining workers and the rest. 
The black w o rk -fo rce  on the gold mines have been variously 
characterised: at the one extrem e, by Paul Trew hela, as “the 
proletariat [which] could not be a stranger to the notion of civil war,
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and revolut ion",329 to the other by the Unity Movement, who “did not 
consider the mining proletariat a genuine part of the working 
class”.330 Whatever the view, the black gold-mining work-force tends 
to be singled out from the rest. Most scholars seek to explain the 
peculiarities of the gold-m ining w ork-force by the upheavals and 
transformations which swept southern Africa in the wake of the 
opening-up of the diamond and gold fields, especially the latter.
Although the present essay is not concerned with seeking answers to 
all these  questions, it does offer a re a s se ssm en t of the  
proletarianisation process which followed in the wake of the great 
mineral discoveries and suggests an alternative explanation for the 
peculiarities of the black labour-force of the gold-mining industry. 
Here we are particularly interested in the level of wages, the 
oppressive form of housing, and the control on movement with which 
that work-force came to be associated. W e will attempt to show that 
these peculiarities flow from the m a n n e r  in which that black work­
force was created. This manner reflects three projects on the part of 
capital: (i) to reduce the market price of black labour-power; (ii) to 
ascertain the value of black labour-power; and (iii) to control the 
value of black labour-power. W e will address the creation of the 
black mine w ork-force out of the economies existing in southern 
Africa at the time, and the forces working against such creation. The  
proposition is that, during the period when gold-mining was the only 
significant industry in the country, the developm ent of the social 
homogenisation of labour was foreclosed by the particular manner in 
which the black population was proletarianised. The question of 
abstract labour, as conceived by a number of prominent theorists, 
will be examined.
This examination covers (more or less) the period from the land 
dispossessions around the diamond diggings to the establishment of 
closed compounds for black mine workers on the Witwatersrand, i.e., 
c.18 7 5 - C .1 9 0 7 .  The notion that the migrant workers in general and 
mine workers in particular have “access to the means of production” 
in the reserves has been an albatross around the necks of all
3 2 0 Trewhela, P. (1986a), p19.
3 3 0 According to Ticktin. H. (1991), p11.
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sociology-based analyses (but not only these). An exploration of the 
relationship which evolved between the reserves and capital after 
the Land Acts of 1913, 1927 and 1936 falls beyond the scope of our 
investigation. W e confine ourselves only to the establishment of a 
work-force adequate to the production of gold under the conditions 
flowing out of the changeover from placers to lodes. The whole 
question of the relationship between the go ld -m in ing  industry, 
manufacturing and agriculture will, therefore, not be addressed here.
‘Abstract Labour’ and South African Scholarship
In the literature examining the peculiarities of the black work-force  
on the South African gold mines, we could find only three studies in 
which the category of abstract labour serves as an explanatory  
device. These are an article by Michael Williams, South African  
Capitalism— Neo-Ricard ian ism  or M a rx ism ?;331 a manuscript forming 
part of the unpublished doctoral thesis of Paul Trewhela entitled The  
Problem of Subject in the Modern World: The Role of the Proletariat 
of Southern Africa',332 and Hillel Ticktin’s book The Politics of  
R a c e  333 Trewhela draws on Williams and the latter, in turn, bases 
himself on the first two chapters of Karl Marx’s C a p i ta l , Volume I.334 
Both W illiam s and T re w h e la  a rgue  that g o ld -m in in g  labour  
constitutes abstract labour in view of the social character of gold as 
the money commodity. Ticktin, on the other hand, sees abstract labour 
as that condition of labour which renders it ideal for industrial 
capitalism, viz., generalised fluidity and homogeneity. W e shall 
discuss the W ill iam s-T rew h e la  conception first, then proceed to 
Tick tin .
Central to Williams’ conception is the idea that the homogeneity of 
the material gold approximates the homogeneity of abstract labour 
more adequately than that of any other substance. He then makes the
331 Williams, M. (1975).
3 3 2 lrew h e la , P. (1986a).
3 3 3 Ticktin, H. (1991).
3 3 4 Marx, K. (1983).
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subtle point that, “in this way, g o l d - d i g g i n g , a specific form of 
concrete labour, becomes the m e d i u m  of expressing its opposite, 
human labour in the abstract”. Since gold serves for the expression of 
the values of all commodities, proceeds Williams, “gold, as it comes 
out of the South African mines, ‘is forthwith the direct incarnation 
of all human labour’”.335
Trewhela picks up from here, arguing that the c o n c r e t e  labour of 
gold-digging is abstract labour, and as such, it is all other labour. A 
number of categories are here conflated. The first is that simple 
labour is conflated with abstract labour. Trew hela  talks of the, 
“appropriation of abstract, homogeneous, simple human labour in the 
form of go ld -d igg ing”. It is not our intention here to open an 
extensive discussion of the two-fold character of labour, merely to 
examine it to the extent that it has a bearing on gold-mining labour in 
p a rt ic u la r .336
The term abstract labour is not without its difficulties. Firstly, 
abstract labour  needs to be distinguished from human labour in the 
abstract.  The former is an aspect of the character of labour when its 
concreteness can only become social through a mediation. Labour 
assumes the character of abstract labour only under particular 
conditions, viz., that of generalised commodity production and, in 
particular, wage-labour. Human labour in the abstract, as opposed to 
abstract labour, refers simply to the total quantum of social labour, 
abstracted from its aggregated specificities, which an economy, any 
economy, has at its disposal for allocation to its various necessary 
productive tasks. Hence, wherever there is human labour, there will 
be human labour in the abstract, but not necessarily abstract 
labour.337
Labour brought to activity by capital has a two-fold character: (i) it 
is, like all labour in every form of economy, c o n c re te  labour. That is
3 3 5 Williams, M. (1975), p7. Emph. orig. The words between single parentheses are those of 
Marx quoted by Williams.
3 3 6 For a discussion of the two-fold character of labour, see Marx, K. (1983), pp48-53, but 
also the examination in McMahon, C. (1991), Ch. 3.
3 3 7 For a discussion of these questions, see Marx, K. (1977b), Ch. 1.
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to say, it is a physical338 activity involving a distinct series of 
physical actions which can, on the basis of informed anticipation or 
past experience, be expected to result in a specific product the 
material character of which results from that specific labour and no 
other.
Concrete labour can be either complex or simple. Concrete labour is 
labour as it is performed by the individual. It is therefore also 
private labour. Complex labour expresses the concentration within 
the individual of a great deal of skill, and conjointly, the lack of such 
skill in machines, i.e., socially. This was a feature of labour during 
the early part of capitalism and, indeed, in more primitive modes of 
production. Simple labour indicates the lack of such skill in the 
individual, but not necessarily, however, its social lack. At the dawn 
of civilisation such social lack would be the case.
In modern society skill is socially at the sam e tim e both 
concentrated and diffused in machines. Concentrated because it can 
be executed more efficiently through machines, and diffused because 
the number of individuals in society capable of executing this skill is 
greatly increased— the individual being required to dispose only over 
labour sufficiently simple to enable his operation of the machine.339 
The complex labour-sim ple labour polarity is therefore a private 
labour-socia l labour polarity. This, however, talks only of the 
technical  nature of labour and says nothing yet of its social form.
(ii) Regardless of how simple or complex concrete labour might be, it 
would have to be engaged under particular social conditions in order 
for it to assume the character of abstract labour. C o m m o d ity -  
producing labour is rendered social through the act of exchange.
3 3 8 This is taken in the broad sense which includes mental activity.
3 3 9 “As soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive 
sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a 
fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his 
means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow: to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise 
after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or 
critic", MECW, Vol. 5, p47.
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Exchange lends it the capacity to convert itself from one particular 
concrete labour to any other particular concrete labour. Labour 
exercised under these conditions is, in addition to its specific 
concrete character, also abstract labour. Without its exchange it 
remains merely potential social labour. It is therefore exercised with 
this intention. When such intention is generalised across an economy, 
then all labour is exercised for its abstractness, rather than its 
concreteness. The aim of w age-labour is to objectify itself in a form 
which encapsulates that abstractness.
From the side of labour, wage-labour is labour for money. From the 
side of capital, wage-labour is continuously driven beyond the bounds 
of its own particularity. Concrete labour becomes increasingly simple 
and in its simplicity increasingly comes to approxim ate abstract 
labour. With the development of industrial production, skill loses its 
particularity (both in its specificity and in its concentration in the 
particular individual) to become generalised social skills applicable 
to all production. This merely expresses the process by which 
concrete labour comes increasingly to approximate abstract labour. 
Industrial production itself propels concrete labour in this way. This 
is Ticktin’s point, viz., "the social reduction of labour to a common
f o r m ”.340
The increasing homogenisation of concrete  labour does not, however, 
render concrete labour abstract.  If concrete labours were to become 
so hom ogenised that one unit of concrete  labour becom es  
indistinguishable from another unit of concrete labour, such concrete 
labour will not have attained a condition of abstract labour. Rather, 
abstract labour will have been sublated, and concrete labour would 
come to express, directly, human labour in the abstract.
Williams makes the observation that, “the reason why gold has come 
to serve as the money material is because its n a t u r a l  substance  
approximates more closely than any other commodity to the s o c ia l  
content of com m odities, to wit, abstract, undifferentiated and 
therefore equal human labour”.341 It is true that this social form of
3 4 0 Ticktin, H. (1991), p5.
341 Williams, M. (1975), p9. Emph. orig.
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production, which, like all production, must apportion its total social 
la b o u r-t im e , its hum an labour in the abstract,  to its various 
necessary production tasks. In a form of economy where all concrete 
labours assume the character of abstract labour, such human labour 
in the abstract must first exist as abstract labour in order to be so 
apportioned.
Since the measure of human labour in the abstract is labour-time, 
labour-time is the measure of all labour. The unit of measure is a 
fixed time during which labour of the minimum skill valid as labour 
is exercised. Abstract labour, however, being a particular form of 
labour mediated through exchange,  already announces that the unit of 
labour-time requires a bearer to reliably transfer m easurem ent from 
one concrete em bodiment into another. It requires a medium of 
circulation. Commodity economy itself sets aside a portion of its 
human labour in the abstract for the purpose of producing this bearer. 
Such production is part of its necessary labour tasks.
For such bearer, such circulating medium, to have any bearing 
capacity, it must, like the commodities between which it mediates, 
be a product of human labour and reducible to its unit, x labour-tim e. 
But it is concrete labour which is so reducible and as such, it shares 
the two-fo ld character of all commodity-producing labour: that of 
being at the same time concrete labour and abstract labour. The 
product of this concrete labour, the material gold, is as homogeneous, 
divisible and re-unitable  as the labour which produced it is in its 
character as abstract labour . This concrete labour becom es the 
medium for expressing not only its own character as abstract labour, 
but, since abstract labour is “undifferentiated and therefore equal 
human labour”, for expressing all  abstract labour. The product of such 
concrete labour is called, according to its concrete character, gold; 
according to its abstract character, money. Human labour in the 
abstract, i.e., the total body of available social labour, is, in 
commodity economy, thus allocated in the units in which abstract 
labour is allocated, viz., in units of money, unit weights of gold.
When Williams, then, says that, “g o l d - d i g g i n g ,  a specific form of 
concrete labour, becomes the m e d iu m  for expressing its opposite,
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human labour in the abstract”,342 he is saying a number of things, 
some of which are correct and some of which are not. Gold-digging, of 
course, is a form of concrete labour. This labour is also a medium, 
and that medium does express the opposite of concrete labour. But the
opposite of concrete labour is not “human labour in the abstract”, but
rather, abstract labour.343 It is such a medium only under conditions 
of exchange, and ceases to be so outside of exchange. Since human 
labour in . the abstract requires, under conditions of commodity  
economy, to be expressed as abstract labour, this concrete labour 
b e c o m e s  the medium for expressing abstract labour. W illiam s’ 
deduction is based on the following passage by Marx:
“The body of the commodity that serves as the equivalent, figures as the
materialisation of human labour in the abstract, and is at the same time the product
of some specifically useful concrete labour. This concrete labour becomes, 
therefore, the medium for expressing abstract human labour’’.344
When Marx makes a distinction in this passage, between “human 
labour in the abstract” and “abstract human labour”, he is actually 
talking about two different things, and not merely being editorial 
with himself, as Williams apparently thinks. Williams uses “human 
labour in the abstract” where Marx uses “abstract human labour”, 
thereby conflating what Marx keeps clearly separate.
Williams then argues further that, “gold, as it comes out of the South 
African mines ‘is forthwith the direct incarnation of all human 
labour’”.345 It must already follow from the argument advanced above 
that gold is the in d irec t  incarnation of all human labour. It is true, 
though, that it a p p e a r s  to be the direct incarnation of all human 
labour. But this appearance is none other than a moment of the very 
appearance according to which the social relation between the 
products of concrete labours presents itself as an attribute of their 
material selves. Marx, in Volume I of his C a p i t a l , makes the point 
thus:
“We followed up this false appearance to its final establishment, which is complete 
so soon as the universal equivalent form becomes identified with the bodily form of
3 4 2 /b/d. Emph. orig.
3 43The opposite of human labour in the abstract is human needs in the abstract.
3 4 4 Marx, K. (1983), p64.
3 4 5 loc. cit., p40.
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a particular commodity, and thus crystallised into the money-form. What appears  
to happen is, not that gold becomes money, in consequence of all other commodities 
expressing their values in it, but, on the contrary, that ail other commodities 
universally express their values in gold, because it is money. The intermediate 
steps of the process vanish in the result and leave no trace behind. Commodities find 
their own value already completely represented, without any initiative on their 
part, in another commodity existing in company with them. These objects, gold and 
silver, just as they come out of the bowels of the earth, are forthwith the direct 
incarnation of all human labour. Hence the magic of money”.346
Williams, by removing from this general argument (and adapting) the 
one sentence: “...gold and silver, just as they come out of the bowels 
of the earth, are forthwith the direct incarnation of all human 
labour”, m anages to give it a meaning exactly opposite to that 
intended by its author. Far from gold being, “the direct incarnation of 
all human labour”, it is all human labour which becom es identif ied  
with gold. In Marx's Grundrisse , e.g., it is put thus:
“In the form of exchange value, labour-time is required to become objectified in a 
commodity which expresses no more than its quota or quantity, which is indifferent 
to its own natural properties, and which can therefore be metamorphosed into— i.e., 
exchanged for— every other commodity which objectifies the same labour-time. The 
object should have this character of generality, which contradicts its natural 
particularity. This contradiction can be overcome only by objectifying it: i.e., by 
positing the commodity in a double form, first in its natural immediate form, then 
in its mediated form, as money. The latter is possible only because a particular 
commodity becomes, as it were, the general substance of exchange values, or 
because the exchange values of commodities becomes identified with a particular 
commodity different from all the others".347
It is on these misreadings of Marx by Williams that Trewhela basis 
his own argument. Trewhela argues, following Williams, that g o ld -  
producing labour, since it produces abstract wealth, has the concrete  
character of abstract labour. It is argued that the product of go ld -  
mining represents not itself, but the entire spectrum of products of 
concrete labours, i.e., products in the abstract; the concrete  labour of 
gold digging is abstract labour. For Trewhela, the value form renders 
the labouring activity of g o ld -d ig g in g , “im m ediate ly  abstract, 
immediately social, homogeneous human labour”. Thus Trewhela:
“...abstract, homogeneous, qualitatively equal human labour in the immediately 
useful form of gold-digging"; “...the form by which the concrete labour of the
3 4 6 Marx, K. (1983), pp95-6. Emph. ours.
3 4 7 Marx, K. (1973), p168. Emph. ours.
197.
collective gold producer is, by the very nature of the value form, immediately 
abstract, immediately social, homogeneous human labour”.348
Here use-va lue  II is conflated with use -va lue  I. Concrete labour 
produces only use-value I, in this case the material gold. Use-value II 
comes about by the value relation, “the very nature of the value  
form”, that arises between different instances of use-va lue  I. All 
labour is compared to gold-producing labour because gold is the 
universal equivalent. But this is not the same as gold-producing  
labour = abstract labour, for in such equation even gold-producing  
labour is but a part of the pool of universal human labour and thus 
void of attributes, and hence figuring as a re la t ive ,  rather than an 
equivalent expression of value. If gold-producing labour were actually  
this attributeless universal human labour, were identical with it, 
then all  labour must be actua l ly  gold-producing labour, whether the 
product of that labour is shoes, caviar or gold. Gold as use-value II 
merely off ic ia tes  as abstract labour; it does not b e c o m e  abstract 
labour.
“The b o d y  of the commodity that serves as the equivalent, figures as the 
materialisation of human labour in the abstract, and is at the same time the product 
of some specifically useful concrete labour. This concrete labour becomes, 
therefore, the medium  for expressing abstract human labour” 349
Gold producing labour is immediately social, but not for the reasons 
offered by Trewhela. It is immediately social (use-value II), but not 
because it is abstract; on the contrary. It is immediately social 
because it is concrete. It is immediately social not as use-value I—  
for as such it is a commodity and by definition not immediately  
social— but as use-value II, which is not a commodity and is hence 
immediately social. Abstract labour is abstract precisely because it 
is abstracted from this or that “immediately useful form". Precisely 
because the labour here discussed comes in “the immediately useful 
form of gold-digging”, it cannot be abstract. It is different from all 
other labours in the same way that any particular labour is different 
from all other labours. Or, as Marx put it, “digging gold, mining iron, 
cultivating wheat and weaving silk are qualitatively different kinds
3 4 8 Trewhe!a, P. (1986), p8.
3 4 9 Marx, K. (1983), p64. Emph. ours.
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of labour”.350 In other words, there is nothing exceptional about gold-  
digging labour as concrete labour. To talk of gold digging as 
“homogeneous, qualitatively equal human labour”, is to say nothing 
more than that gold-digging is qualitatively equal to gold-digging.
Gold-digging is further described as, “...labour unmystified by any 
particular concrete form or skill, labour whose particularity lies 
solely in its general lack of particularity”.351 If labour is ever 
mystified, it is not by its “concrete form”, but by its social form, for 
the concrete form produces a use-value and, “the mystical character 
of commodities does not originate... in their use-va lues”.352 Labour 
which does not come in “any particular concrete form ” cannot 
produce a use-value. Gold is a use-value, the particular concrete form 
of the labour which produced it being gold-digging. Indeed, it is only 
as use-value, as a product of specific concrete labour, that anything 
can play the role of equivalent.
The “particularity” of gold-digging is gold-digging. The gold digger 
produces neither abstract wealth nor money, or even the money 
m aterial, but a metallic substance called gold. That a metal is 
capable  of being mined does not presuppose particular s o c i a l  
re la t ions , like relations of exchange, which posit abstract labour, but 
only certain technical capacities.  What labour claims from nature is 
the substance of gold, which becomes the use-value gold. This may or 
may not take the social form of a commodity which, in turn, may or 
may not take the higher social form of money. That this metallic 
substance does become money presupposes its being a commodity 
which, in turn, presupposes its being a use-value.
The implications of the W il l ia m s -T re w h e la  thesis is far from  
exhausted. For example, if the concrete labour which produces the 
m oney-com m odity has the single-fold character of abstract labour 
alone, then, firstly, what labour is it an abstraction of?; and, 
secondly, so, too, must cattle-rearing labour, shell-cleaning labour, 
m at-weaving labour, woman-raising labour, etc., have the single-fold
3 5 0 Marx, K. (1977b), p29.
351 Trewhela, P. (1986a), p8.
3 5 2 Marx, K. (1983), p76.
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character of abstract labour, for cattle, shells, mats, women, etc., 
were all, at some time or other, the m oney-com modity. Although 
these have since ceased to be money (some have even ceased to be 
commodities), the concrete labour producing them persists. If, then, 
with gold as m oney-com m o dity , go ld -d igg ing  labour is in its 
immediate  concrete character  actually abstract labour, then either 
gold was always money and always will be money, or there was no 
gold-digging prior to gold assuming the social role of m o n e y -  
commodity, i.e, it was never a commodity or even a product.
It is one of the recurring errors in scholarship to consider the 
particular use-value and the universal use-value of gold in isolation 
from each other, i.e, as if there is no relation between them. When  
gold is regarded in its role as money, it is forgotten in its role as 
commodity. W hen exam ined as commodity, its role as money  
disappears from view. One of the founding philosophers of socialism, 
Lenin, does not escape this charge when he suggests that when gold 
ceases to be the repository of value, it ceases to be a use-value.353
At the same time, apart from the general point of the equation of 
simple labour with abstract labour, Trewhela does argue that the 
labour of gold-mining is abstract labour on account of the social 
nature of the product, viz., money. In other words, looking at the 
relation from the van tage  point of the product, gold is a 
supercom m odity  in that it is exch an geab le  against all other 
commodities. Gold is a commodity,
“whose useful character is solely that it serves as the repository of value as such; 
that, as against all other commodities which appear in competition as so many 
hostile particulars, this one commodity is at all times the soul of all and 
immediately convertible into all. To this degree, we have here a commodity standing 
outside of competition: the monarch of commodities, raised up by all the others as on 
a throne. ...it is their crowned head: it is the Messiah of commodities elevated over 
their own heads by all the rest, that living god in comparison with which all other 
commodities are merely mortals. In the circulation process, where values are
3 5 3 The Importance of Gold now and after the Complete Victory of Socialism, (1921), in LCW, 
Vol. X XX III. pp113-4. Desai has compiled a collection of Lenin’s utterances on economics. 
Apparently he could not find any thoughts of Lenin on gold. See Desai, M. (ed.) (1989). The fifty 
volume Lenin Collected Works shows Lenin to have understood nothing more about gold than that 
it is used in international trade. When orthodox economsts mock his extraordinary remark about 
“using gold for the building of public lavatories”, they do so with some justification.
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realised, all other commodities must attain to the state of grace— gold alone is born 
to it".3 5 4
The social form of labour as abstract labour expresses itself in the 
exercise of that labour as wage-labour. As wage-labour, labour-power 
is a commodity like any other. The labour which produced labour-  
power, likewise, has a two-fo ld character. It only becomes social 
upon alienation. W ag e -lab o u r  is therefore, by definition, labour for 
money. The  object of w a g e - la b o u r  is, therefore , an abstract
commodity, money. It is not, however, correct to say that since gold 
is money, gold-producing labour is abstract labour. Gold, as use-value  
II, is produced for the u t i l i t y  of its e x ch an g e ab il ity . O ther  
com m odities exchange against it for that precise reason. No
commodity can be an exchange value without first being a use-value.
In the case of gold, it is a use-value (use-value II) b e c a u s e  it is an
exchange value— the exchange value associated with use-va lue  I. 
Without its u n iv e r s a l  exchangeability it would not be produced a s  
use-va lue  II. It is as this second use-value, use-va lue  II, that it 
officiates as the equivalent expression of the value of a l l  other
commodities. If it were not a universal equivalent, but merely a
general equivalent, it would do so as use-value I. The point here is 
that the value of a thing is always expressed in the use-value of
another thing. The equivalent form of value, whether particular,
general or universal, is necessarily a use-value .  Hence Marx:
“With the equivalent form it is just the contrary. The very essence of this form is 
that the m aterial commodity itself ...just as it is, expresses value, and is endowed 
with the form of value by Nature itself. Of course, this holds good only so long as the 
value-relation exists...".355
Marx’s last line, which reads, “This holds good only so long as the 
v a lu e - r e la t io n  e x is ts ”, se rves  to bring W il l ia m s ’ fe tish ised  
conceptions of money, gold and gold-digging labour into sharp relief. 
If go ld-digging labour actually is abstract labour, concrete abstract 
labour, so to speak, and gold, “as it comes out of the South African 
mines is forthwith the direct incarnation of all human labour”, then 
the conditionality of the value-relation falls away. The implication is 
that, regardless of the form of economy, gold-digging labour always
3 5 4 Trewhela. P. (1986a), p15.
3 5 5 Marx, K. (1983), p63. Emph. ours.
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has been and always will be abstract labour, while gold always has 
been and always will be money. This same value-relation is what 
labour cannot escape from so long as it remains wage-labour.
The Value of Labour-Power
The question of the value of labour-pow er in South African go ld -  
mining is hardly ever addressed in the literature. It is indirectly 
discussed by Wolpe as “the conditions of the production and the 
reproduction of la b o u r -p o w e r”,356 and by Williams as “level of 
s u b s i s t e n c e ” . 357 S om ew hat arbitrarily , the phrase “cost of 
production and reproduction of la b o u r -p o w e r” is som etim es  
introduced to assist in explaining the Reserves. Ticktin does give the 
value of labour-pow er brief attention.358 It does not, though, appear 
amongst his, “Four categories [which] have to be elaborated and 
understood in order to develop a cogent political economy of South 
A fr ic a ”.359
William s discusses it at some length, unfortunately som ewhat  
d o g m a t i c a l l y . 360 The latter sees the value of labour-pow er as a 
function of w a g e -la b o u r , rather than of labour-pow er. Trewhela  
makes only a few brief remarks about the value of labour-power,361 
but of the three South African scholars reviewed in detail, they are 
the most penetrating. Edna Bonacich, who writes within an orthodox 
economics paradigm, offers a most constructive examination of the 
value of labour-pow er and split labour markets. Her article will be 
reviewed separately  e lsew here .362 In the discussion which follows, 
much attention will be given to Williams and to Trewhela. This is for 
two reasons: firstly, they are the only scholars working on South
3 5 6 Wolpe, H. (1972), p428.
3 5 7 Williams, M. (1975), p7.
3 5 8 Ticktin, H. (1991), pp3, 13-15, 56-7, 74-7.
3 5 9 ibid., p8.
3 6 0 Williams, M. (1975), pp6-7.
361 Trewhela, P. (1986a), p17.
3 6 2 Bonacich, E. (1972) is reviewed under Two Environments and the Question of Free W a g e -  
Labour.
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Africa who have seriously tried to employ the value of labour-power  
as a category of their analysis, albeit in both cases a weak use of the 
category; and secondly, T rew h e la  rem ains unpublished while  
Williams’ ideas appeared in an obscure journal.
The concept of the value of labour-pow er is not only wrongly 
understood, but also wrongly applied. It is suggested that this leads 
to an erroneous reading of the dynamic of the time. W e conclude by 
suggesting that: (i) the value of labour-power was different for black 
workers from what it was for white workers, meaning automatically 
that wage levels would be different; and, (ii) far from black workers 
being underpaid, they were being, at least until the outbreak of the 
South African War, grossly overpaid.
Irrespective of the social form in which labour-power is exercised, it 
remains labour-power, and as such requires the prior consumption of 
a certain sum of products (whatever social form these may take) in 
order to be produced. Capita list com m odity econom y is not 
synonymous with economy, nor is w ag e -lab o u r  synonymous with 
labour. One can therefore talk of the value of labour-power without 
the exercise of that labour-pow er necessarily taking the form of 
w a g e-lab o u r . The solitary hermit, the m ember of the S to n e -a g e  
hunting band and the individual in communist society still need to 
consume a certain quantity of use-values in order to produce and 
reproduce their labour-pow er. All societies, w hatever their form, 
need to consum e a certain portion of their products in order to 
reproduce their total social labour from day to day, year to year and 
generation to generation.
“So far, therefore, as labour is a creator of use-value, is useful labour, it is a 
necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the 
human race; it is an external nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be 
no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life”.363
It is sometimes assumed that the question of the value of labour-  
power, i.e., the necessary means of subsistence, arises only where 
the class of labourers forms a proletariat, or where a proletariat is 
in the process of formation. Williams holds that the value of labour-
power is something to be determined by the class struggle. Value of 
labour-power is equated with level of wages. These, we will show in 
a moment, are not the same thing.
Although Williams acknowledges that the value of labour-pow er  
em braces also the labourer’s “historically developed social needs, 
which become second nature”,364 he confines this conception strictly 
to a proletariat and an already existing one. For this he draws on Marx 
when the latter says that means of subsistence also depends on, “the 
conditions under which, the class of free labourers has been  
f o r m e d ”,365 adding the emphasis himself. If it is suggested that by 
this Marx means to say that the question of value of labour-power  
arises by labour-pow er being realised within the circulation process 
of capital, i.e., when labour-power is exercised as wage-labour, then 
it becomes very difficult to explain why Marx backs up this general 
point with the following footnote, “Hence the Roman Villicus, as 
overlooker of the agricultural slaves, received ‘more meagre fare 
than working slaves, because his work was lighter’”.366
Williams then sees his task as to “ascertain... what was to become  
the ‘historically deve loped  social needs’ of the w orkers...”.367 This 
prediction of the past can only be understood if the ‘historically 
developed’ is deem ed not yet to exist. And so, indeed, it is, for 
Williams goes on to talk of, “the ‘degree of comfort’ which was to be 
established  as second nature”.368 ‘Second nature’, i.e., the cumulative 
past concentrated in the present, is ‘to be established’ in the future.
On the basis of this temporal conflation Williams is then in a 
position to ask, “Who is to determine what the level of subsistence 
of workers ought to b e”?369 and to assert that, “The mining 
capitalists were able to determine for themselves what the living
3 6 4 Williams, M. (1975), p7 quoting Marx.
3 6 5 Marx, K., quoted in Williams, M. (1975), p7.
3 6 6 Marx, K. (1983), p168n1.
3 6 7 Williams, M. (1975), p7, emph. ours.
3 6 6 ibid., p7, emph. ours.
36 9 ibid.
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standards of others ought to be only because they had prevented the 
working class from having a modicum of say in the matter”.370
Value of Labour-Power, Skill, Living Standard and Wage Level
The literature seldom differentiates between value of labour-power, 
skill, standard of living and level of wages. W hat differentiation  
there is, is partial, in that skill is differentiated from level of 
wages. However, level of wages is often used interchangeably with 
value of labour-power. No attempt is made to isolate standard of 
living and the relationship between all of these is never explored. The 
importance of keeping these separate will becom e clear in the 
discussion of the relation between capital and black labour in the 
early gold-m ining industry. The idea for the moment is only to 
separate them conceptually.
W e start with the distinction between the value of labour-power and 
level of wages. The former, as discussed above, describes the average 
socially necessary labour-tim e for the production of a unit labour-  
power. The wage describes the going market price of that unit. Price 
is the form in which value expresses itself. Its actual magnitude is 
thus necessarily imperfect, emerging under the influence of supply 
and demand as the market price. The value expressed in any particular 
market price describes a point along a path of oscillation around the 
actual price: now above, now below. With machine production and 
credit economy the relationship between market price and value 
becomes even more complex. Capital strives to keep the wage as 
close to the value of labour-pow er as possible, it being in its 
interests to pay neither above nor below that value. That value itself, 
though, might change.
Labour-power produced in environments with different productivities 
of labour have different values, taking unskilled labour as the unit. It 
is therefore possible for two groups of workers to be brought 
together from two different environments to work side by side, do 
identical work, and yet have different values of labour-power. It is
3 7 0 /5 / 'd .
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not possible to say whether two groups of workers, each paid at 
different levels of wages, are better or worse off v is -a -v is  each 
other, without considering also the respective values of their labour- 
power and the standards of their living.
It is possible: (i) for group A to be paid twice as much as group B, 
with group A getting poorer while group B grows very wealthy, if A is 
paid below its value and B above; (ii) for group A to have the same 
value of labour-power as group B, yet require twice as much in wages
in order to maintain their respective standards of living, such as, e.g.,
unskilled labour in the countryside compared to unskilled labour in 
the city; and (iii) for groups A and B to have the same standard of 
living, but very different values of labour-power and hence levels of 
wages as, e.g., workers who go to work in an environment with a
lower productivity of labour than the environment in which their
co lleag ues  remain behind. Th ese  distinctions are  particularly  
important when examining the wages of black and white mine 
workers in early South African gold-mining.
One of the problems with the fixed gold price is that it was fixed at a
level which represented a magnitude of value far lower than the value
needed to produce it under late-nineteenth century conditions. This is 
a consequence of the average social labour-tim e necessary for the 
production of a unit of gold having risen with the changeover from
mainly placer to mainly lode mining on a world scale. For reasons
internal to the workings of the international monetary system at the 
time, this change could not be allowed to feed through to the gold 
price. Around the world, gold mining operations w ere  either  
discontinued or not even started on account of the value of the 
labour-power being higher than could be accommodated within that 
represented by the fixed price of the gold to be retrieved by that 
lab o u r-p o w er.371
371 Lock, A. (1882), p p44-5 , 106, 5 11 -13 .
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Enter South Africa
The m id -n in e te en th  century was the beginning of the age of 
generalised free w age-labour, i.e., the process of the abolition of 
slavery had, for all intents and purposes, been completed world­
w id e .372 This means that the social form by which lode gold had been 
mined during the era of placer predominance, viz. working to death, 
was henceforth no longer available. Where transitional forms were  
still extant, these were used, e.g., indentured Chinese labour in South 
Africa.  At the s a m e  t ime,  the period also w itnessed  the 
genera lisa tion  of industrial production. Mining in industrialised  
countries benefited directly from this generalised industrialisation  
by being enabled to reduce their production costs. Mining in such 
areas could thus be restructured on the basis of lo w -v a lu e ,  high 
p r o d u c t iv i ty  labour-pow er, in other words, a labour-force costing 
less but maintaining a high standard of living.
The value of Witwatersrand gold,373 as it happened, exceeded that of 
placer gold to a much greater degree than elsewhere, not only on 
account of the comparatively poor grade of Wits gold (which is the 
only account mentioned in the literature), but also on account of the 
relative backwardness of the South African economy at the time. At 
the sam e time, the value of labour-pow er of indigenous African 
societies was a great deal lower than the world average for mining 
labour. There was therefore the prospect that this gold might be 
retrievable after all. O ne writer theorises that, “If an ore body 
similar to South Africa's had been discovered in Australia, Canada, or 
the United States, it would most certainly have been left in the 
ground because of an inability to mobilize the right type of work­
3 7 2 lsolated pockets of slavery persisted, but in areas marginal to the world economy. “Between 
one-third and one-fifth of the population of West and Central Sudan were slaves at the end of the 
nineteenth century", according to Sender, J. and Smith, S. (1986), p38. See also Encyclopasdia 
Britannica (1982), Vol. XVI, p864.
3 7 3 For the purposes of this study, there is no need to distinguish between gold occurring in 
conglomerate beds (Witwatersrand) and ordinary lode gold. For a detailed discription of how 
Witwatersrand gold mining differs technically from that of other regions, see Jeppe, C. (1946a) 
and (1946b).
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f o r c e ”.374 “The right type of labour-force”, in the global context, 
would have been a low-value, high-productivity labour-force. The  
backwardness of the South African economy did not allow for a high-  
productivity labour-force. For mining capital to have turned the 
indigenous population into a w o rk -fo rc e  of genera l industrial 
productivity would have meant mining capital doing for South Africa 
in the space of a few years what all of previous history had done for 
Europe and North America: create an industrial society. For a low -  
value, high-productivity labour-force to be created, the value of its 
labour-pow er would first have to increase (as it acquires industrial 
skills and improves its standard of living) alongside the increase in 
productivity, until full industrialisation begins to reduce the value of 
labour-power while continuing to increase the productivity of labour. 
Mining capital had to circumvent this bulge in the graph.
In 1901, a skilled miner with a wife and three children lived on £294  
per annum on the Reef, while a similar family in Massachusetts lived 
on £170 per annum at a similar standard of living.375 The value of 
labour-power on the Reef in 1897 is estimated to have been 25%  
higher than in California.376 As an index based on Erith, England at 
100, the cost of living in Scranton, N. America was 69, while at 
Johannesburg it was 128.377 The difference made by the general level 
of industrialisation of the environment in which the mine operates, 
may be illustrated by a comparison of the working costs of the 
Alaska Treadwell mine (CR) with that of Crown Reef (CR) on the 
Witwatersrand. AT’s working costs in 1897 came to 4s. 8d. per ton of 
ore milled, to £1 6s. 8d. per ton for CR. At the same time the labour 
costs of AT came to 2s. 11 d. per ton as against 15s. 6d. per ton for 
CR. The significance of mining in or close to an industrial 
environment is brought out by the fact that despite C R ’s paying six 
times more for labour than did AT, labour constituted a lower 
percentage of C R ’s total expenditure (57.98%) than it did in the case 
of AT (63 .78% ).378 A T’s expenditure on the products of heavy industry
3 7 4 Crush, J. (1991), p i.  To this Crush adds, “Even today, after great technological advance 
and dramatic change in the cost structure of gold mining, this remains true”, ibid.
3 7 5 TC M  (1902), Annexure, Exh. 15 and 15b.
3 7 6 Hall’s evidence, ICE (1897), p420.
3 7 7 ICE, p158.
3 7 8 Computed from table in ICE (1897), p212.
208.
is so much lower than that of CR, that its comparatively lower labour 
costs registers as a higher percentage of its total than does the 
labour costs of CR.
South African historiography consistently departs from the premise  
that South African gold-m ining required a cheap labour-force on 
account of the low grade of its ore. Typical would be, e.g., the 
following observation:
“Profits are largely dependent on low production costs for two reasons. Firstly, 
because the average gold content of the ore is low. Secondly, the internationally 
controlled price of gold prevents the mining companies from transferring any 
increases in working costs to the consumers. Consequently within this narrowly 
circumscribed cost structure, the usual area of cost minimisation has been wages. 
The task then for the mine-owners has been to create and contain a vast supply of 
cheap African labour"379
This is true, but it is also misleading. The point is that the world 
over, gold production found itself in this position on account of the 
fixing of the price of gold to an inappropriate value. Cheap labour-  
forces were needed everywhere for gold-mining to continue. In South 
Africa, one happened to be available , subject to som e slight 
modification. Over and above this comes the problem of the low grade 
of South African ore as an extenuating factor. It is in this global 
context, rather than that of ‘imperialism’ or ‘monopoly capitalism’, 
that the present essay seeks to understand the peculiarity which is 
South African gold-mining.
This low-value labour-force found in South Africa, though more than 
sufficient in number, was not a proletariat. The problem confronting 
capital was: How was this labour-force to be proletarianised without  
raising the value of its labour-pow er? Or, put in a different way, 
could this labo ur-fo rce  be brought to modern, industrial utility 
without making the kind of social investment that was historically 
made to produce an industrial work-force in Europe?
Since this labour, its numerical preponderance notwithstanding, did 
not readily offer itself in the market, it was scarce. On account of 
this scarcity, the different gold-mining capitals competed with one
3 7 9 Webster, E. (1978), p9.
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another to attract sufficient labour, thereby bidding up its pr ice .  It 
was clear to capital right from the start that this labour was being 
paid a b o v e  its value. Black labour, in the first decade or so of go ld-  
mining in South Africa, was being paid a ‘w a g e ’ completely out of 
proportion to its “frugal needs” (to use Legassick’s phrase).
T h e  concern of capital w as, therefore , tw o -fo ld :  firstly, to 
proletarianise this source of labour, thereby taking care of the 
supply; and secondly, to preserve as far as possible the relatively low 
value of this labour-power throughout that proletarianisation process 
and beyond. In Europe proletarianisation can be described as having 
been a ‘natural’ process in the sense that it sprang forth out of the 
dynamic of changes taking place within late medieval and mercantile 
economies. Capital itself paid nothing towards this process, indeed, 
its primitive accumulation was part of that process. In South Africa 
every worker had to be individually brought to the workplace at the 
expense of the individual capitalist seeking to engage him. With his 
own acute sense of what partial proletarianisation means, Lionel 
Phillips, in motivation of centralised recruiting, observed, “The  
objection to allowing individual recruiting would not apply, if the 
whole world was open, as it does in a comparatively narrow field in 
A fr ic a ”.380 Before the worker had even started earning a wage, he 
was already a cost item on the books. The cost to the gold mines of 
bringing a single black worker to the Reef ranged from £2 10s. to £3 
2s. 6d., while their monthly wage ranged from £2 10s. to £3. In other 
words, each worker already cost the company one month’s wages  
before he had even started working.381
That the labour of these labourers was unlikely to develop fully into 
free w age-labour was therefore inherent to the very manner in which 
proletarianisation took place. To entice or coerce individual workers 
to the workplace is one thing (and a costly thing, let it not be 
forgotten), but to create an entire class is quite another thing 
altogether. This was well beyond the capacity of capital, either 
individually or collectively. The state was continually called on by
3 8 0 Phillips to Evans. 17, April 1903, quoted in Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. (1977), pp119-120.
381 ICE (1897), pp14, 23. For details of the premiums paid to secure labour and the losses made 
on them, see ibid., pp110-112.
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capital to fulfil this task. It was not always both able and willing to 
oblige.
In an examination of the detailed interaction between the different 
natural economies in the southern African region, on the one hand, and 
the new capitalist economy in their midst, on the other, reveals a 
complete transformation of the African economies and the gradual 
(and uneven) of African natural labour into w a g e -la b o u r . W hat  
emerges appears to be some way from the notion, so prevalent in 
le ft-w ing literature, of African societies being laid w aste  by a 
rapacious capitalism right from the start. Those works which do try 
to examine this area anew include Bundy, C. (1979), Harris, P. (1982) 
and Richardson, P. and Van Helten, J .-J .  (1982). They make for 
refreshing reading. W e would go a little further than Bundy, when he 
argues that there was:
“a substantially more positive response by African peasants to economic changes 
and market opportunities than is usually indicated; that an adapted form of the 
prevailing subsistence methods provided hundreds of thousands of Africans with a 
preferable alternative to wage labour on white colonists' terms in the form of 
limited participation in the produce market".382
As a relation between different forms of economy, the picture which 
emerges is one of trading the surplus living labour of the African 
economies for accumulated labour objectified in the plants and 
machinery of capitalism. What was surplus to the African societies 
was necessary to the capitalist one. It is, therefore, capitalist 
society which was in the w e ak e r position. Unlike the African 
societies, it had nothing to dispose of without undermining itself. 
Which society gained and which lost by this transaction, cannot be 
straightaway deduced from the eventual triumph of one over the 
other. A case could be made that both the African societies and 
capitalism gained by this early relationship, since they both tapped 
into a resource which was otherwise unusable by either. To calculate 
this lies beyond the purpose of this paper. But if this were to be 
attempted, then, at the very least, reckoning would have to be made 
of the cycles of reproduction: (i) daily; (ii) annually; and (iii) from 
one generation to the next. Only the daily cycle was effected on the
3 8 2 Bundy, C. (1979), p13.
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mines, and then only partially, i.e., while the worker was actually 
sojourning there. The annual and generational cycles were effected 
fully within the African economies. “There are always other reasons 
why the natives went home— ploughing, sowing or getting married”, 
declared George Albu to the IC E .383 Production for all three cycles 
was therefore able to proceed uninterruptedly in addition to the 
consumption  for a part of the daily cycle no longer being a deduction 
from that production. Regardless of w hether the mine workers  
received any cash wages at all, their reproduction represented less of 
a drain on the African economies and hence a nett in c re a s e  in their 
surplus product. Their tenacity in the face of capitalism was  
therefore much greater than the literature would suggest.
The history of the gold mines’ black labour supply in the period up to 
the wake of the South African W ar can be periodised into two distinct 
phases: (i) a period of enticement (1 8 8 6 -9 6 ) ;  and (ii) a period of 
coercion (1 8 9 6 -1 9 0 3 ) .  The first period derives its character from the 
independence and relative prosperity of the various economies in 
which Africans lived.384 These were not all the same. They ranged 
from patriarchal redistributive chiefdoms to peasant economies on 
the verge of capitalist agriculture.385 But in all cases the factor 
determining their response to the enormous and rapidly-expanding  
demand for their produce and their labour, was the fact that in their 
traditional economies they had labour to spare . This, at bottom, is 
why they did not constitute a proletariat. Put differently, had this 
not been the case, their economies would have been undermined from 
the start. Instead, they prospered.
3 8 3 !oc. cit., p177.
3 8 4 For descriptions of these we have relied especially on Bundy, C. (1979), Hobson, J. (1938), 
Innes, D. (1984), Marks, S. and Rathborne, R. (eds) (1982), Sender, J. and Smith, S. (1986) and 
Wilson, F. (1972). It is misleading to discribe these societies as “impoverished”, as do Crush, 
J. et al. (1991), p xiv. The forms in which their wealth could be stored was, however, 
precarious, rendering them susceptible to the vagaries of nature. “These societies were subject 
to cycles of declining productivity and food crises in the face of population change”, according to 
Sender, J. and Smith, S. (1986), p36.
3 8 5 One of the weaknesses of W olpe’s ‘modes of production’ thesis is that he oversimplifies his 
characterisation of these economies. Those African economies which did not fit so neatly into his 
bi-polar scheme of ‘African redistributive mode of production vs capitalist mode of production’, 
such as the short-lived but highly significant peasantries, he simply dismisses as of no 
importance. See Wolpe, H. (1972), p431-2.
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This prosperity has its direct reflection in the relationship between  
capital and labour.386 During this phase of the relationship between 
mining capital and its black w ork-force , capital was on its best 
behaviour towards its ‘Kaffirs’. Management, e.g., was ever mindful 
not to give Africans a bad impression of the Witwatersrand and took 
great care not to offend African tribal sensitivities.
"The desirability of introducing any system by which additional restriction would 
be placed upon the Kaffir, is very debatable. It might have the effect of creating a 
bad impression in the Kaffir districts concerning the conditions of labour in the 
Fields, and so operate to retard the inflow of Natives at its source”387
M anagem ent was not only interested in avoiding “a bad impression in 
the Kaffir districts”, but in making a good one. The provision of 
locations as opposed to closed compounds was one way of doing so. 
The Buffelsdoorn Gold Mine had one of the earliest family locations. 
In praise of it, one witness before the ICE said:
“On account of the isolated position of the Buffelsdoorn Gold Mine and the attendant 
difficulty found in the procuring and retention of an efficient supply of native 
labour to carry on mining operations, a part of the policy of the company to 
overcome this impediment has been to always make the surroundings of the natives 
as comfortable and pleasant as possible. In pursuance of this, five years ago a 
location ...one mile from the works was established"388
Furthermore, as Africans have made their way to the mines of their 
own will (either that of the labourer or that of the chief), they were  
under no particular compulsion to endure what they regarded as 
hardship or abuse. They were at leisure to seek out the most 
advantageous engagements and remained either until they have made 
the amount of money they have come for,389 or until they learnt of
3 8 6 For a discussion of the uneven and heterogeneous character of the proletarianisation process 
in Africa, see Sender, J. and Smith, S, (1986), esp. Ch. 3. Though the strength of this work lies 
in its examination of Africa north of South Africa, the general insights are still useful for South 
A frica .
3 8 7 W CM, (1889), p10. The trickery of and lying to chiefs by private labour touts to induce them 
to release labour for the Rand was so notorious as to “spoil the labour market", thereby placing 
a whole recruiting area out of bounds and compelling mine owners to search further afield. The 
mines campaigned for the ‘putting down’ of private touting and called for this function to be 
performed by properly authorised officials. See Hobson, J. (1938), p261.
3 8 8 ICE (1897), p376.
3 8 9 “The average stay of a Kafir on the fields is six months, and this is probably too high an 
estimate...", W C M  (1890), p76. This was particularly irksome to those who would see in it the 
racial inferiority of blacks. Sentiments such as, “The Kaffir, with few exceptions, is an 
unsatisfactory being, who leaves his employment as soon as he gets sufficient money to buy a
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better paym ent or conditions elsewhere. M anagem ent also had to 
contend with the fact that in the same way as many Africans went to 
the mines of their own will, so a great many more remained in the 
countryside of their own will.
Against this casual to-ing and fro-ing m anagem ent eventually, and 
much to its own distaste, introduced a strategy of making advances  
to potential labourers. These took the form, mostly, of either cash or 
cattle, depending on which particular economy the labourer was to be 
recruited from .390 The intended effect was that, on the one hand, it 
would entice workers out of the African economies, and, on the other, 
that it would tie the worker to a particular employer for the period 
of his contract. The strategy called for a large initial outlay and 
complex administration and was not necessarily efficacious.
"Although the mine owners knew that cattle advances cost huge sums and led to 
much abuse by defaulting mineworkers, they found themselves compelled to tolerate 
the system for some years, so great was their need for labour”391.
The freedom to choose whether to labour or not to labour was not one 
which capital found itself bound to uphold, especially if it cost it so 
dearly. But this was not to last, for very soon capital, whose need for 
labour was far from being satisfied by this trickle, was looking for 
ways of compelling Africans to labour in the mines.392 The strategy 
was about to change from enticement to coercion. But its ability to 
do so depended upon the consolidation and effective exercise of state 
power. Major re-alignments and consolidation occurred throughout the 
region from 1895 to 1902 and further to 1910.
The strategy to compel workers to the mines took two forms: (i) 
dislodging them from the rural areas; and (ii) keeping them on the 
Witwatersrand. (i) This strategy had a number of components to it:
few w ives...", and, “They run away as soon as they have earned enough to get oxen and a 
wife", were commonplace. See letters to the Chamber reproduced in W CM  (1896), p167.
3 9 0 Jeeves, A. (1985), p5.
391 ib id. It seems rather inappropriate to describe this system as “debt bondage”, as do 
Richardson and Van Helten (1982), p90. Since so many ‘bondsmen’ freely absconded and capital 
“found themselves compelled" to tolerate this, it was capital, rather than labour, which was in 
bondage.
3 9 2 “This casual to and fro of nearby tribesmen did not satisfy the appetite for labour in the 
mines", Wheatcroft, G. (1986), p130.
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Already by 1889 some managers were campaigning for a pass system 
(not to be confused with the later Pass Law of the Witwatersrand) as 
a form of semi-indenture:
“A regular pass system has many recommendations; By which (1) a free pass, valid 
for 10 days, would be issued to any Kaffir entering the country, authorising him to 
look for work; (2) No pass to leave the district would be issued to any Kaffir 
without an employer’s discharge certificate (sic) of recent date; and (3) Any Kaffir 
found without a valid pass would be bound for a month to the first employer on the 
register of applicants”393.
The mines did by no means speak ‘like one m an’ on the issue of 
passes. As already suggested by the passage cited before, public 
opinion in the “Kaffir districts” did count for something and some 
mine owners were sensitive to this (or, at least, their capital was). 
Others called for a poll tax, “to ensure that no African remained  
outside the imperatives of the cash econom y”.394 Mine managers  
wanted to make sure that no African was too wealthy to avoid wage  
labour. A poll tax was one way of siphoning off such ‘excess’ 
w e a lth .395 According to a Commissioner of the Industrial Commission
of Enquiry of 1897, “The kaffir fee is 10s. per hut, and 2s. 6d. for
road tax, and he may take as many wives as he likes, and if he keeps
all the women in one house, he has only to pay for one hut”.396 Land
restrictions, although more campaigned for by farmers than by mining 
capital, did have the effect of undermining the traditional economies 
and of ejecting their young men as migrant labourers. White rurally- 
based capital itself, though, existed in at least two forms, and these 
had contradictory demands on the black population. This put the state 
in a vacillating position which made it even less effective than it 
already was.
It was mining capital, ironically, which was to benefit first and most 
from land restrictions on an effective scale. These did not occur in 
any of the territories which were later to constitute South Africa,
3 9 3 W C M  (1890), p9.
3 9 4 l_egassick, M. (1983), p178.
3 9 5 See especially the evidence of George Albu, mine owner, in ICE (1897), p22.
3 9 6 During Charles Goldmann’s evidence, ICE (1897), p129.
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but in M ozam bique.397 Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique has 
always been tenuous, but was vigorously entrenched after the defeat 
of the African chiefdoms in the Luso-G aza War of 1 8 9 5 -7 . In terms of 
the T ran svaa l-M o zam b iq u e  Agreement of 1897, the Portuguese so 
ruthlessly enforced a policy of land restriction that the South 
African Republic government was able to guarantee the mines labour 
from that source.398
(ii) Contrary to popular conception, the mines, during this early 
period, were not interested in a labour-force migrating pendulum -  
fashion between the rural areas and the mines. Harris makes a strong 
case against this conception, showing that “migrant, as opposed to 
stabilised labour, was not cheap in the nineteenth century”.399 Many 
mine managers expressed themselves against the closed compound 
system and in favour of locations. Before the Commission of Enquiry 
of 1897, mine owners, when specifically asked whether they wanted 
locations as opposed to closed compounds on the Rand, unanimously 
declared their preference for a permanently settled black work-force  
on the Witwatersrand. From that Report, we may quote the following 
evidence:
C o m m is s io n e r :  With regard to native labour, do you consider that in the cold 
weather there would be a sufficiently continuous supply unless locations were 
formed on the Rand?
G eorge A lbu: My experience is that it was never owing to winter that we had less 
natives than in the summer. There are always other reasons why the natives went 
home— ploughing, sowing or getting married.
C: Do you consider that if there are locations on the Rand you would have an 
increased supply of skilled labour?
G A: Yes, I think they would stay here. ...I think if natives had their locations here, 
and had their wives and families, they would make this place their home;400
C o m m is s io n e r :  What do you think of the compound system that prevails in 
K im berley?
George Albu: I would not recommend the compound system.
C: Why?
3 9 7 ln respect of the pre-mining period, though, this assertion needs to be qualified. These very 
economies in Mozambique have been sending a regular flow of migrant workers to the Natal 
colony already from the 1850s. See Innes, D. (1984), pp50-1.
3 9 8 This account is based on Harris, P. (1982). This is an extremely detailed study of the effects 
of mine labour on the internal dynamics of the African societies in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. 
Harris, refreshingly, is not afraid to assail some of the sacred cows of South African left-wing 
historiography.
3 9 9 Harris, P. (1982), p142.
4 0 0 ICE (1897), pp23-4.
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GA: Because I think it would hurt the commercial industry;401
C o m m is s io n e r: Can you suggest any plan by which a permanent supply can be 
relied upon for the Rand, skilled principally?
Edward Hay: The only way is to give natives facilities for family life. W e do it to a 
certain extent on the George Goch [Mine], and we get into considerable trouble for 
doing it. We have a location upon our lower claims, and I have boys who have their 
wives and families, who have been working for the mine for the last eight years. If 
locations could be established somewhere in the neighbourhood of the mines— within 
walking distance— so that the natives could bring down their wives and families, I 
think you would have a far greater supply than you require;402
C o m m is s io n e r :  You have a lot of experience o f the compound system in 
K im berley?
S yd n ey  Jenn ings: Yes.
C: Would you think it would be advisable to apply the same thing here?
SJ: Taking all considerations, the commercial community and the good of the land, I 
would say no. We could get sufficient control over the kaffirs if the Pass Law was 
efficiently administered, without the compound system.
C: And how about establishing kaffir locations along the Rand?
SJ: I would say it would be a most excellent idea if the sale of liqour in the locations 
was absolutely prohibited... ;403
A m andus Brakhan: ...There are many ways in which the Government can assist 
the mining industry in its endeavours to procure a sufficient and cheap native 
labour supply. I will only mention the encouragement of locations not far from the 
Rand... ;404
G eo rg e  Denny: We also think that the introduction of a law establishing large 
native locations in the vacinity of the mining camps would be a great advantage in 
keeping up the permanent supply of labour. ...There seems good ground for assuming 
that if locations were established in the proximity of the mines, there would be a 
base formed for a working force more permanent and steady in character than exists 
at present.405
One witness even went so far as to describe migratory labour and 
compound living as an “unnatural condition”.406 This does not mean 
that compounds did not exist on the Rand at this time. The settlement 
pattern of the mine work-force was that most white miners, being 
either single or without their wives, lived in boarding houses or 
company ‘single quarters’, while black mine workers, virtually all on
4 0 1 /'b/'d., p25.
4 0 2 /b/d., p43. Later on in his evidence Edward Hay uses “compound" interchangeably with 
“location". It is clear, though, that he means the latter.
4 0 3 /'b/d., p46. This is in sharp contrast to Innes, for whom, “the process of conquest, ...had 
created the political and economic conditions for the location of the proletariat in the rural areas 
rather than around the points of production themselves”, Innes, D. (1984), p60.
4 0 4 op. cit. p184.
4 0 5 /d/d., p376.
4 0 6 William Hall’s evidence, ICE (1897), p429.
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short-term contracts and by themselves, lived in compounds on mine 
property .407 The pre -w ar compounds had no particular significance in 
respect of political economy, being merely a housing type. Their 
occupants were free to come and go as they pleased.
The closed compound system was introduced in Kimberley primarily 
to counter diamond thefts. Thefts of gold amalgam (an intermediate  
product) did take place on the Rand. One estimate puts the value of 
such theft at £750 000, i.e., 10% of the annual output.408 It was hence 
sufficiently serious a problem for the mines to want something done 
about it. But their proposals were always confined to the areas of 
law and law enforcement. They wanted a revamped Gold Law and 
better detectives. Never has it been suggested that tighter control on 
the compounds might reduce the amalgam thefts, for the culprits 
were not the black workers, most of whom were concentrated  
underground, but those in the plant on the surface. In one mine 
owner’s opinion, “it is done ...by the am algamators, because the 
amalgamators are the only ones who could handle the am algam ”.409 
W e would therefore suggest that Richardson and Van Helten might 
have been overhasty in claiming a direct connection between the 
increase in amalgam thefts and the reduction of black wages in 1 8 9 6 -  
7 .410 Indeed, one mine owner, in an exchange with a Commissioner at 
the ICE, explicitly denies a connection between black workers and 
amalgam thefts:
“If you thrust on individuals or companies the responsibilities and duties which are 
generally supposed to devolve to Government [detection of and prosecution for gold 
amalgam thefts, FS], you would give the directors of the mines the right to institute 
the compound system, to keep the boys on the property, and the searching system, 
so that amalgam thefts would be detected; but those are systems that we would never 
suggest"4 1 1
W e believe that the issue of gold thefts can safely be dismissed as 
having played no role in the evolution of control over the black work­
force on the mines. According to Van Onselen, “a relatively relaxed
4 0 7 “The mine compounds, which housed the black workers, were - without exception - situated 
on mining property", Van Onselen, C. (1982a), p5.
4 0 8 ICE (1897), p456.
409Joseph Robinson’s evidence, ibid,  p263.
41 °Richardson, P. and Van Helten, J-J. (1982), p92.
411 James FitzPatrick’s evidence, ICE (1897), p63.
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compound system emerged on the Rand in the years before the South 
African W a r" .412 The m in e -o w n e rs ’ concern that confining the 
w orkers to closed com pounds would harm the “com m erc ia l  
com m unity” suggests that the workers were free to spend their 
money as they wished. If Williams is to be followed, then this 
freedom to engage in exchange should, at least, have given rise to a 
conflict, if not actually expressed a contradiction. For Williams, as 
the variable capital emerges from production already realised, “they 
can just as easily hold onto this money and purchase the means of 
subsistence for the workers. As the producer of the m oney-m aterial 
there is no need for the worker to constitute an integral part of the 
circulation process".413 As will be shown below, such a contradiction 
does, indeed, emerge. But this is not addressed in Williams’ theory.
Hobson, too, holds a contrary view and asserts that if African mine 
workers were to live in the advocated locations, then, “the houses 
they will occupy will be the property of the mines, as also the shops 
where they will be compelled to deal. This has been the policy 
advocated by the chief mining experts’’.414 As has already been 
abundantly shown, it is true that the mine owners advocated  
locations, but Hobson provides no evidence, neither could we find any, 
to suggests that the mines conceived of their own black work-force  
as potential captive consumers of everyday commodities. Indeed, 
quite the contrary. The mines were forever mindful of the interests 
of the “commercial com m unity”. They advocated that the state  
provide these locations. Most of the literature, Van Onselen being the 
notable exception, do not appreciate the evolution of the compound  
system and the gradations that developed within it. Thus does  
Williams, e.g., talk of black m ine-workers, in both diamond digging 
and gold-mining, as being “herded into compounds” right from the 
s ta rt .415
Capital saw urban settlement as a strategy to counter the labourers’ 
tendency to return to the countryside. Although proletarianisation
4 1 2Van Onselen, C. (1976), p131.
4 1 3 Williams, M. (1975), p24.
4 1 4 Hobson, J. (1938), p271.
4 1 5 Williams, M. (1985), p7.
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was clearly underway, the form of labour can at best only be 
described as transitional. Right from the outset, since each capital 
had to individually induce its own labourers one by one out of another 
economy (and at no small expense), it had no interest in losing that 
labour to a general pool of ‘free’ labourers. Particular labourers were  
engaged by particular capitals for particular jobs. Those who did 
leave one employer for another w ere  guilty of ‘desertion’, and 
desertion was one of the biggest problems for gold-mining capital. A 
market for labour did not exist, and as we shall see, could not be 
allowed to exist.
Africans did respond to the presence of market economies in close 
proximity, but related to them in such a way that the market 
economies remained ancillary to their own traditional economy. The 
peculiar role that the countryside, or, more particularly, the reserves 
came to play in the economics of gold-mining only suggested itself 
later, as capital struggled to control the value of the labour-power of 
the work-force it was as yet only trying to create.
Two Environments and the Question of Free W age-Labour
There were two peculiarities about the price of gold in the late 
nineteenth century: the first is that the price was fixed; and the 
second is that it was fixed at a level which bore no relation to its 
v a l u e . 416 The first of these was important in our discussion of 
competition in gold-mining. But it is the second to which we now turn 
in order to explore the significance of the v a lu e  of go ld-m ining  
labour-power for gold production in South Africa.
The literature proposes a link between the fixed gold price and the 
level of black wages on the mines. Mostly, the argument runs as 
follows: The fixed gold price m eant that the high cost of gold 
production could not be passed onto the consumer. The mines, 
therefore, necessarily had to strain every sinew towards cost
41 6 A point clearly picked up by Hirson, B. (1993).
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reductions. This was more effective in some areas than in others. The 
area where cost reductions could be most effectively pursued was in 
the area of wages, both black and white. White workers, however, 
e ith er  through their skills or through an a lliance  with the  
s ta te /cap ita l,  m anaged to escape most of this. B lack labour, 
consequently , had to bear this burden. Their wages w ere thus 
extremely low when compared to white wages, were the first to be 
attacked, and, underwent virtually no real increase from the eighteen 
nineties until the nineteen seventies.
If labo ur-pow er is accepted to be a commodity, then it must be 
discussed as a commodity. W hat all the literature lacks is a 
consistent treatment of labour-pow er as a commodity. It is treated 
as a commodity only in so far as it has a price and the precise 
magnitude of that price is subject to the laws of supply and demand. 
The story of black labour on the gold mines thus reduces itself to one 
of a struggle between capital and labour over the le v e l  of African 
wages. Duncan Innes, e.g., says that the high labour costs, “could not 
be resolved without restructuring the labour-supply in such a way  
that either the supply increased or the demand decreased. These were 
the only ways in which wages could be reduced...”.417 Innes appears to 
consider the price of labour-power to be secular. The question of 
value never arises for him. Neither does it for Peter Richardson, 
whose discussion of the importation to the W itw atersrand  of 
indentured Chinese labour is examined below.
Although not equipped with the term ‘value of labo ur-pow er’, the 
category lay at the centre of gold-mining capital’s conceptualisation  
of the w ages problem. In a conceptualisation which departs from 
exchange value as the fundamental category, the value of labour-  
power can only be expressed as the cost of living.418 The incisiveness 
of capital’s dealing with this question comes across most pristinely
4 1 7 lnnes, D. (1984), pp28-9. At this particular point Innes was referring to the diamond mines 
at Kimberley, rather than the gold mines on the Witwatersrand. The substantive point, however, 
rem ains.
4 1 8 The value of labour-power includes that expenditure which does not take place via the 
worker’s wage, e.g., state-funded education, although, of course, this comes out of surplus- 
value. In this dissertation we have used the term “value of labour-pow er” without specifying 
whether or not it includes state expenditure on labour-power reproduction.
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in the statement by William Hall, California civil engineer, to the ICE 
of 1897. Hall explains that:
“The cost of living must be a fair index of the wage to be paid, in order that the 
workman remain contented in whatever capacity he may be serving. Those who 
labour only with their hands receive but small margins over living rates, while 
those who have some specially valuable professional or managerial ability demand 
and get wide margins. Nevertheless, living expenses is an index to the wage or 
salary in each grade of service, separately, and for each locality”.419
This spokesperson of capital is a theoretical giant against Williams 
and Innes. Not only does he capture the concept of the value of labour- 
power and lay it at the heart of the wages question, he also 
appreciates that the value of labour-power is different for different 
categories of labour, and that the value of labour-pow er varies  
ge o g rap h ic a lly . This very point is given carefu l theoretica l  
examination by the liberal economist Edna Bonacich in her article A 
Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market, which appeared  
in the journal Am erican Sociological R e v ie w * 20 Bonacich’s starting 
point is a simple one: “To be split, a labor market must contain at 
least two groups of workers whose price of labor differs for the 
same work, or would differ if they did the same work”.421 She deals 
with the value of labour-power as the “price of labour”, which refers 
to:
“labor’s total cost to the employer, including not only wages, but the cost of 
recruitment, transportation, room and board, education, health care, ...and the cost 
of labor unrest. The degree of worker ‘freedom’ does not interfere with this 
calculus: the cost of a slave can be estimated in the same monetary units as that of a 
wage earner, from his purchase price, living expenses, policing requirements, and 
so on’’.422
At this point in history, the reduction of black wages was not only 
consistent with capitalist economy, it was also consistent with 
economy in general. This economy was expending more than the 
necessary portion of its aggregate human labour on the reproduction 
of this particular kind of labour-power. Its reduction in that place, at  
that time was a progressive step; an anti-waste measure.
4 1 9 William Hall’s evidence, ICE (1897), p420.
4 2 0 Bonacich, E. (1972).
421 ibid., p549.
* 2 2 ibid.
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Innes and so many others see the question only within the narrow 
confines of trade union wage struggles. Other developments are then 
explained in terms of this struggle. Thus, e.g., are the Reserves  
conceived as enabling capital to reduce the level of wages, and the 
compounds conceived as preventing their occupants from organising 
to increase it. The literature appears to be more concerned with the 
division of surplus-value than with its production.
If we are concerned with surp lus-va/ue production, then we must be 
concerned with the v a lu e  of the labour-pow er from which springs 
that surplus. Capital is interested in surplus-value production, and 
early  South African g o ld -m in in g  capita l w as certa in ly  most 
interested in the value of labour-pow er. With this known, capital 
would know the capacity of that labour-power to yield surplus-value. 
It was a simple matter of a commodity’s technical specification. The 
structural shortage of unskilled black labour on the Witwatersrand  
right up to the Act of Union in 1910,423 together with the fact that 
most Africans brought their s u rp lu s  labour-tim e, rather than their 
n e c e s s a r y  labour-tim e into the circuit of capital, meant that the 
value of their labour-power could not, by the very nature of the case, 
be known. Skilled white labour was in short supply too, but white 
labourers brought their necessary labour-tim e into the circuit of 
capital. Computing the value of their labour-pow er was therefore a 
stra ightforw ard m atter.
For Wolpe, though, the crucial distinction is that white workers have 
no access to the means of production, while black workers do. These  
m eans of production, for W olpe, exist in the R eserves . The  
environm ent within which the white worker reproduces himself is 
restricted to the urban environment, while his black counterpart does 
so in an area comprising both the urban environment and the Reserves. 
This enables capital to pay the worker less than the value of his 
labour-power on the assumption that the difference is made up for by 
Reserve production. Wolpe puts it thus:
“When the migrant labourer has access to means of subsistence, outside of the
capitalist sector, as he does in South Africa, then the relationship between wages
4 2 3 The political unification and ultimate independence of the four British colonies comprising 
British South Africa.
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and the cost of production and reproduction of labour-power is changed. That is to 
say, capital is able to pay the worker below the cost of his reproduction. In the first 
place, since in determining the level of wages necessary for the subsistence of the 
migrant worker and his family, account is taken of the fact that the family is 
supported, to some extent, from the product of agricultural production in the 
Reserves, it becomes possible to fix wages at the level of subsistence of the 
individual worker"4 2 4 .
One problem with Wolpe is his lack of periodisation. Despite the 
‘d o m inance ’ of the capitalist mode of production over the pre­
capitalist modes, this dominance appears to be static. After all, up 
until the discovery of diamonds, capital had but a to e -h o ld  in 
southern Africa. From the discovery of diamonds till the eve of the 
unification of South Africa, although capital was on the ascent and 
the African economies steadily being undermined, the ‘dominance’ of 
capital was not yet a clear-cut matter. But the relationship then was 
different from what it was prior to the m id -1 8 7 0 s . Today the 
reserves have all but collapsed. What is there for the capitalist mode 
of production to dominate? Part of W olpe’s problem is that he does 
not say what this ‘dominance’ consists in. He does not say what 
exactly it is about the capitalist mode of production which makes it 
‘dominant’ over other modes of production. Another part relates to his 
object. He tries to give an account of the labour reserves without 
rigorously examining and applying the category value of labour-power. 
In other words, for Wolpe, the value of labour-power must serve to 
explain the reserves, rather than the reserves giving expression to 
certain developments hinging around the value of labour-power.
W e shall restrict our response merely to making a few brief points. 
Much theoretical headaches have been suffered over how to account 
for workers who have access to the means of production. This 
conundrum has its origin in a notion which has taken root in a 
particularly mechanical brand of Marxism, that the proletariat, by 
definition, is ‘freed’ from the means of production. The point is not 
whether he has access to the means of production, but whether his 
n e c e s s a r y  labour expenditure sets those means of production in 
motion inside or outside of the circuit of capital. If this is done 
within the circuit, then the worker could own the entire factory, he 
would still only be able to reproduce his la b o u r-p o w er when
4 2 4 Wolpe, H. (1972), p434.
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summoned to do so by capital, which owns his labour-power. Where 
the use of such means of production occurs outside the circuit of 
capital, then the worker can only be allowed to exercise his surp lus  
labour-tim e on it. In the case of the South African labour-reserves  
(which is not within the concerns of this thesis) it is the entire 
labour-time of the worker’s wife and children, plus a portion of his 
own surplus  labour-time which are brought to bear on the means of 
production in land.
It is more usual for workers to have access to some means of 
production than not at all, be it a plot of land in the case of the Third 
World, or a box of tools in the case of the industrialised world. 
Telephones, sewing machines and cars— all owned by workers— are all 
means of production. Access to by the workers to their own means of 
production is on capital’s terms. It is capital’s fine-tuning of the 
working class to its requirements. Workers with “access” to the 
means of production under conditions of capitalist production find 
that such access does not free them from capital. It is indeed c ap ita l  
which has such access to these means of production, the worker 
serving merely as the most effective caretaker of them. A great deal 
of mysticism surrounds this question and many others relating to the 
reserves. But this is not the place for trying to examine these.
What is interesting about W olpe’s conception is not so much that he 
sees (migrant) black workers and white workers as belonging to 
different reproductive environments (a number of writers do that), 
but that for blacks the re la tionsh ip  between wages and the value of 
labour-pow er is different from that for whites. W o lp e ’s general 
theory may be an unconvincing one, but his starting point is correct. 
This is the same as saying that black labour-power and white labour- 
power each has a different relation to capital. The same is said by 
Richardson and Van Helten, and the same is said by Ticktin.
Ticktin’s real exploration of the category of value of labour-power is 
when he makes a distinction between the value of labour-power in the 
colonies and the value of labour-power in the metropolitan areas. For 
T ic k t in ,
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“There is a particular problem when it comes to the wages of the workers in the 
colonies. They receive lower wages than their metropolitan counterparts, 
permitting a higher rate of surplus value even if the local agents may receive only a 
small proportion of that surplus value. On the other hand, the value of their labour- 
power is nationally determined, not internationally, so that they may actually not 
be superexploited, though the rate of extraction of surplus value may be very 
high”.425
It must first be clarified that by superexploitation, Ticktin means, 
“paid below the value of their labour power”.426 The proposition is 
sound and more coherent than in the case of either Wolpe or Williams, 
but it cannot simply be put in this form if we are to examine its 
w o rk in g -o u t in a particular context. Th ree  such contexts are  
identified and briefly discussed by Ticktin: the superexploitation of 
minority work-forces, sometimes immigrant, sometimes indigenous, 
in the metropolitan countries (Moroccans in France or blacks in the 
USA); “the colonial w o rker”; and the superexploitation of the 
majority work-force in “a ‘settler econom y’, such as contemporary  
South A frica”.427 For Ticktin, the payment for labour-pow er a t  its 
value is a feature only of industrial capitalism. He says that, “In the 
non-industrial stage of extraction of surplus value the metropolitan 
power had no interest in preserving the lives of the workers who 
were then often paid below va lue”.428 But the proposition itself 
provides the important qualification that, “the value of their labour-  
power is nationally determined, not internationally, so that they may 
actually not be superexploited”.
Ticktin could have made a more forceful argument by enforcing his 
qualification and assessing exploitation against the background of a 
“nationally determined” value of labour-power, in order to determine  
w h e th e r  such exp lo ita tio n  ought to be c h a ra c te r is e d  as 
superexploitation. His argum ent, however, proceeds to assum e  
superexploitation in all instances. A strong case can be made that, 
“In the non-industria l stage of extraction of surplus value the 
metropolitan power had no interest in preserving the lives of the 
workers who were then often paid below va lue”, but then “n o n -
4 2 5 Ticktin, H. (1991), p74.
4 2 6 Ticktin, H. (1991), p76.
* 2 7 ibid., pp76-7.
* 2 8 ibid., p75.
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industrial stage of extraction” needs first to be differentiated into a 
p re -in d u s tr ia l stage of extraction, and a p o s f- in d u s tr ia l  stage of
extraction, i.e., under the dominance of finance capital.429 The most
important differentiating factor being that in the former, one is 
dealing with a world of relatively atomised production, while in the 
latter, the production which lends the era its character is global and 
integrated to a very high degree. In a pre -industria l stage of
extraction, the worker is a particular unit with a particular skill in a
particular place going at a particular price, i.e., an individual of the 
particular; in the post-industrial stage, both capital and labour move 
around the globe (of course capital with much greater facility than 
labour) with labour-processes so standardised that virtually any 
workers anywhere can take almost any employment from any firm. In 
both instances is capital able to take advantage of the difference 
between “nationally determined” values of labour-power— but so, too, 
are the workers able.
It could be argued that the systematic undermining of a society's 
means of production amounts, in an overall sense, to payment below 
the value of labour-power, since incorporated into the value of any 
labour-pow er is the objectified labour of that society's prior history. 
The worker does not only have to reproduce himself and his family, 
but also his entire society, i.e., the means of reproducing his labour- 
power in its current condition. Just because a worker and his family 
physically survive from generation to generation, does not mean that 
he is not being paid below the value of his labour-power. This could 
be one possible argument that in support of the superexploitation  
thesis. In an urban-industrial environment, one would have to show 
decline in the worker' standard of living. A Moroccan worker living in
4 2 9 In the pre-industrial case, exploitation has taken many forms, amongst others tribute, 
slavery, warlordism (or its milder variant, chartered companies), penal colonies (or labour 
camps), indenture or proletarianisation. In the post-industrial case, the forms include both full 
and partial proletarianisation, and full and partial de-proletarianisation. None of these, however, 
by definition implies systematic working to death. Callous murder and systematic extermination 
did take place, but only extremely rarely was this integral to an economic system. Examples of 
these are particular kinds of plunder, e.g., those practised by nomadic raiders such as the 
Vandals (it being not in the interests of settled raiders to destroy the economies they plundered); 
Stalin's and Hitler's labour camps; and, in all ages prior to the abolition of slavery, mining gold 
from lode. Only the latter can unequivocally be characterised as ‘working to death’; were there 
is “no interest in preserving the lives of the workers who were then often [in this case, always] 
paid below value”, to borrow Ticktin’s phrase.
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squalor in France might just as easily have been living in squalor in 
Morocco. Perhaps his condition in France is worse than that in 
Morocco, but perhaps this worker is sending part of his wages to his 
family in Morocco, who through this are able to extricate themselves  
from Moroccan squalor. Likewise Phillipinos on the high seas, or 
Pakistanis in Kuwait, or Z im babw eans in South Africa. Without 
figures, these relations cannot become clear.
Only Trewhela relates the value of labour-power of the gold miners 
directly to the nature of gold as m oney-com m odity. By interfering 
directly in the reproduction process of go ld -m in ing  labour, says 
T re w h e la ,
"Gold-producing capital infringes even on the value-character of labour-power 
itself. The market thus appears as shrunken and restricted at both poles of the 
process of gold-production simultaneously. As product, and as producer, at the end 
of the production process and at its beginning, basic elements in the life—cycle of 
gold-producing capital are reproduced in these non-market forms".430
But this “infringement” on the value-character of labour-pow er is far 
deeper and broader than T rew he la  appears  to apprec ia te . It 
constitutes a fo rm  in itself and relates directly to what Trewhela  
elsewhere very accurately refers to as “a bizarre kind of socialism 
of v a lu e ”.431 The existence of the labour reserves, from which 
Trewhela makes this correct, but nevertheless intuitive insight, are 
but the circumstantial expression of something much more basic. The 
present essay shows that this “bizarre kind of socialism of value” is 
far more fundamental than the mere geographical organisation of 
exploitation. It is already present as a potential in gold’s being "both 
a commodity and not a commodity”, i.e., both a value and not a value; 
both socialism and not socialism. Without a study of the relationship 
between particular use-value and universal use-value, and, especially 
an appreciation of the distinction between them, there is nothing to 
bridge the gap across which Trewhela so brilliantly leaps. The  
spanning structure is the nature of capital which realises itself 
through the production of a commodity for which the contradiction 
between use-value and exchange value has been solved. Gold-mining  
labour is not special on account of gold being special, but on account
4 3 0 Trewhela, P. (1986a), p17.
431 ibid., p16.
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of go ld-m in ing  c a p i ta l  being special. This, too, Trew hela  does  
indicate, but again, only intuitively:
“the entire system of social relationships in the African subcontinent, ... with the 
gold mines at the centre, rests upon the contradiction of capital's promotion of the 
market and its infraction of that market through the migrant labour system; the 
pass laws... [etc.] ...”.432
The relationship of w age-lab our is with capital, and not with the 
particular commodity that capital sets it to. This is the d i f fe r e n t ia  
specifica  of wage-labour. By considering only gold’s universal u s e -  
value  and ignoring its particular u s e -v a lu e  (“I exclude  from 
consideration here the use of gold for non-m oney purposes, e.g., 
dentis try”) ,433 the character of commodity-producing labour as both 
concrete and abstract labour slips from view. All that remains is the 
character of the money-commodity as immediately social. The labour 
which produces it is then taken to be immediately social. It is 
forgotten that such labour produces not the m oney-com m odity, but 
precisely those commodities which have been “exclude[d] from 
consideration”, and without which it could never be the m o n ey -  
commodity. W illiam s’ treatm ent of the gold and labour question  
makes it even more obscure than its appearance causes it to be. To 
build a thesis on Williams, as Trewhela does, is to attempt to turn 
alchemy into chemistry.
W olpe’s words, “since in determining the level of wages necessary  
for the subsistence of the migrant worker and his family, account is 
taken of the fact that the family is supported, to some extent, from 
the product of agricultural production in the Reserves, it becomes  
possible to fix wages at the level of subsistence of the individual 
w o rk e r”,434 are more instructive than he appears to realise. He does 
not ask himself how or when capital went about, “determining the 
level of wages necessary for the subsistence of the migrant worker 
and his family”, i.e., determining the value of the migrant worker’s 
labour-pow er.
4 3 2 /'b/'d., p18.
4 3 3 /b/'cf., p15n. Trewhela falls foul of his own prescription: “Least of all, therefore, can the 
money-commodity segregate itself from the market behind ghetto walls, any more than a king 
remains king without subjects, or the Good Shepherd tend sheep without Christians", ibid., p18.
4 3 4 loc. cit.
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Capital has every interest in determining the value of labour-power  
as accurately as possible. Let us assume a situation where capital is 
under pressure to reduce its cost of production and the most 
effective area  for doing so is in wage reductions. This it will 
normally establish in the market soon enough, when it finds that it 
cannot secure the commodity (labour-power) that it needs for the 
value that it is prepared to cede. As in all exchange, the threshold 
between socially necessary labour-tim e and surplus labour-tim e is 
always tested by both parties to the act. Bonacich goes straight to 
the economic question: “The prejudices of business do not determine 
the price of labor, darker skinned or culturally different persons
being paid less because of them. Rather, business tries to pay as 
little as possible for labor, regardless of ethnicity, and is held in 
check by the resources and motives of labor groups”.435 If, on the one 
hand, the level of wages is too high to reflect the value of labour-
power (as they were for black wages under conditions of such acute
shortage), then capital would want to know the extent to which,
under normal supply conditions, it would be able to reduce these 
wages. If, on the other hand, wages were being paid at the value of 
labour-power, it knows that in order to reduce the level of wages, the 
value of labour-power itself would need to be reduced. The value  of 
labour-power, as distinct from its m arket price, would be one of the 
first things that capital would need to ascertain.
None of the works assessed for this study make this point. The  
attempts of gold-mining capital to compute the value of labour-power  
down to exact pounds, shillings and pence seems, at first, to border 
on miserly obsession. A full account of this may be gleaned from the 
ICE (1897).436 The evidence of James Hay to the Commission puts the 
problem succinctly:
Jam es Hay: ...In working those mines ...wages are also divided into two classes, 
whites' wages and blacks' [wages]. The cost of white wages depends upon the law of 
supply and demand, and the cost of living of the white people. ... The cost of living of 
the white people depends upon the price of food they consume, and that is made up in
4 3 5 Bonacich, E. (1972), p553. “The conflict... takes place between the m arketable value 
demanded by the supplier and the marketable value supplied by the demander”, MECW , Vol. VI,
p 1 18.
4 3 6 ICE (1897), passim.
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this country largely by the charges on railway carriage and Customs dues, in 
addition to the original cost of the goods at the place where they came from. The next 
question is that of native wages, and it is a very important one, not only for the
mines, but for the farmers, and everybody who requires labour. ! think we are all
agreed that the natives are too highly paid in this country. But the difficulty is, how
can the wages by reduced...437
The value of white labour-power is known, or at least knowable; the 
value of black labour-power is not only unknown, but also unknowable. 
White workers brought their n e c e s s a r y  labour to the mines. The  
limits of that necessity are therefore testable by capital. It knows 
both how and to what extent white wages can be reduced. Not only 
does the boundary between necessary and surplus labour for blacks 
lie outside of the circuit of capital and hence beyond capital’s ability 
to test, but capital is unable even to approach this on account of 
supply and demand, i.e., there still being too much competition for 
black labour.
The truth of this was brought home to capital with its first attempt
at reducing black w ages. Harris, in analysing the relationship
between the African economies and the mines, gives the following 
account:
“The benefits of the redistributive economy ...provided them with the land and 
labour needed to subsist outside the wage economy. This acted as ...a  weapon with 
which to combat low wages and poor conditions on the labour market. Thus when the 
Chamber of Mines tried to reduce African wages in 1 8 9 0 -9 1 , thousands of 
Mogambicans were able to withdraw their labour by returning home and in this way 
were able successfully to force a return to the old wage level"438.
This clearly does not stem simply from black miners being in great 
demand. Workers can be in great demand and still be unable to 
withdraw their labour, simply because they would starve. This was 
not the case here. They were fully able to reproduce their labour-  
power with or without mine labour. Their necessary labour was 
exercised outside the capitalist economy. Or, as Bonacich puts it, 
“The worker’s standard of living does not, therefore, depend on his 
earnings on the job in question, since his central source of
4 3 7 ibid., p4.
4 3 8 Harris, P. (1982), p157.
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employment or income lies e lsew here”.439 All labour they exercise 
outside of their own economies was therefore superfluous to their 
needs (until such time, of course, as their needs were to expand or 
their economies to shrink). Therefore all monies they earned were  
superfluous to their needs. The mine owners took the trouble to study 
this question. One of their number, giving testimony before the ICE, 
puts it thus:
George Albu: The reduction of native wages is necessary for two reasons, the one 
is to reduce our whole expenditure, and the second has a very far-reaching effect 
upon the conditions which may prevail with regard to native labour in the future. 
The native at the present moment receives a wage which is far in excess of the 
exigencies of his existence. The native earns between 50s. and 60s. per month, and 
then he pays nothing for food and lodging, in fact, he can save almost the whole 
amount he receives. At the present rate of wages the native will be enabled to save a 
lot of money in a couple of years. If the native can earn £20 a year, it is almost 
sufficient for him to go home and live off the fat of his land. In five or six years' 
time the native population will have saved enough money to make it unnecessary for 
them to work any more. The consequences of this will be most disastrous for the 
industry and the state. This question applies to any class of labour, and in any 
country, whether it be Africa, Europe or America. I think if the native gets 
sufficient pay to save £5 a year, that sum is quite enough for his requirements, and 
will prevent natives from becoming rich in a short space of time.
C om m issioner: You say the native does not require luxuries, and if he has worked 
for a year he has saved enough to go back to his kraal and remain idle ?
GA: Yes.
C: Can you suggest any remedy for this?
GA: The only remedy I can suggest is that we pay the native a wage which, whilst 
enabling him to save money, will hinder him becoming exceptionally rich.440
To most scholars this would stand as an exam ple  of extreme  
callousness on the part of gold-m ining capital. The truth is that 
capitalism did provide the African societies with an opportunity to 
convert a great deal of their s u r p lu s  labour into wealth. To be 
wealthy in a society with relatively few needs to address, is not the 
same as being wealthy in a society with relatively many needs.
4 3 9 Bonacich, E. (1972), p551. This is not a uniquely southern African phenomenon, as Bonacich 
explains:
“The characteristic feature of the labor market in most of Africa has always been the 
massive circulation of Africans between their villages and paid employment outside. In 
some places villagers engage in w age-earning seasonally. ...The  African villager, the 
potential migrant into paid employment, has a relatively low, clearly defined and rigid 
income goal: he wants money to pay head and hut taxes, to make marriage payments 
required of prospective bridegrooms, or to purchase some specific consumer durable (a 
bicycle, a rifle, a sewing machine, a given quantity of clothing or textiles, etc.)", ibid.
4 4 0 ICE (1897), pp13-14. “If wages [of workers who work only to amass a certain amount of 
money] were to rise, workers would reach their desired income and withdraw more quickly 
from the market", Bonacich, E., op. cit.
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Capital is never interested in paying more than the value for labour- 
power (or for any other commodity, for that matter). In this case it 
was definitely paying for labour-power higher than its value. It was 
concerned to bring the price it paid for this commodity more in line 
with its value.
The wage is the amount of value, in money terms, which expresses 
the equivalent of the worker’s necessary labour-time. The only way in 
which capital can know the quantity of that necessary labour-time is 
by bringing its exercise into the circulation process  of capital. How 
was this to be done? To borrow Hobson’s words,
“There are only two genuinely economic forces which will bring such labour more 
largely into the labour market: The growth of population with increased difficulty 
in getting a full easy subsistence from the soil is one; the pressure of new needs and 
a rising standard of consumption is the other”.441
“Genuinely economic forces” are things which take time to run their 
course and capital is not something which can always wait. If the 
population is not growing fast enough to exceed the capacity of the 
land to support it, then the land must be reduced till it can no longer 
support the population; if new needs are not being added fast enough 
to exhaust the social product, then that social product must be 
reduced to the point where it can no longer support the needs. Put 
differently: either destroy the capacity of the African economies to 
engage all of the worker’s necessary labour-tim e; or seize the 
labourer’s surplus labour without exchange, thereby leaving him with 
the product of only his necessary labour.
The systematic emasculation of the African areas took place through 
land dispossessions and the extraction of a rent. The latter took two 
forms: ‘taxation’ and price fixing. The various taxes imposed upon 
different African economies (hut tax, dog tax, poll tax, etc.) were not 
taxes as ordinarily understood. They had little to do with state 
revenue and no state services were had for them in exchange. When 
revenue was mentioned in this context, it was purely incidental:
“According to the native laws the actual tax per native in the native districts 
amounts to about £2 10s.; the only exception to the liability of this payment being
441 Hobson. J. (1938), p255.
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natives residing as servants under white persons. Thus, if the dignity of labour 
were impressed upon them by the enforcement of this law, we are likely to get a 
larger supply. The other purpose served would be -  that such boy coming to work 
would earn money, and after completing his term of service he would have sufficient 
funds to enable him on his return to his district, when called upon by the 
Government, to pay all his taxes, which would be an additional revenue to the 
Governm ent”.442
The object was to siphon off the surplus labour of the African
economies. Or, as Hobson puts it, “not to provide revenue, but to 
compel labour”.443 But it was no use this surplus labour being offered 
to the state as a c o r v e e  (the s ta te ’s own labour needs
n o tw ith s ta n d in g )444. Neither was it efficacious for this labour to be 
seized as particular commodities, e.g., cattle or maize (the shortage 
of these, too, notwithstanding). Surplus labour had to be handed over 
to the state in the form of money, hard cash. Only two opportunities 
existed for Africans to transform surplus labour into money. Either 
the labour was objectified into agricultural produce and disposed of 
for cash in the market, or living labour itself was sold for a wage. 
The existence of the first possibility made the second less effective.
“All ...engaged in the collection of native taxes, should discourage the
system of the natives selling their cattle to meet the tax, and by 
their paying only in coin, there would be a greater necessity for them 
to come out and work”, urged the mine owner George Denny.445 Even 
those African economies which still traded their surplus produce by 
barter, quickly switched to cash. The problem was solved both by 
further undermining the productive capacity of the land through 
increased dispossessions and by through fixing of the price and 
centralised buying of African produce. This am ounted to the 
extraction of a rent by settler agriculture from African agriculture.
For those who went into w age-labour, the handing-over of part of 
their earnings to the state amounted to a neutralisation of at least 
part of their surplus labour. A portion of their labour-tim e was 
removed from the surplus side of their economic balance sheets and
4 4 2 Charles Goldmann’s evidence, ICE (1897), p117.
4 4 3 Hobson, J. (1938), p268. Although Hobson makes the same distinction, he argues it slightly 
differently. See pp257-8, 266, where this device is discussed as integral to colonial land 
dispossession and proletarianisation, and pp268-72 for its examination in South Africa.
4 4 4 According to Hobson a corvee  was imposed in Natal. See Hobson, J. (1938), p256.
4 4 5 George Denny’s evidence, ICE (1897), p375.
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added to the necessary side, thereby shifting the boundary between 
surplus labour-time and necessary labour-time in favour of the latter. 
Part of the worker’s necessary labour-time, though not yet all of it, 
was now spent ins ide  the circuit of capital. And since this was the 
object, the ‘tax’ in fact became superfluous once the worker becomes 
established as a wage-labourer. Mine owners could see this, as George 
Albu, e.g., insisted before the 1897 Commission of Enquiry:
C o m m iss io n er: If a man can live without work, how can you force him to work? 
George Albu: Tax him then. If I have £5 per month to spend, I don't want to do any 
work; but if the Government passes a law that all gentlemen at large... must pay £3 
per month tax, there only remains £2, and I am forced to work.446
A hut tax of £2 was imposed in the ZAR in 1895,447 but by 1897 a 
Commissioner on the ICE found it necessary to object to yet another 
call for taxation of blacks by pointing out that, “They are already 
taxed higher than the white population, and it would be unreasonable 
to tax them much more than they are taxed”.448
But these efforts at coercing labour out of the African economies 
began to prove successful. A sufficiently large influx of Africans to 
the Rand was underway between 1895 and 1897 for the mines to 
declare, “at the present moment we have sufficient labour”,449 and 
for the phenomenon to be described as a ‘Kaffir Boom’. But this influx 
did not bring the thriving location settlements which the mines were  
campaigning for. This was a time when releasing workers from the 
Rand, or, indeed, from the premises, was without guarantee that they 
would return. Even by 1889 the Chamber stressed that:
“the local mining industry is subject to outside competition in the Native labour 
market. Other mining districts offer wages almost as high as the Rand, the Railways 
being constructed in Natal and the Cape Colony draw away large number of Kaffirs, 
and the Boksburg Tramway is employing 1,500 to 2,000 Kaffirs at very high rates 
of pay".450
By 1904, “three-quarters of a million peasants in the Transvaal had 
access to land on terms more favourable than the 123 000 on
4 4 6 ibid., p22.
4 4 7 Hobson, J. (1938), p269.
4 4 8 ICE (1897), p230.
4 4 9 George Albu’s evidence, ibid., p14.
4 5 0 W C M  (1889), p10.
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G o v e rn m e n t locations or the 50 000  A fricans in fu l l- t im e
e m p lo y m e n t”451. Between the end of the South African W ar and the 
imposition of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, about 25 000 
Africans in the Transvaal went to seek te m p o ra ry  employment each 
y e a r .452 Although part of this would be accounted for by agriculture, 
rail and road-bu ild ing , the largest em ployer at the time was, 
nevertheless, the gold mines on the Witwatersrand.
Such workers, emerging as they did out of a Spartan environment, 
were now immersed in an ocean of new wants. The contradiction now 
is that the condition which allows for the value of labour-power to be 
known is the very condition which makes that value fluid.453 And in 
the specific condition of the black workers with their relatively 
frugal needs, that fluidity meant increase. These new needs are then 
assimilated into their standard of living. Thus does the value of their 
labour-power increase. Of course, when they acquire new needs they 
are also prepared to work more to meet those needs. The point is 
made by Henry Jennings, mine owner, when recounting his experience 
with locations in Venezuela,
“They came from different islands, and they had these little locations. There was a 
certain amount of rivalry between them, their wants increased, and that stimulated 
their ambition, and they were finally willing to do more work than at first".454
But such increase in the value of labour-pow er, higher absolute 
surplus-va lue notwithstanding, runs directly against the solution to 
the second labour problem— that of the reduction of costs. The  
problem was exacerbated by the fact that from about 1895, the gold 
mines no longer offered the only means of making a living on the 
Rand. There were increased opportunities for both employment and 
self-em ploym ent, small as these were in comparison to mine work. 
Charles van Onselen describes the situation of the ‘houseboys’ 
(general domestic workers) and the self-employed washermen in the 
1890s around the time of the so-called ‘Kaffir Boom’. Houseboys were 
earning on average a monthly wage of eighty shillings in contrast to
451 Bundy, C. (1979), p209.
4 5 2 /b/c/., p212.
4 5 3 0 n e  is reminded of the physicist’s conundrum: the very act of determining the position of an 
electron, alters its position.
4 5 4 ICE (1897), p229.
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the average fifty shillings per month of black mine workers. Although 
van Onselen does not give a figure for w asherm en’s income, it is 
clear that, despite its changing fortunes, hand-laundering did offer a 
viable occupation. The accommodation of so many white mine workers 
in boarding houses and the absence of so many European men’s wives 
meant that the market for this particular service was very large. 
Indeed, large enough for Johannesburg to boast half a dozen steam  
laundries by 1898 .455
The point is that despite the fact that the manner in which black 
mine labour was recruited militated against the development of free 
w age-labour, free w age-labour was nevertheless developing around 
the mines on the Witwatersrand and directly ancillary to it. Normal 
urban residence for black miners meant their induction into a pool of 
fluid w age-labour. There is every reason to believe that in such an 
environment, with the mines under pressure to keep labour costs 
down, they would quickly have lost their work-force. Somehow, they 
had to be near to the mines, yet not form part of a general free 
labour-force .
The solution lay in the closed compound system. Although mine 
owners were as late as 1897 still expressing them selves against 
compounds for fear of scaring off potential recruits and because of 
reluctance to antagonise the “commercial community”, the issue was  
brought to a head by the South African W ar and its immediate  
aftermath, when the gold mines found themselves in a severe labour 
crisis. W age reductions were pushed through during the South African 
W ar while the mines were, in any case, on a m uch-reduced staff as 
production had been interrupted. There was very little reason for idle 
black mine workers with a secure base in the countryside (which 
most of them had) to remain in a very dangerous war zone. The return 
of the Rand to production in 1901 found the area  in the grip of a 
serious shortage of labour. For most scholars, the significance of this 
state of affairs lies only in that it prompted the introduction of
4 5 5 Van Onselen, C. (1982a), pp18-19. Van O nselen’s two-volume study of the social and 
economic history of the early W itwatersrand adds a stimulating human dimension to these 
questions. This is a well-researched and richly-anecdoted work which is an ideal complement to 
theory.
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indentured C h in ese  labour in 1904, which served to further
exacerbate the race and labour question. This, in our view, misses the 
most important points: firstly, the significance of in d e n tu re d  labour
as a form; and, secondly, the role of this labour-form in effecting the
changeover from one form of proletarianisation to another.
The problem of creating a world proletariat had its particular 
expression in South Africa in two areas: sugar production in Natal, 
and gold production on the Witwatersrand. The specific examination 
of early Natal sugar production is not of interest here. W hat is
important is that the form of labour was indenture. On a world scale, 
by the time of the opening of the goldfields on the Witwatersrand, not 
only was slavery long abolished, but indentured labour was past its 
zenith around the 1850s.456 Although a labour-force did not exist in 
the gold-mining area and had to be created from scratch, such labour- 
force was never conceived of as either slaves or indentured labour, 
but as w age-lab ourers . The peculiarities of lode production under 
inappropriate go ld -p r ice  conditions, together with the manner in 
which proletarianisation was proceeding, m eant that the narrow  
v a lu e -s p e c if ic a t io n s  required by go ld -m in ing  capital could for 
decades not be met. This could be accommodated up to a point, but the 
upward pressure on the value of gold-mining labour-power became  
intolerable for capital in the wake of the South African War.
The source most cited on the Chinese labour question in early South 
African gold-m ining is Peter Richardson’s article The Recruiting of 
Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold-M ines, 1903-  
1 9 0 8 .457 Richardson provides a w e ll-researched  account of this 
comparatively obscure chapter in Witwatersrand gold-mining history. 
It is an account, though, which does not attempt to offer a political 
economy of indentured labour. Indeed, the fact that the labour was 
indentured is, for Richardson, purely incidental (the word ‘indentured’
4 5 6 “ln British Guiana the local labor force, composed mainly of African ex-slaves, called a 
series of strikes in 1842 and 1847 against planters’ attempts to reduce their wages. Plantation 
owners responded by using public funds to import over 50,000 cheaper East Indian indentured 
workers. A similar situation obtained in Mississippi, where Chinese were brought in to undercut 
freed blacks", Bonacich, E. (1972), p554.
4 5 7 Richardson, P. (1977).
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appears only twice in the text). For Richardson, as for scholarship in
general, the importance of this labour is that it was Chinese.
To Richardson’s credit, though, it has to be said that he does situate 
this episode in the context of a colonially initiated, “international 
movement of labour”.458 That this particular system of international 
movement of labour takes over from another which had just come to a 
close, viz. the slave trade, and that its form stands m id-w ay between
slavery and w a g e -la b o u r , is not drawn out by Richardson. An
institution with the capacity to organise the procurement, transfer 
and application of labour on a mass scale across the globe is not 
examined for its theoretical significance. This is despite the very 
detailed description of the “high degree of vertical integration” of 
the company (in fact a central organ of the W itwatersrand g o ld -  
mining industry as a whole) which, “operated as recruiting and 
shipping agency in China, receiving agent in Natal and co-ordinating  
and advising agent in the Transvaal".459
That indentured labour is less free than proletarian labour is 
appreciated by Richardson, but again, the significance of this is 
confined to accounting for the devices employed by the gold-mines to 
conceal that fact. “The necessity of securing indentured as opposed 
to ‘free’ labour for the Transvaal mines, had meant the employment of 
reputable western firms to give the whole operation a semblance of 
bona fides”.460 Evidence for the importance of this distinction in 
political economy is provided by Richardson himself, when he quotes 
an account of Japanese recruitment of free w ag e -la b o u r  from the 
same area in China:
“Already difficulties are experienced whenever the Japanese require coolies and 
send a ship to Chefoo to collect them. All able-bodied men are taken, they are paid 
good wages, there is no medical examination, no questions are asked and coolies are 
not tied down by strict regulations. They ...can return when they please”.461
This split in the Chinese labour-force in the recruiting area of China 
into a coerced labour-force and a free labour-force, reflected exactly
4 5 8 /b/'d., p85.
4 5 9 /b/d., p108.
4 6 0 /b/'d., p97.
461 Quoted in ibid., p106.
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the kind of transformation taking place in the black work-force on 
the Witwatersrand at the time. One section of the labour-force had 
the value of its labour-power held fast, while that of the other was 
free to adapt. Those blacks on the Witwatersrand outside of the 
employ of the gold-mines found themselves the envy of those in gold-  
mining. The same “difficulties" existed between the two branches of 
the newly bifurcating work-force in China.
On the W itw a te rs ran d , 1 903  saw w a g e - in c re a s e s ,  endem ic
‘desertions’ and an acute labour shortage, and this amidst increased 
pressure to expand production.462 The possibility that the mines 
would ever secure for themselves the stable, cheap labour-force upon 
which their very operations depended was now seriously in question. 
In 1903 , “most South African blacks persistently rejected mine
em ploym ent, especially underground, where any alternatives were  
open to them. Africans knew well enough about conditions on the 
R a n d . . . ’’ .463 In this year and in pursuit of a solution, the gold-mining 
industry, firstly, formed a Com mittee of Agents to look into the 
feasibility of Chinese labour importation,464 and secondly, turned to
the diamond industry for help. A special Commission was dispatched
to study and report on the closed compound system operated at De 
Beers. This system served as a model for the closed compounds in 
which the Chinese workers who started arriving a year later were  
housed. However, once the Chinese had been repatriated in 1907, “the 
remaining compounds, combined with the Pass Laws and the contract 
system, were the central institutions of African labour control in 
South African mining industry”.465
Having started life as a mining camp, Johannesburg in 1887 boasted a 
total population of 3 000 ,466 which by 1904 had grown to number 158 
580. Initially, the only employment available on what was later to
4 6 2 According to Van Onselen, the Cinderella Prison, opened on the East Rand in 1905, “supplied 
local mines with convict labour”. See Van Onselen, C. (1982b), p179.
4 6 3 Jeeves, A. (1985), p11.
4 6 4 Richardson, P. (1977), p86. The idea, however, has already been mooted at least since 
1896. See letter of Markham to Cham ber of Mines, 19 February 1896, reproduced in W CM  
(1896), p 167.
4 6 5 Van Onselen, C. (1976), p131 -2.
4 6 6 Van Onselen. C. (1986b), p2.
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develop into the Witwatersrand gold complex, was in mining. But 
already by 1889, with the W itw atersrand total black population  
numbering between 15 000 and 17 000, only 5 978 blacks were  
employed in mining. Of the remainder, 1 750 were employed on the 
construction of the Boksburg tram way467, an infrastructural project 
necessitated by the east-w est extension of the gold-mining area. The  
total permanent population of the Witwatersrand in that year was 30 
000, with a “floating population" of 100 000 .468
Table: 3 W itwatersrand and Black M ining Population, 1889-1904
Year Number of Total Black Total White Total Wits
Black Miners Population Population Population
1 8 8 9 5 978 16 500 13 500 30 000
1 8 9 4 40 888 - - -
1 8 9 6 - 51 163 (Jhb) 50 907 (Jhb) 102 070 (Jhb)
1 8 9 9 96 704 - - -
1904 (June) 95 309 74 678 (Jhb) 83 902 (Jhb) 105 580 (Jhb)
Sources: various
The goldmines, even though they remained the raison d ’etre  of the 
Witwatersrand, was by no means the sole employer for very long. A 
free market for labour developed around the mines despite the 
continued existence of the controlled labo u r-en g ag em en t system  
which characterised W itwatersrand employm ent when gold-m ining  
was the only form of employment. This system has been undermined 
right from the word ‘go ’, with the competition for labour between  
mines, and later merely extended to competition between a multitude 
of employers covering a whole range of employs.
The extent of this range of employment opportunities for blacks on 
the Witwatersrand, may be gauged both indirectly, from the number 
of whites as a proportion of the total population (all employers were  
white), and directly from the numbers of blacks engaged in other 
forms of employment, and a comparison of their incomes against that
4 6 7 W CM  (1889), pp10-11.
4 68The Statesman’s Year Book (1890), p923.
241
to be had in gold-mining. In 1896, Johannesburg, the centre of the 
Witwatersrand, had a total population of 102 078, of which whites 
accounted for 50 907 .469 In that same year,
“central Johannesburg was served by: 3,253 domestic sen/ants (mostly black), 
3,054 servants (white and coloured), 402 cooks (white), 345 laundresses 
(coloured), 341 waiters (white), 235 housekeepers (white), 219 nurses, 165 
grooms, 146 ‘houseboys', 106 ‘kitchenboys’, 84 coachmen (black and white), 8 
stable-keepers, 5 charwomen, 5 stewards, 4 mother’s helps, 3 valets and 1 
page."470
The monthly wages for a trained ‘houseboy’ in 1896 ranged from £3 to 
£6, in addition to which he received some payment in kind (usually 
food and clothing). The black mineworker, by contrast, could expect 
an average income of £3 0s. 10d.471 But already between 1887 and 
1892, an untra ined  ‘houseboy’ (a “raw Kaffir") made between £3 and 
£4 per month.472 This means that this option was immediately open 
to the newly-arrived mine recruit one year after the fields were  
declared. By 1904 there were 83 902 whites in Johannesburg out of a 
total population of 158 5 8 0 ,473 while by 1906, the town had between  
25 000 and 30 000 ‘houseboys’ earning a monthly wage of between £4 
and £5 per month, the same as a European housemaid.474
Particularly instructive is Van O n se len ’s account of how Africans 
during the first few months after the war, “held aloof from domestic 
service”, where cash wages were between £2 10s. and £3 10s.475 In 
this context, what chance was there of their freely engaging in mine 
labour at the then average going rate of £1 13s. per month?476 
Already by 1899, ‘houseboys’ were earning an average monthly wage  
of eighty shillings in contrast to the average fifty shillings per 
month of black mine workers.477 “Since the reduction of mine boys’
46 9 The Statesman’s Year Book (1901), p225.
470Van Onselen, C. (1982b), p3.
471 Gool, S. (1983), p88.
472Van Onselen, C. (1986b), p6.
4 7 3 The Statesman’s Year Book (1905), p246.
4 7 4 Van Onselen, C. (1986b), pp9-10.
475Van Onselen, C. (1986b), p10.
4 7 6 Richardson, P. (1977), p87.
47 7 Van Onselen, C. (1986a), p18.
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wages there has been a much larger supply of kitchen boys”, reported 
The Star  after the reduction of black mineworkers’ wages in 1896.478
After the end to hostilities in 1902, one may begin to speak of 
distinctive W itwatersrand black w o rk -fo rce  not only as a social 
entity, but as an entity in political economy. The de facto  free  
movement of labour across the Reef meant that the value of black 
workers’ labour-power was beginning to tend towards an average on 
the Witwatersrand, that average being much higher than the average  
for the gold-mining work-force. At this point one cannot yet speak of 
manufacturing industry. The tendency of capital to find in its labour-  
power utilisation the statistically average ‘m a n -h o u r ’ (what Ticktin 
describes as the tendency towards abstract labour) cannot yet be 
identified. Nevertheless, the bifurcation of the black work-force into 
a relatively unfree black mine work-force and relatively free non­
mine work-force was already a fait accompli. There is a great deal of 
evidence to support a thesis that the eventual construction of two 
distinct labour-forces along racial lines across the entire South 
African economic landscape, has its origin in this bifurcation of the 
black work-force at birth.
The g o ld -m in ing  industry, despite  the large increase  in the 
W itwatersrand black population, was still wrestling with its old 
bugbear: labour supply. The mines, having paid labour above its value 
since the opening of the fields, have consistently tried to reduce  
black wages to the value of black labour-power. By the end of the 
South African War, however, the target was beginning to shift. 
Although the basic problem of getting a large work-force permanently 
established on the Witwatersrand has been solved, that work-force  
becam e increasingly expensive. Geographical distance has been  
replaced by ‘value distance’ ; demand has been replaced by effective  
demand. The mines could not afford the quantities of black labour it 
required b e c a u s e  that labour was free to move, free to seek the 
highest bidder.
4 78Quoted in Van Onselen, C. (1986b), p7.
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But if the mines could not afford black workers, how could they 
afford Chinese workers? A curious deficiency in R ichardson’s 
otherwise very impressive article is his failure to examine Chinese  
workers’ wages. To take the year 1906 (at the height of the Chinese 
labour experiment): the mines employed 102 420 blacks at £2 12s 3d, 
and 53 062 Chinese at £2 1s 6d.479 The recruiting cost per head per 
annum for black workers was £4 10s. and for Chinese workers £31 
10s., bringing the total cost per head per annum for black workers 
£142  5s. and for Chinese workers £240  16s.,480 almost twice as 
much.
Although the presence of the Chinese workers no doubt contributed to 
the constant fall in black m ine-workers’ wages from £2 15s. in June 
1904, to £2 11s. 11d. in December 1905,481 their role cannot be seen 
merely as one of undercutting. The key lies in their indenture. The 
indentured labourers, while they cost the mines a great deal more, 
formed a secure labour-force. Their contracts were fixed for three 
years, and so were their wages and working conditions, and, since 
they were indentured, so was their employer. In other words, although 
they were expensive, they had all the attributes which the mines 
were looking for in its black labour-force. The mines’ most stubborn 
problem was the apparently inexorable march towards free labour:
“There was a considerable tendency among African mine workers to dessert from 
their jobs and escape from the mines. By the time of the Union, in 1910, the annual 
desertion rate was about 15 per cent. -  about 30,000 out of 180,000”.482
This is despite a state of sem i-indenture already being de jure  in 
place for all black workers in the form of the Masters and Servants 
Laws and the Pass Laws. The first made breach of contract by black 
workers a criminal, rather than a civil offence. The second controlled 
the movement of black workers, thereby serving as an enabler of the 
first. Indentured labour allowed the mines to continue production
4 7 9 Wheatcroft, G. (1986), p221.
4 8 0 Calculated from figures provided in Richardson, P. (1977), p93n28. Black workers remained 
on the mines for periods ranging from six to fifteen months. Our calculations are based on one 
year and we have assumed that all workers were fresh recruits, ignoring returnees, who would 
be slightly cheaper.
4 8 1 /'b/'d., p100.
4 8 2 Johnstone, F. (1976), p37.
244.
while a mechanism was being set in place for isolating the black 
mine work-force from the general development of labour at the time. 
This holds both directly, in that the Chinese compounds became the 
model for the new closed compounds introduced for black workers 
after the departure of the Chinese in 1907, and indirectly, in that 
Masters and Servants Laws and the Pass Laws were made specifically 
applicable to black mine workers by the Native Labour Regulations of 
1 9 1 1 .483
The resort to indentured labour was a retrogressive step inconsistent 
with the general world development of labour at the time. It was also 
retrogressive in that that world movement was beginning to express 
itself in South Africa: a free proletariat was coming into existence  
directly, paradoxically created by the gold-mining industry itself. The  
gold-mining industry, on account of the fixed price of gold, found 
itself with a foot in both worlds: Fluid international capital seeking a 
fluid international labour-force  appeared in go ld-m in ing as fluid 
capital needing to put in place a restricted labour-force. Neither on a 
world scale, nor in South Africa, could restricted labour exist s ide -  
by-side with free labour. The undermining of indentured labour as a 
form came not only from its being, globally speaking, transitional 
between slavery and w age-labour, but also from its contact with 
w a g e -la b o u r  in the particular situation. Being in daily working  
contact with black proletarians, Chinese indentured labourers rioted 
and deserted as part of their demand, “for the slackening of their 
extremely rigid terms of contract, which would allow them at least 
the same freedom as black labourers”.484 Richardson neither explores 
the relation between free and indentured labour, nor situates these 
developments on the Witwatersrand within a world context.
4 8 3 ibid., p35.
4 8 4 Kallaway, P. and Pearson, P. (1986), p i 12. A poster of the time, depicting an immaculately 
attired African, complete with cigar and bicycle, in conversation with two haggardly dressed 
Chinese, explains Chinese desertion with the caption, “Allee same us wantee be like Kaffir". 
Ibid., p118.
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Control over the Value of Labour-Power
There can be no question that the significance of the closed compound 
system in political economy lies in its role as an institution of 
labour control. Some writers have tried to understand the compounds 
in terms of the political economy of mining in the entire southern 
African region.485 But scholarship generally has always understood 
this control in a limited way. The closed compound system is seen 
either as a theft-prevention device (especially in diamond mining), or 
as inhibiting worker organisation, particularly unionisation, or both. 
These views are not being contested. W e wish to argue that these 
areas of control, important as they were, were, in the case of the 
gold-mining industry, secondary to control over the value of labour-  
power.
The tendency for free wage-labour to develop amongst blacks on the 
Witwatersrand despite the non-m arket way in which mine labour was 
procured and allocated, presented the mining industry with the 
problem that its own labour, circulating within a quasi-p lanning  
system, was continuously filtering out of that system to fuse into 
that general body of market-controlled labour. The value of all black 
labour-pow er stood to rise dramatically with the acquisition of a 
host of new needs associated with urban living. Gold-mining capital, 
with the fixed price of its commodity expressing a value much below 
that of unskilled, urban-based labour-power, could therefore simply 
not reproduce itself on the basis of such free wage-labour.
The value of the labour-power of its own black work-force had to be 
restrained. In order to do this, its work-force had to be segregated  
from the general body of labour. The only competition for labour that 
gold-mining capital would be subject to would be amongst its own 
members. Such competition at least held out the prospect of being 
overcome, given the lack of competition to dispose of the product. 
Under conditions of free w a g e -la b o u r  it would com pete with all 
capitals, including those with com m odity -p rices  consistent with
4 8 5 See e.g., Lanning, G. (1979), pp173-4 and Van Onselen, C. (1976), pp128*32.
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labour-values. The closed compound, damaging as this was to the 
ability of the Rand to attract labour, was now forced upon go ld -  
mining capital by the threat that it might end up with no labour at all. 
Its reluctance to resort to repression may even be shown by the fact 
that a daily absentee rate of seldom less than 30%  prior to the South 
African W a r ,486 did not prompt the mines to dem and closed  
compounds.
Ticktin, too, sees abstract labour as restrained from attaining full 
maturity in South Africa, and he, too, ascribes this to the peculiar 
development of labour in the gold-mining industry. But Ticktin traces 
this restraint back to the political events that occurred in the go ld -  
mining area in 1 922 .487 Prior to this date, argues Ticktin, South 
A frica  w as d ev e lo p in g  to w ard s  norm al “a b s tra c t  la b o u r”. 
S u b seq u en tly , abstrac t labour has b eco m e “fra c tu re d ”. The  
implication is that prior to 1 9 2 2 ,488 South Africa had a single, 
unified work-force, its members free to flow across the economic 
landscape in search of capital offering the best return, and that this 
free flow was encouraged by the normal development of capital. We  
hope to have shown that from the very inception of gold-mining, this 
was never the case. Abstract labour could not become fractured 
because there never was abstract labour, or, at least, it was c re a te d  
already fractured.
The normal process by which the value of labour-pow er becomes  
known to capital— that of the lowest wage which will secure the 
requisite labour-power— was already, in part, foreclosed in the case 
of black mine labour w h ere  the labourers  lived in ‘o p en ’ 
accommodation on mine property and received food as part of their 
payment. Every firm has a wage bill and that wage bill is made up of x 
number of individual wages. Where payments are made in kind for part 
of what the worker would ordinarily spend out of his wages, those 
items, although paying towards the value of the worker’s labour-  
power, are no longer part of the wage bill. This is so because they are
4 8 8 Van Onselen, C. (1976), p293n11.
4 8 7 Ticktin, H. (1991), Ch. 4.
4 8 8 The defeat of the Rand Revolt of 1922 also signifies, for Ticktin, the beginning of racial 
discrimination as a system in South Africa. The controversy surrounding this position lies 
outside of the scop of this thesis.
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no longer individually differentiated. Capital procures them as bulk 
items. Hence African food came under “stores” in company accounts, 
and not under “w ages”. It also means that these items could be 
purchased in bulk— not only for all the workers on one mine, but for 
the entire industry.489 Apart from the obvious cost advantages  
associated with, on the one hand, bulk buying, and on the other, 
monopsonistic buying, the most important saving lies in the mines’ 
control over the s ta n d a rd  of the workers’ diet and accommodation, 
transport, etc. In the 1896 Annual Report of the Chamber of Mines, 
e.g., we read of the following two resolutions (unanimously adopted) 
regarding the regulation of compounds:
2. Re Food -  That the maximum allowance of mealie meal be two and a half pounds 
per boy per day.
3. That the maximum allowance of meat be two pounds per boy per week.
4. That in addition to the above-mentioned allowance for food, calculated on the 
number of shifts worked, 25 per cent, be added for boys not working, also that the 
customary gift of Christmas food be still continued 490
No worker could decide e.g., to travel to the mines in seated  
compartments rather than goods wagons, as these had already been 
paid for before the worker had even signed on. They did, however, 
have the option of travelling back from  the mines by whatever  
standard of carriage they preferred. As it happened, the standard of 
carriage which they did prefer was even lower than that transacted 
by the mines, but that was only because the mines were ignorant of 
this offer. Once having learnt that the goods-w agon-ra te  for workers 
was lower if they were packed in tw enty-five  to the wagon, the 
mines wasted no time in adapting to the workers’ lower standard and 
fixing it, and this already in 1897:
“The rate of transport of natives ...from Indwe to here [is] 25s. 3d. ...The boys on 
their return to Indwe have the option of engaging a truck; 25 and over can engage a 
truck, which works out at £1 a head. Now I argue that as a good many boys can go in 
trucks, and if boys are brought in trucks they should be carried on what I would 
consider a reasonable truck-load basis. On this basis boys would be brought from 
Indwe to here for about 16s.".491
4 8 9 See any Chamber of Mines Annual Report.
4 9 0 W CM  (1896), p i 61.
491 Charles Goldmann’s evidence, ICE (1897), p117.
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As accommodation and food always make up the largest portion of a 
w o rker’s expenditure, go ld -m in ing  capital a lready had a large 
measure of control over the worker’s capacity to acquire new wants. 
In 1902, the average cost of housing and feeding a black worker on a 
Witwatersrand gold mine was £12 5s. 6d. per annum.492 But such a 
worker was still free, nevertheless, to acquire new needs in the 
remaining areas of his life and to address those needs with money in 
the wider commercial arena. Although management knew what portion 
of that value was accounted for by food and accom m odation, 
transport to and from the mines, training and medical attention, 
there remained an item outside of m anagement’s ability to control.
The closed compound brought this unknown factor, too, within 
m anagem ent control. Access to prostitutes and alcohol now, also, 
came under capital’s control, although the latter only with a great 
deal of difficulty.493 The lack of security for personal property 
within the open dormitories itself served to restrain any developing 
need for additional use-values, e.g., shoes, mirrors, etc .494 and, 
indeed, compelled the keeping of even the most basic ‘historically 
determined’ use-values to a minimum. Thus did the closed compound 
as a system not only segregate black gold-mining labour from the 
general pool of labour, but also aim to keep the value of labour-power 
static against the value of labour-power in general. And in this it has 
succeeded.
Conclusion
In this final section we have been concerned to show that the 
particular economic history of early South African gold mining and 
gold mining labour, derives its character not so much from southern
4 9 2 TCM  (1902), Annexure Exh. 23.
4 9 3 See the controversy over the Liqour Law in ICE (1897), passim , and the chapter ‘Randlords 
and Rotgut’ in Van Onselen, C. (1982a).
4 9 4 W hile outside the compounds, “People become locked into the world economy as former 
luxury imports become necessities and that this was an important factor in generating migrant 
labour. It was not merely human nature, however, that encouraged the importation of goods like 
cloth and liquor...", Harris, P. (1982), p157.
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African conditions as from world conditions. Theoretical weakness  
often obscures an a priori moralism on the part of scholars, so much 
so that relevant facts are sometimes ignored, sometimes spuriously 
interpreted or even denied. This is not a uniquely South African 
problem, as may be illustrated when Del Mar, who has no theory, 
makes the correct empirical observation that:
“To-day the mines of Nertschinsk and others in Russia are worked by convicts and 
serfs; the mines of Mysore are worked by native Indians practically reduced to a 
condition of slavery; the mines of the Witwatersrand, in South Africa, so long as 
they were worked at all, were worked by 100,000 negros, involuntary labourers, 
contract-labourers, naked African labourers, bought from their chiefs at so much 
per head and thrust into the subterranean caverns of Johannesburg to win gold for 
distant shareholders in London and Paris".495
Although one of the main devices of his book is to consistently draw 
a distinction between freely-produced gold and gold produced by 
coerced labour, he is nevertheless too honest a scholar to ‘assist’ his 
project by characterising either the conditions or the form of labour 
of early South Africa’s black mine workers as slavery. In the case of 
Russia, he is talking of the forms of labour; in the case of India, he is 
referring to the workers’ condition (slavery has been abolished in the 
British Empire by 1831); while in the case of South Africa he knew 
that neither the form of labour nor the condition of the labourers 
could be described as slavery, despite their “nakedness”. This very 
“nakedness” placed them outside of the category of American and 
Australian miners. He solves this problem by, only semi-truthfully, 
referring to them as, “involuntary labourers... bought from their 
chiefs at so much per head”. For the rest, he does what so many 
scholars have done and continue to do: resort to emotive language and 
the dramatic phrase. This can never be a substitute for the mortar of 
theory.
It would appear from this section that the need to maintain a black 
gold-mining labour-force separate from the general industrial work­
force (regardless of colour) had a far more significant and direct role 
to play in the eventual creation of an A p a r th e id  state. Fruitful work 
might well be done in extending this thesis into the present.
4 9 5 Del Mar, A. (1969), p448.
250.
Conclusion
This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that the manner in 
which gold plays its economic role was transformed in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. A theory of gold derived from its
history prior to this transformation, such as M arx ’s, could, like
A ris to tle ’s theory of value, necessarily  only attain to partial 
completion. One of the objects of this thesis has been to contribute 
towards the completion of such a theory.
There are two deficiencies in Marx’s theory of gold. The first relates 
to the contradictory demands of commodity and money, and of money 
and capital on this material. The second relates to the v a lu e -  
relationships within the actual production process of gold, and the 
changes in those value-relationships. This dissertation has attempted
to address these deficiencies.
We have aimed to achieve this by re-examining the nineteenth century 
in detail, and described the relevant developments which have taken 
place. These fall into two broad categories: those relating to the
circulation of gold (gold as money); and those relating to its 
production (gold as use-value). In this dissertation, M arx’s treatment 
of the circuit of capital in gold production, as presented in Volume II 
of Capita l,  was examined in the light of these developments. It is our 
contention that M arx’s discussion of gold production is undeveloped. 
Similarly, he does not have an adequate picture of the nature of go ld-  
producing labour-pow er. In Volume I of C a p ita l ,  as well as in A 
Contribution to the Critique o f Po lit ica l E cono m y  and in the
Grundrisse, gold is examined as money, hence his characterisation of 
gold-producing labour as necessarily oppressive where gold embodies 
independent exchange value. The circuit of gold-producing capital in 
Volum e II, though, assum es gold as capita l.  But gold is not
empirically examined as capital, only as money. The character of
gold-producing labour is assumed to remain unchanged when, in fact, 
it requires re-examination. The theory is in need of refinements
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which Marx, being either unaware of these developments or not in a 
position to assimilate them before the end of his life, was unable to 
carry out himself. Hence Engels’ lengthy footnote in Volume II of 
Capital.
How Marx’s thoughts on these questions might have developed remains
unclear. His recently published notebook Bullion: das voUendete
G e ld s y s te m ,  is itself in a very u n vo llen d ete  state.496 The manuscript
Geldwesen, Kreditwesen, Krisen  remains unpublished. The original, 
housed in the Institute of Social History (now the M arx -E n g e ls  
Foundation) in Amsterdam, we have been unable to study for the 
illegibility of M arx ’s handwriting.497
But one lesson which emerges very strongly from this study is that 
the scholar has, on the one hand, to keep a clear distinction between 
gold as use-value, gold as money and gold as capital, while on the 
other, always seeing these distinctions in their mutual interrelation. 
This, e.g., is where Trewhela might have distinguished himself from 
Williams, had he not decided to leave out of account gold as tooth -  
filling, etc.
In this dissertation we have devoted a substantial am ount of 
attention to those scholars who have tried to show a direct  
relationship between the social role of gold, and the character of the 
labour which produces it. Although we have taken issue with both
Williams and Trewhela, they distinguish themselves from Innes in 
that they have been creative, whereas Innes, without demonstrating 
any knowledge of Marx's thought processes, offers Marx’s conclusions 
as axioms. Both Williams and Trewhela are correct in the sense that 
they see the social role of gold and the labour which produces it as 
intimately related. This is not appreciated in the literature generally. 
The narrative of this thesis consisted in tracing the course of this 
in tim acy.
4 9 6 MEGA, Vol. 8, IV/8, pp767-73.
4 9 7 Manuscript B -7 2  of the M arx-E ngels  NachlaB collection, Institute of Social History, 
Am sterdam .
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It is the social character of gold in relation to the social character of 
the labour which produces it, which is mediated in the particular 
situation by the concrete character of gold in relation to the concrete 
character of the labour which produces it. This is how we have tried 
to understand the complex relation between South African gold and 
South African gold-producing labour. In the light of this, early South 
African gold-mining history does not appear to be the aberration it is 
so often made out to be. Its character was consistent with a world 
pattern at the time. Late nineteenth century gold mining, in the South 
African context, took the form of South African gold mining.
This is by no means to suggest that South African conditions were  
free from evil and wrongdoing. Racism and paternalism there were. 
Brutal mine foremen and unscrupulous recruiters, too. Racist and 
corrupt border officials so often robbed Africans of their mine 
earnings that the mines were eventually moved to intervene, as they 
were when the white public of Johannesburg became alarmed at the 
number of dead bodies of black mine workers left on the streets to 
rot. Het Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek— such was 
its actual name— was the instrument for turning large numbers of 
mine workers into alcoholics on potato whiskey. W e have found 
sufficient evidence to sketch a most horrific picture of the general 
atmosphere of abuse.
Up to the advent of generalised w age-labour, the history of go ld -  
mining is a history written in blood. No particular individual or class 
is responsible for humanity having paid this grotesque price. It is the 
price paid by humanity for its own social development. Gold-mining  
only becomes working to death once gold becomes money. That 
particular transformation of its social character is only a signature 
of the transformation of the social character of humanity. The  
scholar’s humanity is not diminished by a refrain from expressing  
outrage at gold-mining as such. Neither does gold-m ining become  
more humane by the scholar inveighing against its horrific human 
cost. Human labour itself, of which gold is the material hand maiden, 
has to develop beyond the need for a value form.
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W e have deliberately avoided questions of ethics and morality. The 
reason for this is that we have seen the scientific credentials of too 
many works compromised by the writer’s moral outrage at some or 
other perceived abuse. The most obvious is the difference in wages  
between black and white mine workers on the Witwatersrand. To 
most writers this was discrimination— they should be paid the same. 
Closely related to this is the question of the actual level at which 
African mine workers were paid. Sentences in which actual figures 
are given, are sometimes punctuated with exclamation marks. Very 
few scholars have approached wages for what they are: the money 
equivalent of the labourer’s n e c e s s a ry  consumption. Sometimes this 
point is very tentatively touched on and then immediately backed 
away from. Gool even goes so far as to discuss differential value of 
labour-pow er in detail, but then dismisses his own dispassionate  
examination with, “This provides a marvellous rationale for low 
w a g e s ”.498 The same can be said of some of the international works. 
Del Mar, e.g., inveighs at length against the role of slavery and other 
forms of unfree labour in the history of gold-production, despite  
himself producing enough material to actually explain this. As for the 
slave trade, we were not interested in cataloguing its horrors, but in 
understanding it as the starting point for universalised wage-labour.  
To discuss wages, even extremely low wages, in a scientific manner 
does not imply approval of discrimination or u n d er-p ay in g . It 
indicates only an attempt to see an object for what it really is, 
rather than to have that attempt compromised by how one might feel 
about it.
Another area where morality, or p o lit ic a l  morality, interferes with 
scientific examination is in respect of the role and nature of capital. 
In left-w ing South African historiography, there is a tendency for 
capital to be automatically dismissed as inherently incapable of 
anything positive. Thus, for example, is the very important 1897  
Report of the Industrial Commission of Enquiry into the Gold-mining  
In d u s try  of the then South African Republic rejected out of hand by 
many writers as “industry propaganda”, especially  as the ZAR
4 9 8 Gool, S. (1983), p27.
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government did not have the expertise to oppose the claims of the 
engineers and managers of the Chamber of Mines.
S im ilarly , capita lists  are  only quoted w hen they incrim inate  
them selves, i.e., confirm their nastiness. Their scientific interests 
(subject to the needs of capital, of course) are simply not noticed. It 
is often the case that capital has a more acute perception of a 
question than have others, simply because it stands to loose money if 
it did not. It cannot be denied that the 1897 report was prepared by 
mining capital for mining capital, but does that necessarily render it 
devoid of all truth, not worthy of academic scrutiny? W e have found 
only one writer who has made a serious study of this critical 
document. Like this isolated scholar, we have not shied away from 
turning to capital when it was the source of useful material.
It has not been our object either to, “place the African working-class  
more in the centre of the stage”, or to expose the collusion between 
capital, the state and white workers against black workers. One  
scholar regards it as, “essential that we place the class struggle to 
the fore”, without establishing just how backward or forward that 
struggle actually w as.499 The object has been to study gold and the 
labour which produces it. That is a universal question of which South 
Africa is a particular expression. W e hope that we have managed to 
demonstrate, e.g., that the eventual closed compound system of the 
gold m ines, which is so often a u to m a tic a lly  ascrib ed  to 
m anagem ent’s need to contain unionisation (of course, it did have 
that effect), relates to a u n iv e rs a l  problem of the need to restrain 
the value of gold-producing labour-power below that represented by 
the price of gold. We hope that we have shown, further, that without a 
study of the particular form assumed by competition amongst go ld -  
producing capitals, it becomes very difficult to explain why South 
African gold-mining capital stopped short of outright monopoly and 
put in place, instead, the group system. This being despite the 
monopoly in diamond mining, and the “monopoly stage” of capitalism.
4 9 9 Williams, M. (1975), p7.
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This thesis has considered the relation between gold-producing  
capita l and South A fr ica ’s black g o ld -m in in g  w o rk - fo rc e ,  in 
preference to considering the white w ork-force  or the total work­
force, for a number of reasons: (i) the nature of gold as commodity-  
capital, as distinct from other commodities as com m odity-capital, 
and the nature of gold-producing capital as distinct from capital in 
general, em erges far more strongly w here gold-producing capital 
itself has the opportun ity  to s tru c tu re  the  c a p ita l - la b o u r  
relationship, rather than inheriting it from history, as with the white
workers; (ii) white workers and capital related to each other in the
“classical” manner, which means that this relationship has already 
been explained by, amongst others, Marx; (iii) scholarship has failed 
to appreciate that the relation between gold-producing capital and 
black labour describes another form  of capita l-labour relation, rather 
than merely a greater degree of antagonism  within the same form. 
This thesis aimed at providing a different basis for understanding
these relations.
To conceptualise the determination of early gold-m ining capital to 
reduce the pay of black goldminers in South Africa as a wages  
struggle is erroneous. The concern of capital was far more 
fundamental. In its own parlance, capital was concerned with the 
“cost of living” of its work-force. Ordinarily this cost of living, a 
definite portion of the value of labour-power, is a real, calculable
figure. Its computability involves a simple addition of all the 
w orker’s (and his family’s) expenses. This presupposes that the 
worker’s necessaries of live take the form of c o m m o d it ies .  By itself, 
however, this precondition is only adequate  for revealing to the 
worker the value of his labour-pow er. Capital, too, could formally 
know this simply by asking the worker what his weekly or monthly 
expenses are. But this is inconsistent with the c a p ita l- lab o u r  
relation, as W illiam s illustrates by his s trange com plaint that 
capital did not give the workers “a modicum of say” in determining 
the value of their labour-power (when, in fact, he means the level of 
their wages). Capital does not pay for labour, but for labour-power— it 
hires the worker’s capacity to labour for a definite period of time. It 
has, in fact, no real interest in the value of labour-power. The value 
of labo ur-pow er forces its way into cap ita l’s calculations as a
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necessary deduction from the total value. In this way does capital 
know the value of labour-power as the complement of its surplus- 
value. W age struggles are struggles over this known figure.
In early South Africa go ld -m in ing , only white workers found 
them selves in such a relation with capital. The value of white 
workers’ labour-power was known to both workers and capital down 
to the minutest detail. This is the basis of capital’s inability to
reduce white workers’ wages, rather than the fact that they were
skilled or had trade unions (although, of course, these did have a 
bearing). When capital did finally assault white workers’ wages, it 
was assaulting their l ive lih o o d .  To talk of workers’ resistance and 
unionisation is appropriate in this respect.
The same cannot be said for black workers. Not only was the bulk of
the workers’ necessaries of life not commodities, and hence not
expressible in value terms, but as such they circulated outside of the 
circuit of capital. That is to say, capital in its relation to black 
workers had no unified circuit. It was painfully obvious to capital 
that the workers were retaining part of the s u r p lu s - v a \u e  for 
themselves, something which “rightfully” belongs to capital.
Any talk of “organisation”, “resistance", “bargaining power”, “union 
rights”, etc., with reference to black goldminers in this early period 
is, therefore, inappropriate. They were not engaged in a cap ita l-  
labour relation since capital could not properly function as capital 
and labour could not become fully w age-labour. Having bought the 
w orker’s labour-pow er, capital was but its formal owner, not its 
effective owner, not its possessor. Similarly could labour-pow er not 
properly be a commodity, since capital was unable to express its 
exchange value for it.
There are two ways of solving this problem (from the point of view 
of capital). This could be done either by forcing the workers “into the 
cash nexus”, or by simply offering less in exchange for their labour- 
power. Why this was not so straightforward a matter and how it was 
pursued have been discussed in detail.
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In the case of gold-mining capital in particular, finding the definite 
figure which describes the value of labour-power (or, from the point 
of view of capital, the necessary deduction from value) assumes a 
particular urgency on account of the fixed price. Regardless of how 
large or small the magnitude of value objectified in the product, it 
will only ever be transformed into a predetermined va lue -to ta l of 
other commodities.
In theory this does mean that if gold could be produced at a lo w e r  
value than that represented by its fixed price, the gold-m ining  
industry would be drawing a rent from the rest of society. But 
producing gold at a h igher  value does not mean that, in turn, society 
draws a rent from gold-mining. Instead, the value of labour-power in 
gold-mining is reduced and kept low, so that in effect, society draw 
the rent from the go ld-m in ing  w o rk -fo rce  directly. G o ld -m in ing  
c ap ita l  escapes this rent.
In the particular situation of South Africa, it is the existence of two 
w ork-forces whose respective reproduction related to the circuit of 
capital in two very different ways— that circuit running under the 
particular va lue-constra int of the fixed gold price— that gives the 
political economy of South A frican  gold its historically peculiar 
character.
Restriction of the value of black goldminers’ labour-pow er by South 
African gold-producing capital on the one hand communalises the 
restrictions free go ld-d iggers  individually placed on the value of 
their own labour-power, and, on the other, transforms the working to 
death of pre-capitalist gold-mining into a value-relation.
W hat remains to be done is to account for the twentieth century 
history of gold in terms of the same set of concerns as was done for 
the period reviewed in this thesis. One and the sam e thing, the 
material gold, is at the same time two different commodities, i.e., 
two different contradictions. The history of gold in the twentieth 
century, the evidence seems to suggest, is the working out of the 
contradiction betw een  these two contradictions, i.e ., between  
commodity I (the first contradiction) and commodity II (the second
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contradiction). So commonplace has gold commodity II become, that 
when one today speaks of gold as a commodity, it is automatically 
understood as an investment opportunity, rather than as a “thing of 
utility” which has an exchange value. Gold as capital has entirely 
eclipsed gold as money, which, in turn, has eclipsed gold as use-value. 
The contradiction between capital and money, and the role of gold in 
world credit economy, need to be examined. This must be the next 
chapter in the development of a theory of gold.
About the social character of gold we may conclude that the same 
physical substance, gold, occurs simultaneously in a variety of social 
forms. In its physical consistency it is the one product in nature most 
adequate to the physical consistency of labour— as productive human 
activity. Gold, in whatever social form, remains gold; so does labour, 
whatever social form it may take, remain labour. Gold, in whatever 
concrete form it is fashioned, remains gold; labour, in whatever  
concrete form exercised, remains labour. Gold is the compass by 
which labour negotiates its way through its troublesome adolescence 
as value. The history of gold is, in the most literal sense then, the 
history of the making of man. Only upon his labour maturing as freely 
associated labour can that labour lay its golden lodestone down.
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